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Interim Editors’ Introduction
Issue 8.2 of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal will be the second and final issue 
edited and published by the Interim Editorial Board, consisting of Kjell Anderson, Amy Fagin, Melanie 
O’Brien, and Rafiki Ubaldo. We have been assisted by the guest editors of this issue, Kosal Path and Elena 
Lesley-Rozen. The goal of this issue was to reflect some of the different justice issues facing the Cambodians 
in the wake of the Cambodian genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge.
We have been very appreciative of the University of South Florida for hosting this new, online and open 
access version of GSP, and look forward to a long future working together.
The next issue of GSP will be directed by the newly appointed Editorial Board. The members of this 
board are listed below. The IAGS plans to continue to build on the strong tradition of GSP by connecting to 
new audiences and broadening the disciplinary scope of the journal.
The Interim Editorial Board welcomes the new Editorial Board, and wishes them the best of luck at the 
helm of GSP.
The call for papers for Issue 8.3, on Humanitarian Technologies and Genocide Prevention, is available on 
the GSP website at http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/Call_for_Papers.pdf, and the call for peer reviewers 
for the same issue is at http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/Call_for_Peer_Reviewers.pdf.
The new Editorial Board has also opened up a call for co-editors, specifically for the rubrics of book 
review, film review and Internet resources. This call is available at http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/call_
for_editors.pdf.
Scholars in the field and other readers of GSP are encouraged to open an account at http://scholarcommons.
usf.edu/gsp/ for news and information on new calls for papers, peer reviewing, and other GSP related activities.
Kjell Anderson, Amy Fagin, Melanie O’Brien, and Rafiki Ubaldo
Interim Editorial Board
New GSP Editorial Board
Editors-in-Chief
Christian Gudehus, PhD, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Gabriel Gatti, PhD, Centro de Estudios sobre la Identidad Colectiva, University of the Basque Country
James Waller, PhD, Cohen Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Keene State College
Associate Editors
Melanie O’Brien, PhD, ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University
Douglas Irvin-Erickson, PhD, Rutgers University
Production Editors
Julie Fielding, University of South Florida
Rebel Cummings-Sauls, University of South Florida
Rafiki Ubaldo, Media and Communication, IAGS
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The quest to address the legacy of mass violence is a politically complex endeavor that does not 
necessarily foreground the needs or desires of victims. Indeed, victim claims may contradict the motives of 
those in power or become overshadowed by the drive to establish international legal norms and regimes of 
justice. The international push for a tribunal to hold accountable those responsible for the deaths of some 
1.7 million Cambodians from 1975-79 did not begin until after the fall of the Soviet Union. Until that time, 
Cold War politics shielded the former Khmer Rouge from prosecution; indeed a reconfigured Khmer Rouge 
coalition claimed Cambodia’s place at the United Nations even after the Vietnamese drove the brutal regime 
from power in 1979. Co-Prime Ministers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen wrote to the UN in 1997 
requesting the creation of a tribunal — some claim to intimidate remaining Khmers Rouge into defecting to 
the current government — but changed his position soon afterward. Nonetheless, international pressure for 
a court continued and, after a series of lengthy negotiations, the Cambodian government and United Nations 
reached an agreement in 2003 to establish the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), 
more commonly known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT). 
Hun Sen agreed to the tribunal against a backdrop of mounting international criticism of his regime’s 
widespread human rights abuses and corruption.1 Dunncan McCargo refers to the ECCC as “the play-within-
a-play” that characterized the political drama between Hun Sen and the international community.2 From the 
start, Hun Sen sought to limit the scope of prosecutions to create a narrative of the Khmer Rouge regime 
that assigned culpability to a small group of elite actors. Members of the international community pushed 
for more widespread prosecutions and sought both retributive justice and truth recovery. For transnational 
human rights organizations and a larger international community, the KRT processes are anticipated to 
produce spillover effects that would transform the judicial system, and perhaps usher in a gradual regime 
change in this impoverished country.3 Truth recovery, they also hope, would facilitate a process of national 
“reconciliation,” which is mentioned in the June 2003 agreement between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia.4 As the KRT draws to a close, its impact on victims, politics and international 
norms has only begun to be debated. Thirty-five years since the crimes took place and with over $200 million 
spent on two trials to date, how has this court affected justice for genocidal violence, national reconciliation, 
historical truth and the culture of impunity in Cambodia?
This special issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal addresses such questions 
through new analysis and reflection. The following essays provide an even-handed analysis of the KRT’s 
contributions and limitations. The politics surrounding the court’s establishment, political interference from 
the Cambodian government and a lack of resources have all constrained the tribunal’s accomplishments, 
particularly in meeting the multitudinous needs of victims.
Alexander Hinton’s article provides insight into the significance of the KRT to victims of S-21 and how 
the “deeply personal” struggle of healing and truth seeking does not necessarily align with the priorities of 
the transitional justice community. Drawing on his unique access to late S-21 survivor Vann Nath during the 
Duch trial, Hinton emphasizes the importance of the painter’s Buddhist beliefs, arts (to educate the public 
through the painting of atrocities committed at S-21), his confrontation with a former S-21 guard, and his 
testimony against Duch.5 Vann Nath’s unique personal journey over time led him to internalize the Buddhist 
precept of karma, a cosmic justice.6
Hinton argues that the tribunal’s limited temporal jurisdiction puts forth “a ‘truth’ bleached of historical 
processes and an understanding of the factors that enable the Khmer Rouge rise to power.”7 Indeed, transitional 
justice mechanisms such as the KRT that offer sweeping promises of truth, justice, personal healing and 
national reconciliation, are bound to fail. Yet supporters push forward with such efforts as part of a “transitional 
justice imaginary.”8 In essence, practitioners and supporters of internationalized courts such as the KRT are 
incentivized to represent the court as a success both to satisfy donors and to secure their membership in the 
transitional justice community.9 In its discursive representation, this transitional justice community places 
greater emphasis on constructing a linear narrative of transition from a barbaric society to a modern liberal 
democracy. Supporters of the KRT can thus claim agency in shaping this normative discourse of human rights 
Introduction
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and democracy, forging a sense of “shared belonging” to a larger transitional justice community.10 Throughout 
the KRT proceedings, complex histories of the Cambodian genocide were truncated by the court’s temporal 
jurisdiction and legal design to produce a “truth” that suits the transitional justice discourse. However, this 
kind of “truth,” as Hinton argues, “directs attention away from social praxis and the ways in which the meaning 
and understanding of such transitional justice processes are negotiated on the ground.”11
Helen Jarvis, who served as Chief of the Victims Support Section of the ECCC (widely known as Victims’ 
Unit) from June 2009 to June 2010,12 provides insight into the struggle of this small, under-resourced and under-
staffed office to meet the enormous demand for victim participation in the KRT proceedings. According to 
Jarvis, the ECCC was “completely unprepared” for direct participation by Civil Parties13, a limited form of victim 
participation and symbolic reparations that owes its existence to a 2006 negotiated compromise between judges 
from the civil and common law systems.14 The office, Jarvis suggests, was unprepared for its success, as its outreach 
campaign received active support from at least five local civil society organizations, including the Documentation 
Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam).15 As Civil Parties increased from 90 victims (22 went on to testify in court) in 
Case 001 to 3,850 in Case 002, the financial support from the ECCC could not keep pace, leaving the Civil Party 
legal representation to the mercy of donors’ goodwill.16 For the sake of efficiency, the Plenary Session of judicial 
officers revised the court’s Internal Rules in February 2010, consolidating Civil Party representation in Case 002, 
a much more complex undertaking than Case 001.17 In Jarvis’ view, this new approach provided a “more coherent 
framework for Civil Party legal representation” because “individual Civil Parties still retained their own co-lawyers, 
and “the Lead Co-Lawyers gave opportunities to these co-lawyers to speak in court.”18
Referencing The Long-Awaited Day, a video made for the Victims’ Unit, Jarvis contends that victims who 
participate in the KRT are motivated by a search for justice, acknowledgement of Khmer Rouge atrocities and 
dissemination of historical truth for younger generations.19 The participation of some 4,000 Civil Parties may 
be considered one of the ECCC’s main contributions to the development of transitional justice. Yet, as Jarvis 
concludes, had the issue of victim participation been given “sufficient attention and weight at the time of the 
establishment of the court,” a great deal of anxiety, disappointment, and suspicion could have been avoided.20
Wendy Lambourne makes a convincing case that despite its flaws, the ECCC does have a meaningful role 
to play, especially when coupled with NGO-led processes. Drawing on data gathered from interviews in 2009, 
she weighs the ECCC’s positive impact, particularly the “symbolic and psychological benefits of survivors of 
having their suffering officially acknowledge at last”21 with its severe limitations in transforming domestic 
legal capacity and the local rule of law. Echoing Jarvis, Lambourne emphasizes the importance of “official 
acknowledgement” by the tribunal of Khmer Rouge crimes and of victims’ suffering. However, she underscores 
the fact that the court is by design ill-equipped for “truth recovery” and, perhaps worse, limits opportunities 
for former Khmer Rouge leaders’ acknowledgement of wrongdoings, which might provide some closure to 
victims.22 Notably, she argues for “a more pragmatic approach to international justice that closely responds 
to the perceptions and expressed needs of locally affected communities.”23 Lambourne goes on to question 
both the rationale and benefit of pursuing cases beyond Case 002, as many human rights organizations desire. 
Relying on her interviews with survivors in January-February 2009, and surveys conducted by DC-Cam 
around the same time, she doubts that the majority of Cambodians would welcome an expansion of the cases 
under investigation.24
Legal scholar Randle DeFalco makes a strong case that the five suspects under investigation in Cases 003 
and 004 qualify as “most responsible” for crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge. These include Meas Muth 
(Army General), Sou Met (Army General), Ta An (Deputy Secretary of the Central Zone), Im Chaem (District 
Chief), and Ta Tith (Deputy Secretary of the Northwest Zone). DeFalco uses the examples of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal 
Court to demonstrate a relatively consistent set of criteria that qualify those “most responsible” according to 
the suspect’s seniority and gravity and scale of offenses committed.25 DeFalco suggests that political motives 
offer a powerful potential explanation for Cambodian resistance to Cases 003 and 004; in addition, financial 
concerns may be sapping the interest of foreign donors.26
Donald Beachler argues that the significant limitations of the KRT are hardly surprising when one closely 
examines the political underpinnings of the court.27 For Beachler, the confluence of Realpolitik considerations and 
vested national interests dictates against a more complete process of justice and truth recovery. Many Western 
governments, including the United States, lack the political will to push for trials beyond Case 002. In fact, Beachler 
suggests that such governments have used Hun Sen’s political interference in the court’s judicial independence as an 
excuse for their “non-committal” stance on the issue of whether Cases 003/004 should be pursued.28
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Two major world powers – namely China and the United States – are far more interested in persuading 
the Hun Sen government to support their strategic interests than they are in pushing for additional cases at the 
KRT. China needs Cambodia’s support in its dispute with Vietnam and the Philippines over the South China 
Sea; meanwhile, the core interests of the United States and its Asian ally Japan have shifted in recent years 
from a focus on human rights and democracy to anti-terrorism, anti-drug trafficking, and countering China’s 
influence.29 The sobering lesson, as Beachler concludes, is that “politicians on national and international stages 
acted largely in their own self and national interests with regard to the ECCC. […]. The Cambodian genocide 
trials are hardly the first time that the imperatives of Realpolitik triumphed over concerns for truth and justice 
in matters of genocide and other mass killings.”30
Most contributors to this volume conclude that the KRT can reveal only partial truths relating to the 
Cambodian genocide and that its legal proceedings are unlikely to improve the rule of law or culture of 
impunity in Cambodia. Nonetheless, the court may provide symbolic and psychological benefits to victims as 
they seek closure, an evolving and deeply personal process. We hope these pieces will help provide insight into 
the impact of the KRT thus far, even though we can only begin to assess its long-term legacy.
Kosal Path, Elena Lesley-Rozen
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“The historical truth will never be found in this courtroom or any courtroom for that matter because courts 
are not designed for the historical truth.”
Michael Karnavas, International Co-Defense Lawyer for Ieng Sary2
“Is this court trying to bury history? And why?”
Michiel Pestman, International Co-Defense Lawyer for Nuon Chea3
“I believe there will be justice. A person harvests what he has sown. According to the Buddhist religion, good 
actions produce good results, bad actions produce bad results.”
Vann Nath, survivor of S-21 prison4
Abstract: This essay explores the interrelationship of justice and time at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia [ECCC hyperlink: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en] (ECCC, or “Khmer Rouge Tribunal”). In doing so, it follows the trial 
participation of the late Vann Nath, a survivor of S-21, a torture and detention center operated by the Khmer Rouge. From 
April 15, 1975 to January 6, 1979, this Maoist-inspired group of revolutionary implemented policies resulting in the death of 
up to two million of Cambodia’s eight million inhabitants, almost a quarter of the population. This essay argue that, even as 
they seek to help post-conflict societies like Cambodia “move forward through justice” (as the ECCC slogan goes), transitional 
justice mechanisms like the ECCC are premised on a set of temporal assumptions that are part of a larger transitional justice 
imaginary. Scholars and practitioners need to attend to such assumptions as well as the sorts of “vernacular time,” or local 
conceptions of temporality that also mediate the understanding and responses of people like Vann Nath.
Keywords: genocide, transitional justice, tribunals, violence, Cambodia, Khmer Rouge, reconciliation, justice, Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Khmer Rouge Tribunal
I. Vann Nath at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Does justice for mass murder have meaning 32 years after the fact? This question was a hot topic of 
discussion in Cambodia in June 2011, when I attended the initial hearings that launched the trial of the 
four surviving, most senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge, which finally got underway at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). At this United Nations (UN)-backed international hybrid 
court, more commonly known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT), the scales of justice appeared to be set 
before an hourglass, one that was quickly running out of sand.
After more than twenty-five years of delay, it took roughly three years after the June 2006 launch of the 
court for the first trial to begin. Only in February 2012 was the verdict finalized after the Supreme Court 
issued its decision on appeals, sentencing the accused, Duch, the former commandant of the regime’s central 
prison and interrogation center (S-21), to life imprisonment. And that was supposed to be the quick case, 
more or less a “slam dunk” of justice since the accused admitted his guilt and cooperated throughout the trial. 
Meanwhile, the second case, involving the four most senior, surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge -- a 
group of Maoist-inspired revolutionaries who enacted policies leading to the deaths of almost two million of 
the country’s eight million inhabitants from April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979 -- had only more recently gotten 
underway, now more than thirty years after they were overthrown by a Vietnamese-backed army.
On June 27, 2011, the first morning of the initial hearing, I sat with 66 year-old artist Vann Nath, one 
of a handful of survivors of S-21, the Khmer Rouge security center where over 12,000 inmates perished, 
many after being interrogated and tortured. We were positioned just yards away from the defendants: Brother 
Justice and Time at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal:
In Memory of Vann Nath, Painter and S-21 Survivor
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Number Two, Nuon Chea (age 85); Pol Pot’s brother-in-law and Foreign Affairs Minister, Ieng Sary (age 86); 
Ieng Sary’s wife and Minister of Social Affairs, Ieng Thirith (age 79); and Head of State, Khieu Samphan (age 
80). There was also an unspoken absence, as their leader, Pol Pot (“Brother Number One”), and other high-
ranking officials such as General Ta Mok and Minister of Defense, Son Sen, have passed away or been killed.
Too much time had passed. And, by the look of things on that morning, it appeared questionable that the 
octogenarian defendants would all be able to participate fully or even live long enough to see the conclusion 
of the trial, which could last for several years.
As we gazed at the enfeebled defendants, who suffer from various ailments and at times needed help to 
stand, it was hard to imagine them overseeing one of the most radical experiments of social engineering in 
human history. Upon taking power after a brutal civil war that had led to hundreds of thousands of deaths, 
devastated the economy, and resulted in massive population displacements, the Khmer Rouge set out to 
build a new revolutionary society, one that would be purified of, as they put it, the “corrupting” influence of 
capitalism, feudalism, and neo-imperialism.
Money, markets, and traditional community life were replaced by cooperatives where people worked day 
and night in a constant state of fear and terror. Freedom of speech, movement, and assembly were severely 
curtailed. Buddhism was banned. Family members were forced to live and work apart for long hours and often 
on starvation rations. And then there were the purges and mass executions. In just 3 years, 8 months, and 20 
days, the Khmer Rouge enacted policies leading to the deaths of almost a quarter of the population. 
***
Roughly two years earlier during Duch’s trial, Vann Nath had told the story of how he became swept up 
in the violence. It was a story that he had told before, to me and others in interviews and in a memoir, but, as 
he told the court that day, he was happy to do so because he wanted his testimony both to serve as a “mirror” 
upon which the younger generations could reflect and as a way to attain “justice for [the dead],” a justice that 
would be “seen by everybody.”5 On the first day of Duch’s trial, Vann Nath had told journalists, “I couldn’t 
sleep last night. I was dreaming about my time at S-21.”6
Vann Nath told the story of how he and his family and the rest of the population of Battambang City 
had been relocated to the countryside, where they, like Cambodians throughout the country, were forced to 
perform agricultural labor for long hours on increasingly meager rations. In the Khmer Rouge imagination, 
the creation of a mass agrarian work force would catalyze a “super great leap forward,” one that would surpass 
China and Vietnam. The plan failed miserably and the population suffered the consequences both through 
diminished rations and from purges the Khmer Rouge leadership launched to track down the “traitors” who 
were subverting the revolution -- for it was inconceivable that the “all-knowing” Party Center had a deficient 
party line. 
On December 30, 1977, Vann Nath was swept up in the purges, which were well underway, with 
executions taking place on the cooperative, district, provincial, and national levels. Upon his arrest, Vann 
Nath was taken to a pagoda that had been converted into a detention center, where he was accused of being a 
traitor and tortured by electric shock.
Eventually Vann Nath was trucked to S-21, located in Phnom Penh. He said that after arriving at S-21, 
he lost all hope upon seeing how the guards “degraded us. It’s indescribable, the way they treated us, the 
prisoners. Sometimes...while we were asleep they suddenly woke us up and if we could not sit up on time then 
they used their rubber [tire] thongs to kick our heads.”7
Vann Nath was shackled in a communal cell, where the prisoners subsisted on a few spoonfuls of rice 
gruel at each meal. They rapidly began to weaken, which made them more susceptible to rashes and ailments. 
Due to infrequent bathing, they began to smell. Over time, they barely looked human. The starving prisoners 
would eat grasshoppers or other insects if they could catch them, a difficult task since they were closely watched 
and would be beaten if they moved about or spoke to others. The prisoners “didn’t care” if a companion 
died because “we were like animals.” Vann Nath thought only of thirst and hunger, a deprivation that was 
so extreme that he recalled thinking “that even eating . . . human flesh would be a good meal.”8 Meanwhile, 
the guards kicked and beat them without hesitation. Many inmates were interrogated and tortured; almost 
everyone was executed soon after arrival.
Vann Nath survived because he could paint. In 1980, he was shown an execution list that included his 
name, crossed out in red ink with the annotation “keep for use.”9 While conditions were much better in 
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***
As Vann Nath and I sat together at the initial hearing before the proceedings began, I asked him why he 
had come to the court. “For justice,” he told me. “And to see their faces.” When Nuon Chea, wearing a black 
and white ski cap and sunglasses, complained that he was “not happy” with the proceedings, Vann Nath just 
shook his head, perhaps recalling how he was imprisoned by the Khmer Rouge without rights, counsel, or 
due process.
As Vann Nath departed after the first morning session, he was surrounded by a large flock of journalists, 
eager to hear the impressions from this de facto spokesperson for Khmer Rouge victims.
This was the last court session Vann Nath attended. He died, after suffering from kidney disease for many 
years, on September 5, 2011. 
***
Vann Nath’s death brought the issue of justice and time into stark relief. An obituary by civil society 
leader Youk Chhang stated that Vann Nath’s passing illustrated “the high cost that the simple passage of time 
Vann Nath, age 32, at S-21 in 1978. Courtesy of the 
Documentation Center of Cambodia.
[http://www.dccam.org]
the small artisan workshop where he began to 
work, Vann Nath frequently heard the screams of 
prisoners being tortured (one “got used to it”) and 
caught glimpses of the suffering and violence that 
took place at S-21, such as prisoners shackled in 
cells and a man strung to a pole like an animal.
After the fall of the Khmer Rouge, Vann 
Nath returned to work at S-21, where a genocide 
museum was being built. His contribution was to 
paint pictures about what he had seen or heard or 
what other former prisoners related to him. During 
his testimony, his paintings were displayed, which 
included scenes depicting a prisoner being tortured 
by having his fingernails pulled out; waterboarding; 
and a baby being taken from a mother. These 
paintings are among the most powerful and iconic 
images at the museum that has been constructed 
at S-21. 
S-21 Prisoner in Cell (Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide 
Crimes), painting by Vann Nath. Photograph by author.
Vann Nath speaking to journalist at the 
ECCC in 2011. Photo courtesy of the 
Documentation Center of Cambodia.
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can inflect on the pursuit of justice. Sadly, this tragedy repeats itself silently throughout Cambodia, as each 
day victims of the Khmer Rouge pass away without having been provided any measure of justice.”10 This 
sentiment was echoed by others, including civil party lawyers, donors, monitoring groups, and survivors, who 
underscored the importance of moving the proceedings forward without further delay.11
After the weeklong initial hearings in June 2011, the case had stalled once again due to a host of 
complications ranging from a sudden surge in civil party applications to numerous appeals by the four teams 
of defense lawyers. Meanwhile, it became increasingly doubtful that the aging leaders would all be able to 
participate fully or even live long enough to see the trial, which could last for several years, conclude. 
On October 24, 2011, Ieng Sary’s lawyers notified the court that Ieng Sary, who was having trouble 
focusing and having to relieve himself frequently, would not testify during the proceedings.12 He would die 
in 2013 before the trial ended. On November 17, 2011, the Trial Chamber found that Ieng Thirith suffers 
from progressive dementia and was not fit to stand trial. They ordered her release, a decision that once again 
highlighted the urgency of moving forward with the trial even if it was reversed on appeal on December 13, 
2011.13 Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan also complain of ailments, with the latter having suffered a stroke in 
2007.
In response to such concerns, the Trial Chamber decided to split the complicated case into parts, the first 
of which focuses on population movements and crimes against humanity. This was done “in the interests of 
justice” so that a shorter initial verdict could be rendered, one that would thereby safeguard “the fundamental 
interest of victims in achieving meaningful and timely justice, and the right of all Accused in Case 002 to an 
expeditious trial.”14 To this end, the evidentiary proceedings began on November 21, 2011. Closing arguments 
would finally be held in October 2013 with a judgment expected in 2014.
II. Juridical Time 
Time. It is a central motif at the ECCC. If, outside of the court, the KRT has been criticized for its glacial 
pace, the notion of time also figures prominently in the proceedings themselves. Here, time is directly bound 
up with fair trial rights, as the importance of upholding the due process rights of the defendants sometimes 
come into tension with the concerns of the civil parties. In this tribunal, civil parties have procedural rights 
almost on par with those of the prosecution and defense, including the right to see the accused tried in a 
timely fashion. Even so, civil party lawyers frequently complain that their clients need additional time to speak 
in court or that they need more time to cross-examine witnesses. Meanwhile, in the first trial, a monitoring 
group timed each session down the minute, noting how long the court spent in session on given matters. Here 
the concern is trial management, as an efficient court presumably operates in a timely manner.
Time, however, constitutes a much bigger backdrop at the ECCC and is directly linked to the ways in 
which truth and knowledge are produced in the court. One of the most obvious illustrations of this point 
is temporal jurisdiction. The ECCC is authorized to examine mass human rights violations that took place 
while the Khmer Rouge were in power – not before and not after. As opposed to seeking a deeply historicized 
understanding of the genocide, the court provides a temporally limited one.
This was evident in the first case, the trial of Duch, who ran S-21 while Vann Nath was imprisoned 
there. The judges did explore Duch’s work at M-13, a detention center Duch operated during the civil war and 
where he developed some of the torture techniques he would later employ at S-21. There was brief mention 
of the complex histories that enabled the Khmer Rouge to rise to power, including the Vietnam War and the 
U.S. carpet-bombing of Cambodia, but this information was deemed relevant only insofar as it bore upon 
establishing the guilt or innocence of the accused. Indeed, the trial verdict devotes a mere two pages to the 
discussion of the historical background of the genocide.
Nuon Chea’s defense team focused on this issue as part of a larger strategy of challenging the integrity of 
the court. On the first morning of the initial hearing, Nuon Chea’s international co-defense lawyer, Michiel 
Pestman, rose to explain why Nuon Chea was “not happy with this hearing,” arguing that “the proceedings 
should be terminated” due to investigative failures, political interference, lack of transparency, judicial 
incompetence, and temporal bias.15
In rapid order, Pestman picked up on a series of controversies at the court, including accusations the 
Cambodian judges were controlled by the government, the failure of the Office of Co-Investigating Judges to 
properly investigate Cases 003 and 004, and the subsequent resignation of the international co-investigating 
judge, and the unwillingness of current Cambodian government officials who were themselves former Khmer 
Rouge to be interviewed.
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“A trial is like building a house,” Pestman explained. “It needs solid foundations, solid judicial investigation. 
Without a proper foundation, the trial will sooner or later collapse.”16 To avoid creating a “show trial” like 
the 1979 People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (PRT) that was “completely orchestrated and controlled by the 
Vietnamese,” Pestman continued, the court needed to “start showing its teeth […] It is time for transparency, 
not for sealed envelopes.”17
Time was a central backdrop of Pestman’s comments. “Why,” he asked, “were the terrible American 
bombings of Cambodia ... and their lasting impact ... on the people in this country [not investigated]? And 
why not the dubious role played by Vietnam, the Vietnamese in this country, in Cambodia, before, during and 
after the Khmer Rouge years. Is this Court trying to bury history? And why?”18 Cambodians deserved “a fair 
trial, a proper trial aimed at establishing the truth and not simply at rubber stamping history books written 
in Vietnam or in America.”19
Pestman’s remarks played upon a long-standing debate about what the function of a trial should be. 
On the one hand a large group of people, ranging from lawyers to diplomats, have argued that such legal 
proceedings have an important expressive component, a claim echoed in proclamations that such transitional 
justice mechanisms bring a host of positive results, ranging from healing to reconciliation to revealing “the 
truth.”20 The Duch trial, for example, did reveal new things about the operation of S-21 but, by focusing on the 
years of Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia, the case ultimately produced a “truth” bleached of historical process 
and an understanding of the factors that enabled the Khmer Rouge to rise to power.
This was precisely the point Pestman sought to make as part of his larger strategy of calling into question 
the legitimacy of the court. For if one key objective of a tribunal is to reveal the truth that has been hidden by 
the politics of memory, then why not explore the structural and historical roots of the genocide and the ways 
in which it is linked to geopolitics? Indeed, the 1999 “Group of Experts” directly invoked this truth-seeking 
function of the court, expressing the hope that “the United Nations and international community can assist 
the Cambodian people in establishing the truth about this period and bringing those responsible to justice. 
Only in this way can this tragedy be brought to a full and final conclusion.”21 The reason for this historical 
elision, Pestman directly implied, was politics.
Due to the Cold War and Cambodia’s attempt to find peace in the late 1990s, a trial only became a reality 
almost thirty years after the genocide had ended.22 The agreement to form the ECCC, which took years to 
broker, included a limited temporal jurisdiction (“17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979”) that would satisfy the 
United States and China, superpowers implicated in the origins, dynamics, and aftermaths of the conflict, 
and a personal jurisdiction (“senior leaders” and those “most responsible”) acceptable to Cambodian officials 
who wanted to avoid an expanding series of investigations that could imperil peace or even implicate current 
leaders, many of whom are former Khmer Rouge. 
Besides eliding sociohistorical dynamics linked to the rise of the Khmer Rouge, like the Vietnam War 
and the U.S. bombing of the Cambodian countryside, this temporal jurisdiction erases other key events, such 
as the fact that, after being deposed, the Khmer Rouge were rearmed by the U.S., China, and other powers 
due to geopolitics. Indeed, the Khmer Rouge were even given Cambodia’s seat at the UN. It was only after the 
1993 UN elections in Cambodia that many foreign government officials began to speak of the mass violence 
committed by the Khmer Rouge – as opposed to using euphemisms (for example, “the unfortunate events of 
the past”) as they had often done during the Cold War. Such events are too often omitted in juridical time, 
which prefers discrete intervals (the time and place of criminality), efficiency and parsimony (in terms of 
juridical process), and progress (toward a verdict with its attendant qualities, closure and evidentiary truth).
***
Counterposed to those who argue for the expressive importance of tribunals are those who foreground 
legalism. This position was directly laid out in Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, which argues that a 
court is first and foremost about the law. If a trial reveals something about the past, then that is fine. But a trial 
is ultimately about legal justice. 
At the initial hearing, this position was staked out by Ieng Sary’s defense team. Responding to civil 
party lawyer Moch Sovannary, who had argued on the first day that the “victims need to understand the 
truth, the truth that they have been long waiting for, so that they can really move on with life,”23 Ieng Sary’s 
international co-lawyer, Michael Karnavas, stated simply that “the historical truth will never be found in this 
courtroom or any courtroom for that matter because courts are not designed for the historical truth.” Because 
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of the temporal jurisdiction of the court, Karvanas noted, “the whole picture, the whole truth will never be 
revealed.”24
Instead, Karnavas would argue repeatedly, the court needed to focus on the law. During arguments, 
Karnavas noted that he was “a fundamental believer in the power of the law. And the law has to be applied 
whether we like it or not. It is not a technicality. It is not something that we can just ignore when it’s convenient 
or when difficult decisions need to be made.”25 Later, during the press conference that followed the initial 
hearing, Karnavas explained that his team had made numerous submissions and legal challenges in the hope 
that the trials would constitute a “civics lesson” on judicial procedure, one that, after the case had ended, 
would demonstrate how the Cambodian people should expect a court to work and thereby “contribute to the 
betterment of Cambodia’s future court system.”26
During the initial hearings, the Ieng Sary defense team’s challenges related directly to the issue of time 
and justice. First, Karnavas and his Cambodian co-counsel, Ang Udom, argued that Ieng Sary could not be 
tried since the Peoples Revolutionary Tribunal had already convicted him in 1979. To do so would violate the 
international legal principle of double-jeopardy (ne bis in idem).
Second, Karnavas and Ang Udom argued that, because Ieng Sary had been granted an amnesty and 
pardon in 1996, one that was critical in leading to the demise of the Khmer Rouge, who were still waging 
war in the Cambodian countryside, he was immune from prosecution. And, finally, Ieng Sary’s defense 
lawyers argued that the statute of limitations had run out on their client’s crimes and that to ex post facto apply 
international human rights law to the situation in 1979 would violate his fair trial rights.
These issues raised fundamental questions about juridical time, ones with which courts in other countries 
have grappled. Are some crimes so heinous that they transcend temporal limits? Relatedly, is it possible to try 
someone for crimes that are viewed as universal even if they were not formally codified at the time? And can 
an amnesty given to promote peace be nullified?
Running in the background of these questions were other issues about Cambodian history itself. Why wasn’t 
an international tribunal held immediately after the Khmer Rouge were deposed? The answer, of course, was 
largely tied to Cold War politics. Why did the Khmer Rouge remain a viable fighting force until the late 1990s? 
This was partly due to geopolitical machinations that led the U.S., China, and others to support the Khmer Rouge 
for many years after they had fallen from power. And why was the Cambodian judiciary so incapacitated until 
the 1990s? Geopolitics, social instability, and international sanctions were among the reasons.
***
If Karnavas stressed legal process, fair trial rights, and the technicalities of law, civil party lawyers did not 
just support the prosecution’s claims that the arguments of the defense teams were legally untenable, instead 
asserting that their clients also had fair trial rights, including the right to justice, truth, and reparation.27 For 
victims of mass human rights violations, international civil party co-lawyer Silke Studinsky argued on the 
second day of the initial hearing, effective remedy meant “fair, effective and prompt access to justice” as well 
as “prosecution and punishment.”28 The victims had a right to truth, including “obtaining adequate answers 
to the important questions – why crimes happened and why they happened to them and their families.”29 A 
pardon or amnesty clearly denied the victims such access to the truth and was “an affront to the pain, suffering 
and damages done” to the victims.30
The day before, Studinsky’s international civil party lawyer colleague, Martine Jacquin, had framed these 
issues more broadly, asking “Can justice heal or manage the suffering – or mitigate the suffering of victims?” 
Answering her rhetorical question, Jacquin stated, “Justice can only restore whatever harm is reparable and 
whatever injury for which the victims can claim compensation. But justice cannot restore that which is beyond 
reparations, the physical and psychological wounds and scars that [are] borne by the victims for an entire life-
time.”31 “But,” she continued, “at the very least this trial can ascertain the truth, acknowledge facts, provide a 
sense of tranquility for victims and bring closure to their process of grieving.”
III. Time, Justice, and Healing
Can justice bring such closure to people like Vann Nath after so much time has passed? There is little 
doubt that the path to something like “closure” or “reconciliation” is a deeply personal one, inflected by one’s 
past suffering, subsequent experiences, worldview, and sense of the future. It is not a certain course and has 
many pathways.
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One of the difficulties about transitional justice initiatives like the KRT is that they promise too much. 
Promises abound that the truth will be revealed as victims supposedly attain a sense of peace, justice, 
reconciliation, healing, and closure. Such sweeping proclamations are bound to fail. Yet they appear again and 
again in trials and truth commissions and thereby set up the mechanisms for failure.
There are many reasons that transitional justice practitioners and personnel make such promises. For 
example, they play well to the donors who enable the mechanisms. But they are also the stuff of what I have 
called a “transitional justice imaginary,”32 or a set of interrelated discourses, practices, and institutional 
forms that help generate a sense of shared belonging among a group of people – in this case, members of the 
transitional justice community or larger international community.
This imaginary, while not monolithic, can nevertheless be found in a variety of transitional justice contexts. 
It has at least four key dimensions. The transitional justice imaginary is: normative (linked to certain truth 
claims and moral assumptions); performative (an imagined community is constituted through enactment); 
and productive (it produces certain subject positions). It is also characterized by a temporality premised on 
linear intervals (a pre and a post-state), an orientation (war and peace), and a teleology (a straightforward 
movement between these two intervals or states). In particular, this “transitional justice time”33 implicitly 
parses societies into a pre-state of conflict and a post-state of liberal democracy, along with a related set 
of binaries (violent/peaceful, chaotic/ordererly, barbarism/civilization, primitive/sophisticated, irrational/
rational, traumatic/healthy, and so forth). To effect this transition, history is shrunk and erased, filtering out 
the grey zones that disrupt this teleological narrative of past and future.
The temporal jurisdiction of the KRT highlights this point, as complicated pasts are backgrounded even 
as truth claims are made. This temporal foreshortening is paradoxical, for, according to its own logic, truth is 
required for closure yet the temporal modality of transitional justice is one of shrinkage and thus a truncated 
history. In the end, such insights ask us to critically reflect upon the presuppositions of transitional justice and 
ask what sorts of truths are produced and for what reasons. From the vantage of this “critical transitional justice 
studies” perspective,34 one can see how time is manipulated to assert an imaginary that casts the post-conflict 
society into a subordinate position even as it asserts a teleology of movement toward a liberal democratic end. 
One of the key dangers of this transitional justice imaginary is that it directs attention away from social 
practice and the ways in which the meaning and understanding of such transitional justice processes are 
negotiated on the ground. As opposed to attaining some sort of unilineal sense of closure or healing from the 
tribunal, people like Vann Nath grapple with the past in different ways through their life-course.
In his 1998 memoir, A Cambodian Prison Portrait: One Year in the Khmer Rouge’s S-21, Vann Nath recalls 
meeting Him Huy, one of his former captors at S-21, in 1996. He experienced a range of emotions, including 
anger, before coming to pity Huy. During the Khmer Rouge period, this man was like “a savage bull, a lion. 
None of the prisoners, including myself, had dared to look him in the face then. Now, he was in a deadlock, 
with no more fangs or horns. Seeing him in this situation, somehow I felt pity for him.”35
When Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, died two years later, Vann Nath was once again “flooded 
with a jumble of confused thoughts and emotions.”36 On the one hand, he felt relieved because “the bloodiest 
master criminal had disappeared forever from this world.” On the other hand, he felt sorrow that “I would 
never fulfill my long-held desire to see Pol Pot standing in the dock, facing a court to answer for his crimes.”37 
In the end, however, Vann Nath viewed the death of Pol Pot and other leaders who died without being 
tried through a Buddhist frame. His book concludes, “I believe there will be justice. A person harvests what 
he has sown. According to the Buddhist religion, good actions produce good results, bad actions produce bad 
results. The peasant harvests the rice, the fisherman catches the fish. Pol Pot and his henchmen will harvest 
the actions they committed. They will reap what they have sown.”38
Here we encounter yet another form of temporality, what we might call “vernacular time.” Vernacular 
time refers to the specific local understandings and temporal practices operative in a given locality. In this 
case, Vann Nath notes a particular Buddhist vernacular conception of time that is frequently evoked, through 
speech as well as through non-verbal and ritual acts, in Cambodia. From this Buddhist perspective, our being 
is constituted and reconstituted in a cyclical fashion. On a cosmic level, the universe is created and then 
degrades before being renewed. Ontologically, the Buddhist doctrine of samsara holds that being is fleeting, 
a momentary coalescence of constitutive elements. Each moment of coalescence is conditioned by what 
preceded it, a notion that is reflected in the doctrine of karma (kamma) that Vann Nath invoked in the passage 
above. Those who do good will receive good; those who do bad deeds will suffer the consequences. A form of 
cosmic justice is at work here, as punishment for bad deeds is an inevitable part of being.
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This Buddhist vernacular of time, of course, stands at odds with the linearity and progressive teleology of 
juridical time and related conceptions in the transitional justice imaginary, which asserts a binary of trauma 
/ ill-health as well as health / closure that is overcome through the tribunal. For if there are other ways of 
achieving closure, such as through Buddhist ritual belief and practices centered around the notion of meritous 
and demeritous action, one of the key justifications of the ECCC would be undermined. A similar argument 
could be made about related notions of Buddhist forgiving and forgetting. A more modest, yet powerful way 
of approaching time and healing would embrace an openness to different ways of coping with and dealing 
with the past, ranging from religious understanding to juridical mechanisms.
We can glimpse some of the ways in which Vann Nath sought his path forward. Buddhism was one of the 
cornerstones of his understanding of the world, a set of beliefs and practices that had taken shape in his youth 
while studying at a pagoda.39 It provided him with a way to cope with his past suffering and to approach his 
future experiences, such as his encounter with Him Huy and his response to Pol Pot’s death.
Art also seemed to provide Vann Nath with a way of grappling with the past, at first by painting images 
from S-21 and then later participating in painting workshops with young students.40 This engagement with the 
younger generation was very important to Vann Nath. He chose not to become a civil party, foregoing a form 
of participation centered on rights for one that was more humanistically oriented (though clearly civil parties 
have a variety of motives for their participation, including humanistic ones).41 He did this in part because of 
health concerns but also because he did not want to assert a primacy over other survivors. He also did not 
want reparations, perhaps because he felt nothing could compensate for his suffering.42
When asked why he still wanted to testify, Vann Nath stated that, ever since he was detained at S-21, he 
“determined that if one day I survived, […] I would compile the events to reflect on what happened so that 
the younger generation would know […] So I had to reveal, I had to write, I had to compile, and it can [serve] 
as a mirror to the younger generation of the lives of those who were accused with no reason, who committed 
no wrong […] I do not want anything more than that” and a sense of justice.43 Here also we find an interesting 
conjunction of vernacular and transitional justice time, as the Buddhist emphasis on clear understanding 
dovetails with juridical notions of truth and evidence.
Did Vann Nath achieve this sense of justice after the Duch trial and upon seeing the surviving senior leaders 
of the Khmer Rouge stand trial on the first day of the initial hearing? It is impossible to know for certain, though, 
even if he felt some ambivalence, overall he seemed to have a positive attitude toward the court, as he indicated 
to me that day we attended the opening of Case 002. He also seemed pleased in some ways by the initial Duch 
verdict (he did not live long enough to see Duch’s final sentence of life imprisonment), as illustrated by the fact 
that he participated in verdict distributions organized by the ECCC’s Public Affairs office.
But through his paintings, public statements about the past, Buddhist practices and beliefs, engagement 
with the younger generation, testimony during the Duch trial, participation in court outreach events, and 
other activities, Vann Nath seems to have moved closer to something like healing and closure to the extent to 
which it can ever be attained by a survivor.
Vann Nath at Duch Verdict 
Distribution, August 12, 
2010. Courtesy of the ECCC. 
[http://www.eccc.gov.kh/
en/gallery/photo/duch-
verdict-distribution-8]
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Before he died, Vann Nath completed one last painting. It depicts Duch sitting between two columns of 
skulls and bones that recede into the distance of a gloomy horizon. Vultures circle in the sky above, perhaps a 
Buddhist symbol of the attachment and craving that drive people to sin. Before Duch, who gazes mournfully 
into the distance, lies a copy of the verdict from his trial.
Duch verdict. Painting by Vann Nath. Photo courtesy of the Documentation Center of Cambodia. 
Permission courtesy of Kith Eng (Vann Nath’s wife).
This new painting seems familiar. After gazing at it for a while, it appears that Vann Nath may have 
modeled the painting on his own S-21 self-portrait. Both figures assume the same posture with the same 
dejected expression. The two walls of the S-21 cell have been replaced with the two columns of skulls. Instead 
of the iron shackles in the S-21 portrait, in the new painting Duch is “bound” by the verdict, which sentences 
him to imprisonment. But the new painting is also a Buddhist one, suggesting that, like a shadow, the deeds 
of Duch’s past trail behind him, conditioning his future. It suggests how time and justice were interlinked for 
Vann Nath, a fusion of juridical and Buddhist time in which Duch was now imprisoned for his bad deeds in 
the Khmer Rouge past, one from which Vann Nath had at last been released.
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“On 7 January 1979, I never imagined that I would be sitting before the Chamber this very day. It is 
my great honour to sit and explain things to this huge Chamber. I want nothing else. The thing I want is 
intangible; it is justice for the deceased.” These are the words of Mr Vann Nath, one of the handful of survivors 
of the S-21 prison and one of Cambodia’s most renowned painters, who was the very first person called to give 
testimony before the Trial Chamber, on 29 June 2009.1
Mr Chum Mey, another survivor of S-21, stated: “I am a victim of Tuol Sleng. I know what happened in Tuol 
Sleng. We have to tell our children and grandchildren in the next generation about this, and we have to tell the 
world about this. I come every day because I consider the court as history. I am now 79 years old, and I am doing 
this for the sake of the young generations to fully understand what happened…. Some people say that the court 
takes too much time. They just yell from the outside without knowing what is being done. They know nothing. 
You should consider a Khmer saying: “Cooking too long, it would be burned; cooking too little, it would be raw”.2
Ms Im Sunthy, the widow of Professor Phung Ton, the Rector of the Faculty of Law and a diplomat 
during the 1960s, who was killed at S-21 in 1976, gave the following testimony in court: “I am here to actually 
pay homage to the dead souls of my husband and my father and the lost family members. Some people say 
that I am here to take revenge but it is not true. I am here to find justice for my husband. I am here to reveal 
the truth why people were killed, why these barbaric acts were inflicted onto the victims.”3
Mr Tolors Kâsim, also from Kampong Cham, explained his motivation: “First, I want the court to seek 
justice on behalf of our ethnic group4 because we represent Islam. I am concerned about the return of the 
religious terminators. Secondly, I want collective reparations5 so that we can build a school in our village as 
evidence to show the young generations the extreme destruction in our village caused by the Pol Pot regime. 
When we returned here, the village was empty; thus, this to-be-built-house or building will be the evidence.”6
The participation of victims of mass crimes is being taken to new levels in the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) as it brings criminal prosecution for serious crimes committed during 
the period of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979). At the moment, when one trial has been completed and a 
second is now under way, it is timely to analyse the challenges, successes and failures of this experience.
As in many other national or international courts, in the ECCC victims may be called as witnesses to 
the crimes being charged. But the ECCC is providing another and hopefully more meaningful avenue for the 
victims to play a direct role as Civil Parties -- participating in the case in support of the Prosecution, with the 
right to their own lawyers, to propose evidence and witnesses, to make their own statements and to question 
the accused directly in court, and in their own right to make a civil claim for moral and collective reparations. 
This Civil Party status in the criminal case is a feature known in various civil law systems, but has not been 
provided in any of the international or what are sometimes called “internationalized” criminal tribunals.7
More than 8,000 people have filed complaints with the Court, describing the crimes they experienced 
between 1975 and 1979.8
In early 2012, the ECCC completed its first case (Case 001), in which Kaing Guek Eav, better known by 
his revolutionary name Duch, was charged with crimes against humanity, war crimes and national crimes of 
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murder and torture for acts resulting in the deaths of more than 12,000 people carried out while he was in 
charge at S-21 (often known as Tuol Sleng – the apex of Democratic Kampuchea’s system of security prisons). 
The Trial Chamber judgment pronounced on 26 July 2010 found Duch guilty and sentenced him to 35 years’ 
imprisonment. All parties appealed, and the Supreme Court Chamber’s final judgment confirmed those 
convictions and increased the sentence to life imprisonment.9
The second case (Case 002) involves four accused, alleged to be the surviving “senior leaders” of the 
Khmer Rouge regime and responsible for mass crimes. Following the judicial investigation (from 2007 to 15 
September 2010), their trial commenced with the Initial Hearing held in late June 2011. On 17 November 
2011, the Trial Chamber decided to sever one defendant (Ieng Thirith, former Minister for Social Action) 
from the trial on grounds of her mental unfitness. This left three accused on trial: Nuon Chea (widely known 
as Brother Number Two after Pol Pot, who died in 1998), Khieu Samphan (former Head of State and of the 
parliament), and Ieng Sary (former Foreign Minister), who died in March 2013 leaving only two standing trial 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the domestic crimes of murder, torture and religious 
persecution.10
The Trial Chamber also decided to sever the case into several trials, the first known as Case 002/01, 
focusing on the evacuations of the population in 1975 and again in 1976, and on the execution of Lon Nol 
officials in April 1975, concluded evidentiary hearings on July 23, 2013. Final Statements were heard in 
October 2013 before the Trial Chamber retired to consider its judgment, expected to be issued in the second 
quarter of 2014.11 Also on July 23, 2013, the Supreme Court Chamber issued an order that the Trial Chamber’s 
hearing of further charges in Case 002 should include at least those relating to S-21 (Tuol Sleng), a work-site 
and a security center, as well as genocide.12
Meanwhile, since late 2009 the Co-Investigating Judges have been considering whether another five 
people should be charged, as proposed by the International Co-Prosecutor but opposed by the National Co-
Prosecutor. This number fell to four when one Suspect died in mid-2013.13
Victim participation at the ECCC
In the first trial, of Duch, 90 victims participated as Civil Parties in the proceedings, and 22 of them 
testified in court.14 Some 3,850 victims have Civil Party status in Case 002,15 far exceeding the numbers in any 
previous trials of such mass crimes in any international/ized judicial setting.16 What were the motivations of 
so many Cambodian victims to give up an extended amount of time and expose themselves to public gaze, 
emotional turmoil and even trauma from recalling their suffering and hearing the brutal crimes described in 
gruesome detail day after day? Five victims who were witnesses or Civil Parties in Case 001 explained what 
the process means to them in a video entitled The Long-awaited Day, made for the Victims Support Section 
of the ECCC.
Mr Uch Sunlay from the province of Kratie, explains what motivated him to apply to be a Civil Party 
in Case 002: “I did not just think about applying to be a Civil Party yesterday or today. I have been ready for 
years. I was determined that once there is a court, either national or international, I will apply as a Civil Party 
because I have suffered from great pain; this is my first intention. Secondly, I lost a lovely father. Thirdly, I 
lost my wife and all my children, and all my in-laws, including my parents-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law 
simply because they were accused as KGB in that regime.
“I applied as a Civil Party in order to sue the senior leaders and those most responsible in the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime for their killings. Firstly, I want them punished by the law for the atrocities. Secondly, I 
want both national and international courts as well as the whole wide world to acknowledge that there were 
killings, homicide and a killing field regime in Cambodia. Thirdly, I want my children who died recorded in 
the history for the younger generations. My beloved wife and children were all killed during this notorious 
regime. I was determined that whenever a court would be established, regardless of what they can do or 
cannot do as long as it prosecutes those leaders, I will feel relieved. The souls of the deceased ones cannot 
claim for justice; thus, a survivor, such as a husband, shall seek justice for his wife, children and babies. This is 
the reason I have applied as a Civil Party to request the court, particularly the national officials and judges, to 
conduct research, investigation, and prosecution.”
“I want a judgment for the establishment of a symbolic memorial for storing the remains of the victims, 
or the remains can be stored at a pagoda in Kratie so that we will feel relieved and those who died will also 
rest peacefully in heaven. And we who have rid ourselves of pain, suffering and tension from our hearts and 
emotions, will be ready to develop our society to be more advanced and prosperous.”17
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Legal and administrative framework for victim participation
Victim participation at the ECCC has not been without controversy, rising at times to heated argument 
and even bitter conflict. The roles and rights of Civil Parties and the level of support extended to them have 
proved to be among the most difficult and ongoing problems the court has had to face as it grappled with the 
realities and emotions of this sensitive issue.
The whole question of victim participation as Civil Parties was considerably complicated by the fact 
that administratively, the ECCC was completely unprepared for any role for Civil Parties. This was one of the 
clearest instances in which the United Nations’ Technical Assessment Mission simply applied the formulas 
from the ad hoc tribunals of the ICTY and ICTR and the Sierra Leone Special Court without regard to the 
very different legal and judicial context of Cambodia. Neither the budget nor staffing tables for the ECCC 
included any provision for Civil Parties. The first Deputy Director of Administration (who had previously 
served in the ICTR) expressed this approach clearly when she stated at the first press conference held in the 
new premises of the Court that “the only role for victims in the ECCC would be as witnesses”.18
However, the foundation documents for the ECCC (a domestic Law and an Agreement between the 
Cambodian government and the United Nations19) stipulate that the Court shall utilize Cambodian criminal 
procedure, except in certain circumstances when such procedure is silent, internally contradictory, or when 
it conflicts with international standards.20 And Cambodian criminal procedure includes the possibility for 
victims to participate as Civil Parties in criminal proceedings.
Further, while neither the Law nor the Agreement made specific mention of the role of Civil Parties, 
the Law did envisage victims as Parties to the cases in that Article 36 (new) stipulated the rights of victims 
to appeal decisions of the Trial Chamber. In its preparatory work for the establishment of the Court, the 
Cambodian Government Khmer Rouge Trials Task Force anticipated that one of the areas requiring early 
decision would be how to apply Cambodian procedure allowing victims’ participation and claims for 
reparations in circumstances in which millions of people were victims. The first edition of An Introduction to 
the Khmer Rouge Trials, an information booklet published by the Task Force in 2004, included the following 
cautious formulation:
Will victims be entitled to compensation? Under the current Cambodian law on criminal procedure, 
victims may claim reparation in criminal cases for damages they suffered from the crimes being tried. It is 
not yet clear whether or how the Extraordinary Chambers will hear such claims. It is difficult to imagine 
how the many millions of Cambodian victims could receive anything more than symbolic compensation.21
A draft Internal Procedures and Regulations, developed by Dr. Gregory Stanton for and with the 
Task Force,22 was presented to the ECCC judicial officers (judges and co-prosecutors) in early July 2006. 
This draft made provisions for victims to apply to participate in the hearings (Article 89); to appoint legal 
representatives, even envisaging the probable need for common legal representation for groups of victims 
and for legal assistance for representation (Article 90); and to claim reparations, including remedies such as 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation (Article 94).23
Judges from common law systems (who constituted the majority of international judges) were adamant 
that full victim participation, as Civil Parties would present an impossible burden on the court in terms of 
finances and time. Judges from civil law systems, who were used to Civil Parties even in mass crimes, were 
equally adamant that the ECCC had to accommodate Civil Parties, as it had no power to limit rights that are 
clearly and unambiguously provided under Cambodian criminal procedure, so it seemed inevitable that some 
compromise would emerge, providing a limited form of victim participation and claims for reparations.
The judicial officers established a Rules Committee (which consisted solely of judges from civil law 
countries). Its draft of the Internal Rules presented to the November 2006 First Plenary Session provided for 
normal Civil Party action by victims including legal representation and claims for reparations, but including 
the following caveat (with an undecided adjective): “Injury may be compensated by awarding [proportionate] 
damages. The Chambers may also award collective or symbolic reparation.”
After intense debate in many meetings of the Rules Committee, and as one of the very final matters in the 
Internal Rules to be resolved, the Plenary Session in June 2007 adopted a severely limited right to reparations, 
as follows: 
Rule 23-- Civil Party action by victims […]
11. Subject to Article 39 of the ECCC Law, the Chambers may award on
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 collective and moral reparations to Civil Parties. These shall be awarded against,
 and be borne by convicted persons.
12. Such awards may take the following forms: 
 a) An order to publish the judgment in any appropriate news or other media at
      the convicted person’s expense;
  b) An order to fund any non-profit activity or service that is intended for the
       benefit of Victims; or 
 c) Other appropriate and comparable forms of reparation.24
The Office of Administration responded by establishing a small Victims Unit (later known as the Victims 
Support Section), allocating unspent funds from other budget lines, and was lucky to be able to recruit an 
experienced staffer from the ICTY to come in as interim Deputy Head of the Unit.25 However, with such a late 
start, and with woefully inadequate funds, the Victims Unit was very quickly overwhelmed as the enormity 
of its task became evident.
How to reach the unknown number of victims throughout the country, inform them of their rights 
to participate and encourage the filing of complaints and civil party applications was a major challenge. A 
working relationship was quickly developed between the Victims Unit and a number of NGOs that had 
already established or were ready to establish programs relating to Khmer Rouge victims. The most active of 
these “intermediary organizations” included the Khmer Institute for Democracy (KID), the Documentation 
Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights 
(Licadho) and the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC).
While in its first year the Victims Unit had no specific resources for outreach, such funding was already 
flowing to the intermediary organizations from a number of donors (notably the German and French 
governments, and the European Union). And in early 2009 the German Government (through GTZ) made a 
significant direct grant to the Victims Unit.26
Forums were held throughout the country, and teams assisted victims in completing the somewhat 
complex form the ECCC had developed for them to file a complaint and to apply for status as a Civil Party.
While under Cambodian criminal procedure, applications may be filed at any time up until the final 
submissions at the closure of the trial, the Internal Rules of the ECCC were more restrictive, initially providing 
that any application had to be lodged 10 days before the start of the trial.27 As a result of the fact that Case 
001 was limited to crimes relating to a single crime site (the security center of S-21 and its ancillary units) 
and because these procedural decisions were not made until almost the time of the Closing Order, a relatively 
small number of victims applied before that deadline -- 94, of whom 90 participated.
In Case 002, the Victims Unit and the intermediary organizations made a strong and concerted outreach effort, 
and 3,988 victims applied in Case 002.28 The Co-Investigating Judges, who had the initial responsibility of deciding, 
recognized only some 50% of these Civil Party applicants for Case 002, but on appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber took a 
much more expansive approach, admitting 3,850 Civil Parties, close to 100% of those who had applied.
Legal representation
Even after adoption of Internal Rules allowing for Civil Party participation, the ECCC did not initially 
provide any financial support for legal representation for Civil Parties. This contrasted sharply to the Defense, 
which was generously supported from the international side of the budget, on the basis of the Law and 
Agreement provisions for legal support for any Accused deemed to be unable to afford their own lawyers.29 
All five Accused in Cases 001 and 002 were provided with legal teams funded through a legal aid fund 
administered through the Defense Support Section.
No such support from the Court was offered for Civil Parties. Lawyers, mostly funded from foreign 
governments through the intermediary organizations, offered legal pro bono representation. Legal teams 
emerged, not on the basis of inherent or identified differentiation of interest among groups of Civil Party 
applicants, but rather from their relationship to the intermediary organizations which had facilitated the 
collection of their applications for Civil Party status.
Four Civil Party legal teams were recognized by the Trial Chamber and, in a mirror image of the Defense 
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and Prosecution, both national and international co-lawyers were recognized for each team, meaning that 
eight Civil Party co-lawyers were entitled to be present in court at any one time and to speak on most issues.30 
As can be imagined, this presented not only logistical difficulties to the court, including space requirements, 
but also the difficulty of developing and arguing a coherent legal strategy, with co-lawyers often presenting 
repetitive or, at times, contradictory arguments. The cumbersome nature of this arrangement, with a total of 
six national and eleven international co-lawyers recognized for Civil Parties, was exacerbated by the fact that 
the team of international co-lawyers for Avocats sans Frontières (Lawyers without Borders) appeared on a 
rotating basis, and were each generally in Cambodia for only three weeks at a time.
Although the ECCC provided some administrative and logistic support, mainly through the Victims 
Unit, Civil Party legal representation was precarious, with co-lawyers subject to donors’ goodwill to provide 
financial assistance, office accommodation, transport to meet their clients and the other basic requirements 
to discharge their professional obligations. It soon became painfully obvious that such a haphazard basis for 
Civil Party legal representation could not be continued in Case 002, a much more complex case in every way, 
and in which thousands of Civil Parties would be participating.
Accordingly, in early 2009 a working group within the ECCC31 began developing a proposal for the 
Rules Committee, considering various ways in which the Internal Rules could be amended to provide for 
more coordinated and assured Civil Party legal representation. Meanwhile, the Trial Chamber itself decided 
to stimulate a broader discussion, including with lawyers, intermediary organizations and other NGOs on 
the issue of how to ensure effective legal representation for Civil Parties without jeopardizing the efficient 
functioning of the Court, especially in the light of the large number of Civil Parties expected in Case 002.32
Many advocates for victims’ rights feared their curtailing through this process and argued vociferously 
against any change in such a direction.33 Such a fear was perhaps unnecessarily stoked by the inclusion in the 
first drafts of the Trial Chamber’s options paper the option of amending the Internal Rules to remove Civil 
Party participation completely, which was never really a feasible course of action, given that the ECCC was in 
a civil law jurisdiction.
Following lengthy discussion and hot debate, the Plenary Session of judicial officers adopted Revision 5 
of the Internal Rules on February 9, 2010, extensively revising the legal representation of Civil Parties at the 
ECCC, by which  “Civil Parties at the trial stage and beyond shall comprise a single, consolidated group, whose 
interests are represented by the [national and international] Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer […] supported by 
the Civil Party Lawyers […] Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyers shall file a single claim for collective and moral 
reparations.34
Several new articles were added, in which the role of the Lead Co-Lawyers was defined as to “ensure the 
effective organization of Civil Party representation during the trial stage and beyond, whilst balancing the 
rights of all parties and the need for an expeditious trial within the unique ECCC context”.35
This novel approach went into operation in Case 002 and, at least up until the end of Case 002/01, formed 
a more coherent framework for Civil Party legal representation, and a far more efficient functioning of the 
trial, without substantially curtailing their rights. While at the trial stage they were now consolidated into a 
single group, individual Civil Parties still retained their own co-lawyers, and the Lead Co-Lawyers gave many 
opportunities to these co-lawyers to speak in court, on both matters relating to their own clients and certain 
legal issues in which they had a particular interest or point of view.
Victims’ associations
In the Cambodian situation of generalized suffering and privation of the entire population during the 
Khmer Rouge period, within the country there was little concept of distinguishing a separate category of 
“victims of the KR”. During the 1980s the government undertook numerous nationwide documentation, 
literary, and artistic programs, and the experience of victims was taught in schools. In countries with large 
Cambodian refugee populations like France, the US, Canada, and Australia, community and support 
committees were established; their focus included psychological and medical assistance for the large number 
of individuals suffering trauma, as well as documentation of the crimes they experienced, as part of the 
campaign to seek justice.
Following the enactment of the ECCC Law and Agreement, in France an Association “Justice pour le 
Cambodge” (Justice for Cambodia) was formed in 2004, dedicated to promoting the rights of the victims 
of the Khmer Rouge and, in particular, to assisting and representing them before the ECCC. Justice for 
Cambodia joined with several other organizations to establish the Collective for Victims of the Khmer Rouge, 
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which produced a white paper on victims’ rights, set up a branch in Cambodia and proceeded to find legal 
representation for some 59 victims who wished to participate in the coming trials. In Cambodia, at least two 
more victims’ associations were established, and their evolution reveals the complexity of the relationship of 
victims to the formal process of the ECCC.
The Association of Khmer Rouge Victims in Cambodia (AKRVC)
The AKRVC describes itself as “independent of any political or religious affiliation—a network of 
survivors of the 1975-79 killing fields who are joined in the fellowship of suffering, in the demand for justice, 
and in the work for a just peace. The members of the Victims Association are from overseas and spread across 
the provinces and capital of Cambodia.” The AKRVC was founded by Theary C. Seng, the first Civil Party 
to be recognized by the ECCC in Case 002, who established the Civil Parties of Orphans Class, of whom 
she was one. Theary Seng, a well-known political activist, gained considerable publicity for the AVKRC and 
the Orphans Class before becoming disenchanted with the ECCC and withdrawing her Civil Party status in 
November 2011.36
Ksaem Ksan (Victims Associations of Democratic Kampuchea) 
Ksaem Ksan was founded in 2009. Among its leading founders are two survivors from S-21, Chum Mey 
and Bou Meng, as well as a number of Civil Parties in the ECCC. The Association was established to assist its 
members to aims to participate in all stages of the ECCC process, to provide spiritual and material support 
and an improved living standard to its members, and to conduct outreach to new generations so that they 
understand better the history of Democratic Kampuchea in order to prevent a recurrence of such a regime.
Reparations
As mentioned above, the ECCC Law’s Article 39 and Internal Rule 23 provide for the award of only collective 
and moral reparations to Civil Parties, against and borne by convicted persons. In Case 001, the Trial Chamber 
interpreted the Internal Rules narrowly,  ruling out almost all reparation claims filed by the Civil Parties, and 
awarding only the publication of their names and a compilation of apologies by Duch during the trial.
Ksaem Ksan reflected the views of most victims in a press release issued on 24 February 2012 after the 
Supreme Court Chamber issued its final judgment:
On behalf of Victims Association of Democratic Kampuchea “Ksaem Ksan” civil parties in Case 001, we 
wish to express our sadness with the so-called collective and moral reparation the ECCC has decided to 
grant the civil parties in the form of compiled declarations of apologies of the convicted Duch during the 
course of the trial. As we pointed out during our testimonies in the courtroom, we do not believe in the 
sincerity of the apologies made by Duch. We think that his declaration of regrets was only a way to obtain 
mitigating circumstances from the trial chamber. As a proof of what we stated here above, in the last day of 
trial, Duch has asked the court for his release and to be free from any prosecution. How could one sincerely 
think that a simple compilation of these declarations of Duch constitute a moral reparation for the victims? 
In future, we will continue to monitor the honesty of the convicted Duch during his testimony of substantial 
hearing in case 002.37
Following widespread dissatisfaction with the ECCC’s reparations regime, as it unfolded in Case 001, 
the judicial officers amended the Internal Rules in September 2010, allowing a much broader approach. 
Firstly, reparations may now include not only awards ordered against the convicted person, but also other 
projects “designed or identified in cooperation with the Victims Support Section and [which] have secured 
sufficient external funding.” Secondly, the Victims Support Section is “entrusted with the development and 
implementation of non-judicial programs and measures addressing the broader interests of victims. Such 
programs may, where appropriate, be developed and implemented in collaboration with governmental and 
non-governmental organizations external to the ECCC.”
The Lead Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties and the Victims Support Section have since then been working with 
victims associations and intermediary organizations as well as communicating with the Royal Government of 
Cambodia regarding certain issues that fall within its competence, to draft appropriate reparations and non-
judicial programs and measures, which it is hoped will provide more meaningful recognition and response to 
the suffering of victims of the KR regime.
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Conclusion
The process of judicial accounting embodied in the ECCC is being done late, and much has been lost in 
the more than 30 years since the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. Physical evidence has been washed away, 
documents have been lost, memories have faded and, above all, many people have died – some who should 
be on trial, others who should have had the chance to tell their stories in court, and millions of people who 
should have had the chance to see justice done.
The cost of this passage of time is being acutely felt as Case 002 unfolds. As mentioned above, one 
defendant (Ieng Thirith) was severed from the trial, and her husband (Ieng Sary) died, while the fragile health 
condition of the remaining two defendants continues to dog the proceedings. Over the same period, a number 
of Civil Parties and witnesses scheduled to give testimony have passed away, or become too frail to testify, 
while most of those who have testified have revealed limits to both their physical and mental capacities.
As mentioned above, in order to speed up the process, the Trial Chamber decided to break Case 002 into 
several segments, but the trial phase of the initial segment took more than two years, while a final judgment by 
the Supreme Court Chamber is still some years away. Whether even this first segment of Case 002 will reach 
a conclusion is by no means assured.
The ECCC is still in train, not yet a historical event to be evaluated. Until it finishes its work, one 
cannot venture to conclude whether or how well this process of judicial accounting was achieved and how 
it contributed to Cambodia’s struggle to free itself from the weight of this brutal period in its recent history.
What can be stated unequivocally, however, is that millions of Cambodians are watching the process 
intently. By July 2013, more than 200,000 Cambodians had visited the court. The courtroom holds some 500 
people in the public gallery, and its proceedings have been broadcast live on national television and radio. In a 
poll taken towards the end of Case 001, more than 80% of those surveyed reported being aware of the ongoing 
process, 60% having themselves seen it on television and 70% believing it is providing justice.38 A flowering 
of public and private reflection, research and comment is under way in Cambodia, really seizing popular 
attention alongside the judicial process. Week after week, month after month, programs and activities are 
carried out throughout the country – on screen, on stage, in print, in schools, in wats, mosques and churches, 
at memorial sites, in meetings, forums, discussions, and therapy sessions.
Precisely because it was a pioneer among internationalised courts in providing for victim participation 
as Civil Parties, the ECCC had no precedents or road maps on which to rely, but had to develop its own 
procedures, a process that was severely impeded by the unfamiliarity of common law judges and United 
Nations administrators with this element of civil law. Lack of certainty, and changing rules along the way led to 
unease, anxiety and suspicion. Although the Internal Rules were eventually amended to provide more clarity 
and a broader approach to reparations, the sense of disappointment from unfulfilled expectations might have 
been avoided if the issue had been given sufficient attention and weight at the time of the establishment of 
the court. Despite all these problems, however, the participation of some 4,000 victims as Civil Parties may be 
considered one of the ECCC’s main contributions to the development of international justice.
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Abstract: After nearly 40 years, some of the key leaders of the former Khmer Rouge genocidal regime are facing trial at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). This paper explores the challenges and opportunities facing the 
ECCC in its pursuit of justice and accountability for the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge against the Cambodian 
people. It concludes that, despite the political controversies and resource constraints affecting the court in fulfilling its mandate 
to end impunity, victims and survivors of the Pol Pot era may still benefit psychologically from the long-overdue official 
acknowledgement of their suffering and the opportunity for younger generations to learn the truth of what happened. Some 
justice could indeed be better than none in the quest for healing and reconciliation at the individual and community level. 
This process may be undermined, however, if the prevailing culture of “small impunities” and the need for political and 
socioeconomic justice, along with psychosocial support, are not addressed.
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Introduction
When I first travelled to Cambodia to conduct field research in 1999, I discovered that the lack of 
accountability for the former Khmer Rouge leaders responsible for the genocide of 1975-1979 was seen as 
the biggest impunity and the root of all the smaller impunities in Cambodian society at the time.1 However, 
despite the subsequent creation of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 25 years 
after the Pol Pot regime was deposed, this culture of impunity persists. On 12 November 2013, a female 
bystander was killed during a violent crackdown by riot and military police against demonstrating garment 
factory workers in Phnom Penh. The Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC) responded by 
highlighting the culture of impunity, which continues to prevail in Cambodia:
Impunity cannot be allowed the reign in Cambodia. With Chhouk Bandith free and still no investigation 
into the death of Mr. Mao Sok Chan, Cambodia’s claim to be a country that respects rule of law lacks any 
credibility.2
This paper explores the challenges of ending impunity and pursuing justice after genocide in Cambodia, 
including an analysis of the historical and political context as well as the multiple justice needs and priorities 
of Cambodians. Drawing on field research conducted in Cambodia in 1999 and 2009,3 it concludes that, 
despite accusations of corruption and political manipulation, the ECCC could still contribute to peace and 
reconciliation because of the potential symbolic and psychological benefits for survivors of having their 
suffering officially acknowledged at last. What is missing in Cambodia is a greater commitment to political 
and socioeconomic justice, along with psychosocial support and implementation of the rule of law, which 
could underpin a more sustainable peace at individual, community and national levels.
Historical and Political Context
Cambodia was once a great nation covering much of Southeast Asia, with its own distinct Khmer culture 
influenced by India’s two great religions, Hinduism and Buddhism. Culminating in the Angkor dynasty, the 
glorious Khmer Empire lasted from the seventh to the thirteenth century, after which it was progressively 
weakened by invasions from its neighbors Siam (now Thailand) and Vietnam. It was this glorious past that Pol 
Pot and his cohort were inspired to recreate for the people of Democratic Kampuchea by wiping out all foreign 
influences including the Vietnamese that were seen as undermining the pure Khmer identity.
In 1863 Cambodia became a French protectorate and then colony until 1953, when King Norodom 
Sihanouk regained the country’s independence.4 After seventeen years of relative peace as an independent 
country, Cambodia became drawn into the Vietnam War. In 1969 the U.S. Air Force had begun secretly 
bombing Cambodia in an effort to eliminate the Vietnamese communist bases, and the anti-Vietnamese Lon 
Nol government took power in Cambodia (renamed the Khmer Republic). Sihanouk, now in self-imposed 
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exile, forged a coalition with the communist-backed Khmer Rouge who fought a civil war with the U.S.-
backed Lon Nol government. In 1975 the United States withdrew from Vietnam, Phnom Penh fell to the 
Khmer Rouge, and the Cambodian people were subjected to three years of the brutal Khmer Rouge regime 
led by Pol Pot (Democratic Kampuchea) under which an estimated 1.67 million Cambodians (approximately 
25% of the population) died.5
The Khmer Rouge regime started its reign of terror by forcibly evacuating all inhabitants from the capital 
city, Phnom Penh, and other towns to rural areas as part of its agrarian revolutionary plan. The systematic and 
carefully planned regime of terror, torture, hard labor and starvation was aimed at establishing a racially pure 
and independent Khmer state uninfluenced by the West or the trappings of wealth and privilege. The victims 
were identified by a political ideology that characterized the enemy as people of the elite or middle class: the 
educated, city dwellers, professionals, those who could write, wore glasses or spoke foreign languages. These 
enemies were often killed outright.
In addition to the economic and physical deprivations there was a complete denial of all social and 
cultural rights. Foreign and minority languages were banned; schools and hospitals were closed; the labor 
force was conscripted; families were separated; religions and folk cultures were destroyed, including the 
majority Buddhist religion.6 The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea promulgated in January 1976 
failed to guarantee any human rights and abolished private property, organised religion and family-oriented 
agricultural production, and the four-year economic plan drafted in 1976 said nothing about leisure, religion, 
formal education or family life.7
The mass killing that occurred under the Pol Pot regime is generally seen as politically and 
socioeconomically motivated, with particular ethnic and religious groups that were specifically targeted and 
almost totally eliminated, including Buddhists, the Vietnamese, Chinese and minority Cham Muslims.8 It was 
a communist-inspired class struggle taken to extremes and augmented by identity-based violence and killing. 
I have argued elsewhere that the extent of hatred of the Vietnamese and mission of purity extolled by Pol Pot 
and the Khmer Rouge indicates an identity-based or ethnic motive, rather than simply political ideology, that 
reinforces the label of genocide even though the majority of killings did not strictly fall under the Genocide 
Convention definition.9
Following border incursions and a previously failed full-scale invasion, Phnom Penh fell to the Vietnamese 
in January 1979, the Khmer Rouge retreated to the Thai border and the country’s name was changed to the 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The international community condemned the Vietnamese invasion, 
and the Pol Pot regime continued to be recognized by the UN as the official government of Cambodia. In 
1989 the Phnom Penh government with Hun Sen as Prime Minister renounced communism and changed 
the country’s name to the State of Cambodia, and the Vietnamese withdrew. Elections in May 1993 under 
the supervision of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) resulted in a coalition 
government with Prince Ranariddh (Sihanouk’s son) and Hun Sen (leader of the pro-Vietnamese Cambodian 
People’s Party) as co-prime ministers. However, following a coup against Ranariddh and his other opponents 
in July 1997, Hun Sen declared himself sole Prime Minister of Cambodia. The Cambodian People’s Party has 
remained in power since then with Hun Sen as Prime Minister.
Accountability for Genocide?
In the wake of the genocidal Pol Pot regime, there were no significant or effective official public processes 
of accountability implemented in Cambodia, despite the numerous initiatives proposed by the international 
community and Cambodian government.10 Nor were there any official international acts of condemnation 
or prosecution. The People’s Revolutionary Tribunal of Khmer Rouge leaders, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, held in 
Phnom Penh in August 1979, imposed a sentence of death in absentia for the crime of genocide, but this was 
not recognized internationally because of due process objections to the trial procedures and the diplomatic 
isolation of the PRK regime, and the sentence was never carried out.11 According to Hammer and Urs, by 
turning the trial into a tool of propaganda, the PRK ‘co-opted justice in the name of politics’.12
The international community was at first deterred by Cold War constraints, political priorities, and 
respect for state sovereignty from condemning the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime. Once the Cold War was 
over, the international community was still constrained by the legacy of Cold War geopolitical alliances, as 
well as fears that they might also be held to account for their role in supporting the Khmer Rouge. The United 
Nations played a significant role in rebuilding peace in Cambodia, but the issues of justice and reconciliation 
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were not addressed in the Paris Peace Agreement of October 1991. The final agreement did not preclude the 
Khmer Rouge from participating in the Cambodian elections, nor did it prevent former officials of the Khmer 
Rouge associated with the genocide from holding office in the future.13 Hammer and Urs attribute the failure 
to pursue justice for the Khmer Rouge during these two periods to the “politics of ideology” (1975-89) and 
the “politics of reconstruction” (1989-1996).14 As pointed out by Etcheson: “issues of transitional justice and 
accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law are always intensely political.”15
The Khmer Rouge, meanwhile, were able to maintain their strongholds in towns such as Pailin near the 
Thai border. They continued their guerrilla activities with impunity for the next 20 years until the organisation 
was formally disbanded in 1998 after the death of Pol Pot and the defections of two former Khmer Rouge 
leaders, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea. Ieng Sary had defected after being granted amnesty in 1996. In 
March and May 1999, the Cambodian government arrested two other former Khmer Rouge leaders, Ta Mok 
and Duch. Both men faced charges of treason, torture, murder and genocide as well as breaking the 1994 law 
banning the Khmer Rouge.16 Ta Mok died in 2006, but Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary and Duch, 
along with Ieng Thirth, survived to be indicted by the ECCC.17
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
Following several years of negotiations, the UN and Cambodian government finally signed a draft 
agreement on 6 June 2003 for the establishment of a tribunal to try the surviving former Khmer Rouge 
leaders, but it took another two years for funding arrangements to be negotiated and the final form of the 
hybrid tribunal to be agreed.18 The ECCC was finally established in November 2005 and by May 2006 the 
judges and prosecutors had been appointed. The ECCC has been characterized as a hybrid tribunal because 
of the mix of international and Cambodian judges, but in reality it has operated as a national Court with 
international participation. The United Nations half of the Court has found itself with a limited capacity to 
control the Court’s functioning, and has seemed impotent to prevent corruption and political influence, if not 
interference. 
The crimes being prosecuted by the Court include homicide, torture and religious persecution as defined 
in Cambodian domestic law; genocide as defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention; crimes against humanity 
as defined by the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court; war crimes defined as grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and crimes against cultural property defined by the Hague Convention of 
1954.19
The ECCC is instituting a unique feature of international or hybrid tribunals – the opportunity for 
victims to take complaints to the tribunal as civil parties. In addition to being able to appear as witnesses, 
victims of crimes, which fall under the jurisdiction of the court, are able to lodge complaints with the ECCC, 
to be represented by prosecuting lawyers and to claim collective and moral reparations.20 In the beginning, 
civil parties were individually represented, but this was later changed to improve efficiency by requiring civil 
parties to be collectively represented.
On 17 February 2009 I attended the first day of the initial hearing of the first trial at the ECCC, popularly 
known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT). There were crowds of foreigners and Cambodians, lining up 
to ensure their place in the courtroom for this historic occasion, to see Comrade Duch (Kaing Guek Eav) 
face charges for crimes committed whilst he was in charge of the notorious Tuol Sleng prison S-21 during 
the Khmer Rouge regime. In Case 001, Duch was charged with crimes against humanity, grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the domestic crimes of homicide and torture. During the trial, Duch 
confessed, admitted responsibility and sought forgiveness for his role in the running of S-21 and the crimes 
that were committed there. This is an excerpt from one of Duch’s apologies from 16 September 2009: 
Please allow me to offer my apology to all the victims who were subjected to the utmost suffering at this 
place [S-21] until the day they lost their lives or until 7 January 1979. I would like to offer my apology to the 
victim’s families who have been living in pain for the past 33 years without their beloved family members 
and who have not yet obtained justice.21
The verdict of Case 001 was announced in July 2010 and Duch was sentenced to 35 years imprisonment, 
reduced to 19 years because of time already served and compensation for prior illegal detention. Furthermore, 
most of the civil parties’ claims for reparations were rejected because Duch was found to be indigent. 
However, following appeals, the decision was made in February 2011 to increase Duch’s sentence to life 
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imprisonment for overseeing the deaths of approximately 15,000 people. The Supreme Court Chamber also 
decided on appeals from civil parties related to the Trial Chambers’ ruling on their requests for collective and 
moral reparations, and affirmed the Trial Chamber’s decision to compile and post on the ECCC website all 
statements of apology and acknowledgement of responsibility made by Duch during the course of the ECCC 
proceedings. The Court’s first reparations award issued in May 2012 also provided for the names of the civil 
parties and immediate victims to be listed in the final judgement. Other collective reparations sought by the 
victims included access to free medical care and funding for educational programs about S-21 and the Khmer 
Rouge, as well as erection of memorials and pagoda fences.
The other four surviving senior Khmer Rouge leaders – Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and 
his wife, Ieng Thirith – were then to be tried together in a group trial as Case 002, which commenced in 
November 2011. The defendants were indicted on charges of crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and genocide. The case includes charges of forced evacuations, forced marriage, 
torture, executions, enslavement and genocide against ethnic Vietnamese and Cham Muslim populations. 
However, in light of the complexity of the case and considering the elderly, frail condition of the accused, 
the Court decided to proceed with the case in a series of mini-trials, starting with charges associated with 
the forced evacuations of the population of Phnom Penh and other major urban centres. The charges for this 
stage of Case 002 were later amended to include the execution of Lon Nol leaders and loyalists at Toul Po 
Chrey immediately after the Khmer Rouge took power in April 1975. But the more significant charges for 
the victims relating to enslavement, forced marriage, torture, executions and genocide will not be considered 
until subsequent mini-trials.
Known as Case 002/01, the first mini-trial concluded in November 2013, but only after one of the 
accused, former Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, had died of a heart attack in March 2013. His wife, former 
Minister of Social Affairs, Ieng Thirith, was judged unfit to stand trial because of dementia in 2012. Therefore 
only two senior Khmer Rouge leaders, 87 year old ‘Brother No. 2’ Nuon Chea and 82 year old former Head of 
State, Khieu Samphan, were tried and remain in custody awaiting the verdict which is expected in the second 
quarter of 2014. The timing of the second mini-trial, Case 002/02, is in question because of a lack of funding 
and the potential need to appoint another set of judges if it is to commence before the verdict is reached on 
Case 002/01.22 On both counts, there are justifiable fears that the accused may not survive to hear the verdict 
of Case 002/01, far less live long enough to be tried and convicted in Case 002/02. This would mean that no 
former Khmer Rouge leaders are, in the end, tried and found guilty of genocide. This lack of prosecution for 
genocide might not be easy for Cambodians to accept, given that the term genocide has been used since 1979 
to describe the atrocities of the Pol Pot era. On the other hand, some evidence suggests that the details of the 
charges are not as important for the survivors as simply seeing their former leaders in court and behind bars. 
According to Youk Chhang, genocide survivor and Director of the Documentation Center of Cambodia 
(DC-Cam), the fact that the senior Khmer Rouge leaders have been arrested and put on trial is profoundly 
significant. He suggests that the legal arguments mean little to people, but that seeing their former leaders 
incarcerated during the past six years has been essential: “for the public, they are [already] convicted”. He adds 
that even if they die in jail, they will be regarded as having been “cursed by their bad karma”.23
On the other hand, Cambodians are critical of the time the trials are taking. For example, a female survivor 
whom I interviewed in Kampong Thom in January 2009 wondered ‘why they don’t make the hearings quickly, 
why do they keep delaying?’. It is especially hard for the victims to understand and accept the processes involved 
in ensuring the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence, the processes required to prove guilt and 
the money, time and energy spent on defending Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan when the media has already 
“established the facts we ‘know’”.24 Why should it take so long to come to a verdict when the crimes of the Khmer 
Rouge have been so thoroughly documented by genocide scholars and others including DC-Cam? For example, 
following the closing hearings of case 002/01, Kem Chem, aged 60 from Pursat Province, said:
I cannot agree with Nuon Chea when he says that victims are mistaken. We all know how much we suffered 
throughout 3 years, 8 months and 20 days. We need the truth and the respect to the victims. I think that the 
KR Tribunal is making true reconciliation. When I attend the court, it feels like anger is released in from my 
heart. I have relatives who were killed in the KR regime. I wish the court would expedite the trial so that the 
accused have a sentence as soon as possible.25
According to my research, what may be more significant than convictions in judging the impact of the 
Court is the extent to which Cambodians get an answer to the ever-present question of ‘Why did Khmer 
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kill Khmer?’ Trials are not normally the best method of finding the truth, yet survivors have shown a strong 
interest in hearing the accused speak about what occurred during the Pol Pot era, with the hope of finding out 
what happened to their family and hearing some kind of truth which could contribute to justice, reconciliation 
and healing.26 This is also true of some of the young people who want to understand their country’s history. 
For example, Leng Samnang, a 21 year old university student interviewed after the closing hearings of Case 
002/01, said:
I believe it is important for every Cambodian to know the truth about this horrendous time in our story. 
This is why I am here. I want to know the KR tribunal. I want to understand the Case 002/01 and hear Nuon 
Chea and Khieu Samphan.27
Both Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan have disappointed in this regard. Whilst they apologised to the 
people of Cambodia during the trial proceedings in May 2013, this was not an acceptance of responsibility 
for the crimes of which they are accused. Rather, they apologised that the Khmer Rouge revolution was “a 
complete disaster” and maintained that they did not have any real power and were unaware of the suffering of 
the people. The survivors were further disappointed when both of the accused refused to testify further because 
they had lost confidence in the Court providing a fair trial, and when, in their lengthy closing statements, the 
former Khmer Rouge leaders continued to distance themselves from responsibility:
‘It is easy to say that I should have known everything, I should have understood everything, and thus I could 
have intervened or rectified the situation at the time,’ Khieu Samphan defiantly told the court. ‘Do you really 
think that that was what I wanted to happen to my people?’ ‘The reality was that I did not have any power,’ 
he said. Nuon Chea also defended his actions, saying he never ordered Khmer Rouge cadres ‘to mistreat or 
kill people to deprive them of food or commit any genocide.’28
Nuon Chea did, however, unlike Khieu Samphan, accept “moral responsibility” for the deaths: “I would 
like to sincerely apologize to the public, the victims, the families, and all Cambodian people,” he said. “I wish 
to show my remorse and pray for the lost souls that occurred by any means” during the Khmer Rouge rule. 
Nuon Chea’s apology evoked this response from one of the many survivors who crowded the courtroom for 
the final day of hearings in Case 002/01:
‘He is just trying to cheat the court so that he can be freed,’ said Bin Siv Lang, a 56-year-old woman who lost 
11 relatives during the Khmer Rouge rule. ‘If he issued no orders to kill people, his subordinates would not 
have killed.’29
Bin Siv La, from Porsat province, went on to say that she expected Nuon Chea to be found guilty and to 
be hanged for the suffering he had caused her and her family.
Nuon Chea’s defense lawyer argued that the evacuation of Phomn Penh ‘was done for military and 
practical reasons, and lacked criminal intent’, while the former Khmer Rouge leader claimed that Cambodians 
left the cities of their own free will and that the evacuation was a “humane act” designed to protect them from 
impending US bombings and the threat of starvation.30 These claims are unlikely to provide the truth sought 
by survivors for whom these accounts do not match their experience of the inhumane treatment they received. 
Nuon Chea went on further to blame the Vietnamese as well as unruly subordinates and differing factional 
interests among zone and district commanders for the suffering his regime caused.31 Khieu Samphan similarly 
claimed that his actions were based on good intentions: “My political conscience at that time, given the reality 
on the ground, whatever I did was to protect the weak; to uphold and respect their fundamental rights and 
to build a Cambodia that was strong, independent and peaceful.” Both men continued to maintain their 
innocence, and the National Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang called for the maximum penalty of life imprisonment 
for the alleged crimes against humanity committed by the accused.
Also at the closing hearings, lawyers for the civil parties outlined thirteen proposed reparation projects 
to be awarded if the accused are found guilty. The proposed projects were divided into three main categories: 
remembrance and memorialization, including establishment of an official remembrance day and memorial 
sites; rehabilitation, such as testimonial therapy and self-help groups implemented by TPO; and documentation 
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and education, including establishment of a Peace Study Centre and mobile exhibition project.32 If awarded, 
these reparations could contribute significantly to the psychosocial, symbolic and preventive aspects of 
transitional justice which can support individual and community, and hence national, peace and stability.33
The survivors whom I interviewed in Cambodia in 2009 were mostly happy with the idea of collective 
reparations to provide services for local communities, although one male survivor did argue that because of the 
disability he suffers as a result of torture by the Khmer Rouge that he should receive individual compensation. 
He was particularly critical and bitter about the ECCC process and its likely value for him personally. Another 
survivor, a woman who had lost all her family during the Khmer Rouge time whom I interviewed in Kampong 
Thom, indicated “I think I would be peaceful in my mind if I get any support if a road to my house would be 
built”. So far, little in the way of substantive reparations has been provided by the ECCC, but preparations for 
implementation of reparations projects from Case 002/01 is underway with the participation of civil parties 
and ongoing efforts to secure sufficient funding.34
Justice Compromised?
The ECCC has faced significant challenges in obtaining sufficient funding, overcoming delays in its start-
up and ongoing operations, upholding standards of fairness, and prosecuting crimes committed more than 30 
years ago. Even if it manages to meet these legal and operational demands, questions remain as to the ECCC’s 
ability to satisfy the goals of accountability, truth and justice, and most importantly, an understanding of why 
such crimes were committed by Cambodians against their own people.35
The temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC means it cannot prosecute crimes perpetrated by the Lon Nol 
government which preceded the Pol Pot regime, nor address the role of foreign governments in aiding 
and abetting the Khmer Rouge, nor crimes allegedly committed in subsequent years by Hun Sen and the 
Vietnamese-installed government. Its ability to end the culture of impunity still prevalent in Cambodia is 
therefore only partial. The personal jurisdiction of the ECCC is limited to bringing to justice “senior leaders 
of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations”.36 It 
could not try those Khmer Rouge leaders who had already died, including Pol Pot and Ta Mok, and of the five 
key Khmer Rouge leaders brought to trial, one has since died and one has been deemed unfit to stand trial, 
leaving one convicted in Case 001 and only two remaining to face the charges in Case 002.
Efforts to open a third case and try some lower level leaders have been thwarted by the Cambodian 
government and national ECCC prosecutors, although investigations are continuing in the hands of the 
international prosecution. Some have argued that it would be better to use the additional resources for 
alleviating poverty rather than an expensive tribunal, which will try only a few people.37 Kek Galabru, 
President of LICADHO, has asked whether such a tribunal would “bring justice to the Cambodian people and 
to fight against the culture of impunity? Or is it just a show trial for the international community, especially 
to appease the donors?”38 According to Maguire, some Cambodians had given up on punishment and ‘they 
simply seek acknowledgment’.39
Faith in the ECCC to provide truth and acknowledgement by the former Khmer Rouge leaders is likely to 
be misplaced, however, except in the case of Duch who confessed and sought the forgiveness of the Cambodian 
people for his role in the torture and killings that took place at Toul Sleng. By contrast, as discussed above, 
Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan have again portrayed themselves as patriots and defended their actions 
as being in the interests of the Cambodian people. Khieu Samphan, in an open letter in December 2003, 
admitted ‘systematic killings’, but in his 2004 book he claimed that he ‘didn’t know’ about Tuol Sleng and had 
no power to stop the atrocities.40 At his trial, Nuon Chea expressed some remorse in terms of the failure of 
the revolution, but as in the past admitted only that the regime made some mistakes and placed the blame on 
the Vietnamese,41 thus somewhat ironically reinforcing the genocide ideology that justified their persecution 
under the Khmer Rouge. As PoKempner suggests, rather than creating a new respect for the rule of law in 
Cambodia, the opportunity taken by the former Khmer Rouge leaders during their trials to continue to justify 
their actions could have the opposite effect.42
It is unfashionable to argue that the ECCC may be successfully meeting its goals, especially in the wake 
of criticisms of corruption and cooption of the Cambodian half of the court to meeting the political priorities 
of the Cambodian government, and undermining the international investigators’ attempts to bring other 
former Khmer Rouge leaders before the Court. However, based on evidence I collected during interviews 
in January-February 2009, and surveys conducted by the Documentation Center for Cambodia around the 
same time period, it is not necessarily clear that Cambodians would welcome a broadening of the cases under 
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investigation. As one female survivor interviewed in Battambang suggested to me, using a Khmer idiom 
similar to the idea that it would be ‘opening a can of worms’; there was fear in local communities that going 
beyond the five key leaders could destabilise Cambodian society. Another female survivor, also interviewed in 
Battambang, said she thought that there would be ‘chaos in the community’ if more were tried. Where might 
it end? With the trial of Hun Sen and others in the government who were associated with the crimes of the 
Khmer Rouge?
Of course, this conservative view could be seen as reflecting the control of the government over the 
population, as human rights advocates might argue, and therefore a position to be overridden in the interests 
of due process and the legal duty to prosecute. In other words, justice for the international community should 
prevail, a normative position reflecting the power and influence of the ‘justice cascade’.43 On the other hand, 
concerns about expanding the number of trials could be interpreted as a legitimate reason for regarding the 
trial of only the key leaders as sufficient in terms of setting an example and providing a symbol of accountability 
and recognition of the suffering of Khmer people during the Pol Pot era.
Some of the Cambodians whom I interviewed in January-February 2009 indicated that they thought 
only the top leaders should be prosecuted because they recognized that many of the lower level former Khmer 
Rouge were not to blame, or they observed that there was reconciliation but not justice or accountability 
for the leaders who were responsible. For example, a male survivor from Kampong Thom, who was a youth 
at the time of the Khmer Rouge period, said: ‘In my opinion it should be the top leaders [who are tried] 
as the lower rank officials were led by the top leaders’. He also said that he thought that the ECCC could 
bring reconciliation in the community. By contrast, others thought that more former Khmer Rouge should 
be prosecuted. For example, a male survivor who was 25 years old at the time of the Pol Pot regime whom I 
interviewed in Siem Reap said “I think not only those few should be tried … more should be tried” and he also 
thought the KRT would not bring reconciliation.
But for the women living in Battambang quoted above, opening the trials to more former Khmer Rouge 
beyond the top five leaders was seen as a threat to peaee and stability. This position reflects a more pragmatic 
approach to transitional justice that responds to the perceptions and expressed needs of locally affected 
communities even when these views my seem to run counter to international human rights norms.
Cambodians also expressed legitimate concerns that Case 002 has not yet considered the charges of 
genocide, and that the accused may die before the second part of the trial. This concern highlights the problem 
of separating the charges; even though there is a greater chance of reaching a conviction for some of the crimes 
while the defendants are still alive, it also reduces the chances that the survivors will achieve any sense of 
justice in relation to the more serious crimes which generated the majority of their suffering. It also limits the 
opportunity for truth recovery and acknowledgement from the former Khmer Rouge leaders in relation to 
these crimes if the second mini-trial is postponed until after the findings are pronounced for the first mini-
trial.44
I argue that the symbolic potential of the ECCC should not be underestimated, however. As explained 
by a survivor whom I interviewed in Phnom Penh in October 1999: “We have to punish [the former Khmer 
Rouge] … a matter of national responsibility … biggest case of impunity in the world and the mother of other 
smaller impunities in Cambodia.” Similarly in 2009, I interviewed Cambodians in a number of rural areas 
who had lost loved ones and suffered from the hardships during the Pol Pot era, who expressed relief that 
finally their suffering was receiving official acknowledgement by the international community and that they 
at last felt a sense of justice for what had happened to them. In commenting on his experience of the closing 
hearings of Case 002/01, Kranh Uth, an 82-year-old genocide survivor from Kandal Province, said: “In the KR 
regime, I lost 12 relatives. When I see the KR leaders in trial, my emotions seem not agitated anymore. The 
court is helping me to find what I have lost for all these years: justice and relief.”45 Similarly, as quoted earlier, 
60-year-old Kem Chem from Pursat Province referred to how the ECCC was providing ‘a real reconciliation’ 
and that when attending the court he felt like anger was released from his heart. Even if the former Khmer 
Rouge leaders in Case 002 continue to deny their culpability, the finding by the ECCC of individual guilt could 
provide a strong counter to this denial and the punishment meted out could go some may towards satisfying 
the calls for justice as well as contributing to healing and reconciliation.
The evidence suggests that a majority of ordinary Cambodians wanted a tribunal to be established. 
For example, in January 1999, 84,195 Cambodians signed a national petition calling for an international 
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tribunal; 5000 Cambodians rallied in support of an international tribunal in Phnom Penh in August 1999; 
surveys conducted by the Khmer Journalists’ Association in 1995 and the Institute of Statistics and Research 
on Cambodia (IFFRASORC) in 1999 both reported that 80% of the population wanted the former Khmer 
Rouge leaders to be prosecuted; and a survey of 7000 Cambodians conducted by DC-Cam in 2002 found 
that 57% wanted ‘the kind of accountability that only a tribunal could bring’.46 Further evidence of support 
from ordinary Cambodians for a tribunal has also been provided by interviews and surveys conducted by this 
author and other researchers.47
In 2009, when I returned after ten years to further explore Cambodian attitudes now that the ECCC 
had been established and the first trial was finally beginning, I found the evidence of support was less clear 
amongst the general population. Young people who had not experienced the Pol Pot era were sceptical and 
critical, or simply not interested in the court and its proceedings. Older Cambodians who had fought with the 
Khmer Rouge because they believed in the mission to oust the Lon Nol government and rid the country of 
US influence, were concerned about the ramifications of their association with the Khmer Rouge being falsely 
linked to the perpetration of human rights violations rather than also being seen as victims of the period. This 
was especially the case in relation to children who were forcefully recruited to carry out the relocation and 
societal reordering mandated by the Pol Pot clique.
By contrast, however, many of the Cambodians I interviewed in January-February 2009 were extremely 
interested in following the ECCC proceedings and some were keen to participate as civil parties. I interviewed 
a number of older Cambodians, some of whom were still showing signs of the trauma they had suffered, who 
wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to participate in the outreach activities being conducted by the 
Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) and a number of human rights and peace NGOs in rural 
areas, and to use the opportunity to educate their children about what happened during the Pol Pot era.48 
Many young Cambodians had been impatient with their parents’ unusual behavior such as hoarding food 
(presumably symptoms of trauma), had not believed their stories and were generally dismissive of the history 
of that era. A common refrain of older interviewees was that young people who were born after the Khmer 
Rouge era did not believe what had happened, and the observation that the ECCC would be helpful to educate 
young people so ‘the next generation will not follow the same bad actions’ (a female survivor interviewed in 
Kampong Thom who was a young woman during the Khmer Rouge period). A female survivor interviewed 
in Siem Reap mentioned that ‘most children including my own are reluctant to believe’. She said that ‘even 
though it happened a long time ago, I do not have peace in my mind … when I sit down alone I recall past 
events and I cry’.
The local NGO, Youth for Peace, has been particularly active in rural communities bringing young 
people and older people together to learn from each other: the older generations explain about the Khmer 
Rouge period while the younger generations explain about the ECCC.49 Working in conjunction with the 
International Center for Conciliation, Youth for Peace found that participants experienced a greater sense 
of community and reduced social barriers.50 In 2012, Youth for Peace inaugurated its first Community Peace 
Learning Center at a memorial site in Takeo province and it continues to play a leading role in furthering 
understanding of the Khmer Rouge period.51 DC-Cam, meanwhile, has led efforts to introduce a new 
school curriculum, which accurately portrays the history of the period, in addition to its key contribution to 
documentation of the genocide and support for victim participation in the trials at the ECCC.
Outreach is a critical yet often undervalued aspect of transitional justice, including in Cambodia where 
planning for outreach was inadequate in terms of political will, funding and institutional design.52 Outreach is 
necessary for justice to be served not only for the international community, but also for the local population 
by ensuring that they are informed and, where appropriate, able to participate in the trial proceedings. Thanks 
to the efforts primarily of civil society organizations, almost 4000 civil parties were registered in Case 002 and 
of these thirty-one gave evidence during the first mini-trial, and more than 100,000 members of the public 
attended the hearings.53
A parallel process, which can also enhance the effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms such as 
the ECCC, is what I have called ‘inreach’ – obtaining ideas, opinions and feedback from local populations 
about their expectations and responses to the transitional justice process.54 This two-way communication 
or dialogue can, I argue, increase the experience of local ownership and contribute more meaningfully to 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation. During my field research in 2009 I observed how DC-Cam was 
assisting in this process of inreach by conducting a survey to ascertain public attitudes towards the expansion 
of the trials to cover more than the key leaders already accused in Case 001 and Case 002.
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Both those who had experienced the Khmer Rouge period and those who had not, showed a keen interest 
in seeing documentaries of former Khmer Rouge leaders shown at outreach sessions, and later being able to 
go the Court to see the former leaders facing trial.55 Hearing others talk publicly and on film about what they 
had suffered seemed to be providing a sense of validity for their own experiences. In short, the psychosocial 
benefits of the ECCC seemed to be outweighing any dangers of retraumatization by revisiting the horrors of 
the past.56 My research provided evidence of the value of the ECCC for the psychological health of victims and 
survivors, as well as building family and community relations. For example, a female survivor I interviewed 
in Prey Veng spoke of feeling ’peace in [her] heart’ for the first time because of the KRT, while a male village 
chief interviewed in Battambang said that he would feel ‘peace in [his] mind’ when there was a trial of Khieu 
Samphan. Others showed great interest in the court and seeing those who had perpetrated the crimes against 
them being tried and punished, and many said that they thought the ECCC would bring reconciliation as 
well as justice. A female survivor interviewed in Kampot who was 15 at the time of the Khmer Rouge said she 
thought the top leaders “should be tried because they were treating us very badly then and because of them I 
became an orphan” and that she felt happy because there is a trial.
My findings have been supported and qualified by the results of research by Holmes and Ramji-Nogales57 
and Strasser et al58 who interviewed Cambodians in relation to their experiences of Case 001. Holmes and 
Ramji-Nogales found that victim participation in the ECCC can provide a form of reparative healing or 
transformative justice,59 but that this is limited because only a select few survivors of the Khmer Rouge 
regime are eligible to be civil parties.60 They observed that those who attended trials without being able to 
participate as civil parties were more likely to feel retraumatized and that without adequate psychosocial 
support, listening to the hearings might retard rather than promote healing.61 They also found that community 
dialogues supported by NGOs such as DC-Cam can ‘begin the process of community-wide healing’ in a way 
that can provide a more significant and lasting impact on reconciliation that the ECCC trials themselves.62
Strasser et al, meanwhile, concluded from their research in relation to Case 001 that some of the 
psychological dynamics of participating as civil parties were beneficial whilst others ‘carry the risk of 
increasing victims’ suffering’.63 They observed that civil parties appreciated the educational and preventive 
benefits of participation, but that they found it very difficult and painful attending the criminal proceedings, 
hearing the testimonies and being reminded of their own and their relatives’ suffering. Trial proceedings do 
not generally allow for the expression of ‘emotional truth’ and the rather ‘dry and factual’ way in which the 
evidence is heard does not allow survivors to access and better understand their ‘individual and collective 
pain and suffering’ in a way that can promote a healing or restorative truth, according to Strasser et al.64 They 
also speculate on how Duch’s requests for forgiveness could harm victims psychologically, as such forgiveness 
could only be contemplated by victims after truth and justice.65 Overall though, despite these challenges, 
Strasser et al concluded, consistent with my earlier findings, that the psychological benefits outweighed the 
potential harmful effects on survivors in three primary ways: acknowledgement and condemnation; providing 
testimony; and psychological support services.66 They also emphasized the critical contribution of TPO in 
enabling civil parties to ‘deal with stressful and controversial situations typical in a criminal proceeding’.67
On the other hand, there is evidence that many Cambodians are unaware or uninterested in the ECCC 
and its proceedings, although this level of knowledge has increased since the trials began.68 According to the 
latest survey conducted by the Berkeley Human Rights Center in 2010, 75% of Cambodians had a limited 
general knowledge about the ECCC, up from 61% in 2008. However, the researchers found little evidence 
of Cambodians with a detailed understanding of the Court.69 The limited outreach conducted by the ECCC 
to explain the capacity and functioning of the Court has made it difficult to manage expectations, which is 
undermining the impact of the justice achieved and has caused unnecessary distress for victims (for example, 
when their cases were rejected in Case 001).70
There is a need for a more comprehensive national support strategy to provide psychosocial assistance 
to foster individual and collective healing and reconciliation that goes beyond the impact of the ECCC.71 
The socioeconomic stresses experienced by many Cambodians also serve to undermine their ability to cope 
with the psychosocial impact of their suffering/trauma under the Khmer Rouge with which they are being 
confronted during the ECCC proceedings, supporting arguments for a more holistic and transformative 
approach to political as well as socioeconomic and psychosocial justice.72
There are also questions about the amount of resources required for the ECCC and whether this would 
be better spent on socioeconomic development. Funding shortfalls have been a continuing impediment to 
the efficient functioning of the ECCC and therefore its ability to satisfy the expectations of victims and other 
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Cambodians. The Court has faced at least two funding crises in late 2011 and again in February 2013 when 
it ran out of money and staff were not being paid. In October 2013, both Japan and the UK made significant 
new funding available for the international side of the Court following the Cambodian government’s 
announcement of bridging funds to enable the national side to complete its work in 2013.73 But this still leaves 
uncertainty regarding funding for 2014 and the successful completion of Case 002.
Justice for the Future?
I have argued elsewhere that in order for transitional justice to be transformative it needs to address 
the multiple justice needs and priorities of local affected populations, to transform relationships as well as 
structures and institutions, and to focus on the future as well as justice for past human rights violations.74 
In order to transform Cambodian society, therefore, a more holistic and future-oriented vision of justice is 
required than that provided by the ECCC, one that includes elements of restorative, socioeconomic, political 
and psychosocial justice in addition to retributive justice.
A model of transformative justice incorporates the need not only for justice for the past, but also justice in 
the future. The culture of impunity, which has prevailed in Cambodia, is about more than the failure to prosecute 
the former Khmer Rouge; it is also about the continuing lack of respect for the rule of law in a country which still 
operates politically on a patronage system where power is more important than the law.75 The ECCC is expected 
to contribute to the development of rule of law in Cambodia through its legacy program which will be important 
for assessing the value and impact of the ECCC on future law and order, peace and stability in Cambodia.
There have been mixed reactions so far to the Court’s ability to meet expectations in terms of capacity 
building through the development of rule of law, infrastructure and training of Cambodian legal personnel. 
Technical transfer of knowledge and skills appears to be occurring on an individual level, but there is limited 
evidence that this is being transformed into systemic and procedural reform in the judicial system. The Court 
is demonstrating a model of fair trial proceedings, although this is being undermined to some extent by the 
continuing accusations of corruption and political interference, which fail to provide a good example for 
developing the rule of law in Cambodia. The Court’s hybrid nature has led to internal conflict and affected the 
Court’s credibility, which feeds into the likely legacy impact.
There are also those who have argued against the imposition of Western-style legal justice provided 
by the ECCC as being alien to Khmer culture. According to Harris, such imposition of foreign systems and 
universal norms of justice ‘may be read by some sectors of Khmer society [those for whom to be Khmer is 
to be Buddhist] as an expression of contempt for their own traditions’.76 Some Cambodians have responded 
by expressing the desire to return to a Khmer approach to counter the influences of outsiders, which have in 
the past betrayed and neglected the needs and rights of the Cambodian people. They reject the modernist 
enterprise which privileges the Western rule of law approach, arguing for a need to reassert Khmer identity 
imbued with confidence rather than fear of the outside invader.
PoKempner argues, by contrast, that the insistence of Cambodians on international standards for the 
ECCC, far from being culturally alien, is a natural response to demand that their sufferings be considered 
as significant as those of Rwandans and Bosnians who were afforded the full international legal standards 
of an international tribunal.77 This argument is consistent with my observations and interviews in 2009, as 
well as my research in other cultural contexts where the impact of globalization and norm diffusion has led 
to calls for international criminal prosecutions of those accused of genocide and other mass human rights 
violations. Local culturally specific justice and reconciliation mechanisms may still be deemed appropriate, 
although not normally for the key leaders and most serious crimes. For example, a number of interviewees 
in 2009 mentioned the value of Buddhist philosophy for supporting reconciliation in Cambodia, although 
they had not experienced any specific reconciliation mechanisms in their local communities following the 
return of survivors and former low-level Khmer Rouge. At the same time, they were less enthusiastic about 
reconciliation with the former key leaders who had orchestrated the genocide, but rather considered that they 
should be held accountable and would, inevitably, suffer for what they had done.
According to PoKempner, what is needed in terms of societal transformation in Cambodia is the building 
of a new national identity, which repudiates the narrative of the past and reflects values of impartiality, 
legality and fairness.78 Thus, accompanying the legal trials with campaigns for public education, community 
dialogue and reconciliation could enhance the value of the ECCC, as a forum for reconstituting Khmer 
identity. McGrew similarly argues for the need to restore dignity, identity and belonging as part of justice and 
reconciliation efforts in Cambodia.79
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My field research conducted in 2009 suggested that the civil society outreach efforts to support the 
ECCC were contributing to this identity transformation to only a limited degree, although in some instances 
the relationship-building included in some of these outreach activities appeared to be making a significant 
impact on promoting understanding and social transformation, at least at the community level, to overcome 
the legacies of genocide. Civil society programs have subsequently expanded, including the work of Youth 
for Peace in transforming mass killing sites into sites of remembrance and peace education, and DC-Cam’s 
emphasis on community dialogues to complement its outreach (and inreach) programs in relation to the 
ECCC. Others are conducting Buddhist ceremonies and TPO is promoting culturally adapted psychosocial 
interventions.80 McGrew proposes a “joint narrative approach” which could further complement the ECCC 
by providing opportunities for community dialogue between perpetrators and victims which could promote 
the compassion of Buddhism at the same time as satisfying the survivors’ “needs and desires to know why 
Khmer killed Khmer”.81
The ECCC seems to be having little impact, meanwhile, on the national political level of justice. Hun 
Sen and his government continue to rule Cambodia with little regard for human rights and the rule of law, 
and civil society continues to have minimal if any impact on government policies. As discussed earlier, the 
legacy of the ECCC has not so far had any significant impact on legal systems and experiences of justice. The 
governance and participation sector of peacebuilding has been left unaddressed since the UN-sponsored 
elections in 1993, and Cambodians do not expect that the government will respond to their needs and 
priorities. For example, a male survivor whom I interviewed in Phnom Penh in February 2009 said that the 
KRT was helping him to feel peace in his mind, but only at a low level because he was “influenced by politics”. 
A male survivor whom I interviewed in Kampot said that “today we have corruption so powerful people can 
change the situation from black to white, or white to black”. Transitional justice provided by the ECCC has not 
addressed the need for political justice in Cambodia.
Similarly, there are dissatisfactions that socioeconomic justice has not been sufficiently addressed. The 
reparations offered by the ECCC provide some sense of justice for past suffering and have the potential to 
contribute to community development, but they can do little to transform extreme social inequalities that 
continue to plague Cambodian society. The perception continues that while most survivors of the Khmer 
Rouge genocide live in poverty, the former Khmer Rouge leaders are relatively well-off economically. Even 
though they have been arrested and are being tried by the ECCC, the former key leaders are perceived to have 
better living conditions than most rural Cambodians. This continuing experience of relative deprivation, for 
some genocide survivors, undermines any sense of peace, justice or healing they might otherwise feel as a 
result of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.
Finally, the focus on documentation of mass human rights violations through DC-Cam and criminal 
accountability of high level Khmer Rouge leaders through the ECCC does not address the structural and 
other root causes of the genocide, nor does it deal with the need for justice in relation to the many lower level 
Khmer Rouge perpetrators. This paper has argued for the strengthening of psychosocial interventions and 
promotion of reconciliation as an appropriate means of addressing the lack of justice for the mass of lower 
level Khmer Rouge cadre who often also perceive themselves as victims. The current approach also does not 
allow for truth recovery and justice in relation to the United States and its bombing of Cambodia during 
the Vietnam War and contribution to the ease with which Pol Pot was able to gain popular support for his 
revolutionary movement to oust the pro-US Lon Nol government. The policies of the US and other foreign 
powers helped to create the structural context, which enabled Pol Pot to carry out his revolutionary genocide. 
Addressing these root causes through the truth-telling functions of a truth and reconciliation commission 
could support a more transformative justice process and outcome in Cambodia by allowing more crimes to be 
addressed, as well as wider participation and access to more healing or emotional truth than is possible with 
the ECCC. The benefits would, as with the ECCC, be dependent on the provision of sufficient psychosocial 
support to assist survivors to deal with the process and reduce the chances of retraumatization.
Conclusion
After more than 30 years, the ECCC is conducting trials of some of the key former Khmer Rouge leaders, 
marking an important step in ending the culture of impunity in Cambodia. However, despite evidence of public 
support for the establishment of the tribunal, it seems unlikely that the ECCC will be able to meet all of the 
expectations of the Cambodian people. From my field research in 1999, I concluded that Cambodians needed 
to know what happened during the Pol Pot era and why, and they needed acknowledgement from former 
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Khmer Rouge leaders that what they did was wrong. Ten years later, my research revealed that these needs 
remained unfulfilled. Whilst the ECCC has subsequently provided some justice in the form of international 
acknowledgement and punishment for the perpetrators, which is arguably better than none, it has so far not 
answered the most important question of why the genocide occurred. Whilst Duch confessed and apologized 
repeatedly for his crimes in relation to S-21, the senior leaders who orchestrated the genocide being tried in 
Case 002, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, only belatedly expressed some qualified regrets whilst at the same 
time continuing to maintain their innocence. Both leaders claimed ignorance and lack of responsibility for the 
atrocities, which occurred, and defended their actions as being driven by the need to rebuild the nation in the 
face of foreign threats and interference.
It is therefore questionable the extent to which genocide survivors will feel a sense of justice and 
satisfaction from Case 002, and even more so given the increasing likelihood that the two aging defendants 
could die before the trial is completed and the convictions recorded. On the other hand, at the time of the first 
trial, I found evidence that on a personal, psychosocial level, the ECCC was arguably worthwhile in terms of 
providing a sense of justice and peace for at least some survivors. I was less optimistic before I conducted my 
field research in 2009, and to some extent surprised by the feelings of inner peace and reconciliation that were 
being promoted because of the court’s existence. My observations were consistent with the findings of other 
subsequent research that the psychological benefits of civil party participation in Case 001 outweighed the 
risks of retraumatization, at least when sufficient psychosocial support was also provided. The symbolic value 
of Case 002 should not be underestimated, either, as Cambodians see their former leaders being subjected 
to trial and imprisonment, suggesting that possibly some justice, however flawed, may be better than none.
The ECCC is nevertheless limited in its ability to fully satisfy the needs of justice for the Cambodian 
people and the international community, especially given the challenges of funding, high profile resignations, 
allegations of corruption and political interference, and slow progress. A greater emphasis on outreach and 
inreach could assist in improving the effectiveness of the Court, even within the constraints outlined in this 
paper. Even though justice through the ECCC is an important goal, retributive justice only for key individuals 
through a tribunal without truth and acknowledgement is only partial justice. The Court is unable to address 
the structural causes of the genocide, and unlikely to end the prevailing culture of impunity without a more 
constructive engagement with the Cambodian government in order to foster the rule of law throughout the 
country. Ending the bigger impunity is not necessarily contributing to ending all the smaller impunities in 
Cambodian society. This research suggests that other types of justice are also needed, including political and 
socioeconomic justice, in addition to an increased emphasis on psychosocial interventions, for Cambodians 
to fully benefit from the ECCC and to strengthen its contribution to long term recovery from genocide and 
ongoing peace and stability in the country.
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Abstract: The commission of genocide and other large-scale international crimes typically involves a multitude of perpetrators 
acting in concert. As such, the pursuit of individual criminal accountability following the perpetration of mass crimes has 
involved oft-controversial decisions of whom to prosecute. This challenge is exemplified by the ongoing controversy in 
Cambodia concerning the proper scope of prosecutions at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) 
for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979, as the Court’s third and fourth cases have languished amidst 
considerable controversy for years. This paper examines whether the presumed suspects in the two cases legally qualify as 
individuals “most responsible” for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia by considering known information 
about each suspect in light of available international criminal law jurisprudence and argues that all suspects fall well within 
any reasonable legal definition of the term “most responsible” as each is implicated directly in extremely grave crimes. As such, 
it is concluded that there is no viable legal alternative available to bring the two cases to a close save for trial. 
Keywords: Khmer Rouge, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), International Criminal Law, 
Personal Jurisdiction
Introduction
The commission of genocide and other international crimes are typically large-scale group undertakings. 
As a result, the selection of whom to prosecute has presented a recurring challenge for international criminal 
law (“ICL”) practitioners in post-atrocity situations.1 Within ICL practice to date, prosecutors have primarily 
targeted individuals who held positions of significant power or were implicated in especially grave crimes.2 
Meanwhile, lower-profile national or military courts have been sometimes utilized to prosecute less notorious 
perpetrators.3
The difficulty of selecting the proper scope of prosecutions following mass atrocity crimes is exemplified 
by the long-simmering controversy concerning how many suspects will ultimately be prosecuted at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), a special hybrid wing of the Cambodian 
judiciary created in collaboration with the United Nations (“UN”), commonly referred to as the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal.4 The Khmer Rouge held power in Cambodia from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.5 During this 
time, when the country was officially renamed Democratic Kampuchea (“DK”), extremely grave international 
crimes were undoubtedly committed against millions of victims by thousands of individual perpetrators. In 
designing the ECCC, the Cambodian government and UN agreed, following protracted negotiations, that the 
Court would have “personal jurisdiction over senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were 
most responsible” for specified international and domestic crimes committed in Cambodia during the Khmer 
Rouge’s reign.6
This paper considers the meaning of the phrase “most responsible” at the ECCC in relation to highly 
controversial Cases 003 and 004 at the Court, which have languished in their pre-trial investigatory phases for 
years. More specifically, this paper argues that the term should be interpreted in accordance with prevailing 
ICL jurisprudence and suggests that all suspects in the two cases fall well within the purview of any reasonable 
legal interpretation of the term “most responsible.” As such, it is concluded that there is no legitimate legal 
mechanism – other than trials – available to bring Cases 003/004 to proper conclusions and thus, any effort to 
shutter the cases must be viewed as a product of considerations extraneous to the legal principles applicable 
to the ECCC.
To make this argument, a brief overview of the convoluted and controversial histories of Cases 003/004 
is provided, followed by an explanation of why resort to ICL jurisprudence for the ECCC to properly interpret 
the term “most responsible” is warranted by both law and simple necessity. Next, an overview of relevant ICL 
jurisprudence concerning personal jurisdiction and relative culpability assessments, drawn from the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and to a 
more limited extent, International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is provided.7 This jurisprudence is then compared 
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to the known facts concerning the suspects in ECCC Cases 003/004. Through this analysis it is argued that 
due to the extreme gravity of the criminal allegations against all suspects in both cases, combined with the 
apparent high degree of responsibility therein of each respective suspect, all four presumed suspects in the 
two cases fall squarely within the class of persons properly considered “most responsible” for the crimes 
committed during the DK period in Cambodia. While this conclusion may be politically and/or financially 
inconvenient for certain stakeholders and interested parties, from a legal standpoint this paper asserts it is 
essentially unavoidable and thus, should the cases be dismissed ostensibly on personal jurisdictional grounds, 
such action would deeply compromise the already fragile integrity of the ECCC as a legal institution. Thus, it 
is further concluded that should Case 003 or 004 be shuttered prior to trial, a better course would be for the 
ECCC, UN, Cambodian government, donors and other stakeholders to simply admit that a lack of resources 
and/or willpower to proceed with the cases are the cause in order to protect the overall legal integrity of the 
Court and by extension, any judgements reached in Cases 001 and 002.8
The Case 003/004 Controversy in Cambodia
The ECCC utilizes a civil law process involving an investigation instigated by the Court’s Co-Prosecutors9, 
but largely carried out by two Co-Investigating Judges (“CIJs”).10 The ECCC Co-Prosecutors are duty-bound 
to submit an “Introductory Submission” to the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges (“OCIJ”), triggering an 
official investigation of a suspect, when they develop “reason to believe” that the suspect(s) in question is 
implicated in crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction.11 Once seized by an Introductory Submission, the CIJs 
have a “compulsory” duty to investigate the allegations contained in the submission, seeking both inculpatory 
and exculpatory evidence, and thereafter to issue a “Closing Order” that either commits the suspect(s) to trial 
and specifies which charge(s) will be adjudicated or alternatively, dismisses all charges effectively ending the 
case.12 It is within this investigative phase that Cases 003/004 have languished amidst considerable controversy 
since being initiated by then-International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit on 7 September 2009.13
There is widespread speculation that the Cambodian government is working to prevent both cases from 
proceeding to trial. National ECCC Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang opposed the initiation of Cases 003/004,14 
leading to Petit proceeding alone with the filing of Introductory Submissions in both cases.15 One widely 
cited example of the government’s apparent opposition to Cases 003/004 occurred in 2010, when Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen reportedly “clearly affirmed that case three is not allowed” during a meeting with 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.16 Although since such time, Cambodian government officials have 
been more equivocal when commenting on the two cases, the perception that the government monolithically 
opposes the two cases remains largely in place and is routinely repeated by international media outlets when 
discussing the cases. Such a perception undoubtedly sends powerful signals to Cambodians with some stake in 
either case and public perception of the wishes of elite political figures in Cambodia often strongly influences 
local decision-making processes. In regards to Cases 003/004, the perception that Prime Minister Hun Sen’s 
ruling Cambodian People’s Party continues to oppose trials is both reflected and further reinforced by the fact 
that Cambodian lawyers, judges and staff at the ECCC have consistently opposed efforts by their international 
colleagues to move either case along towards trial.
Throughout 2011, the OCIJ was subjected to a steady stream of criticism from rights groups and jurists, 
who accused National Co-Investigation Judge You Bunleng and then-International Co-Investigating Judge 
Siegfried Blunk of colluding to scuttle Cases 003/004 at the behest of the Cambodian government.17 These 
criticisms grew louder when the still-confidential Introductory Submissions in both cases were leaked by 
an online New Zealand news organization, as the two documents detailed allegations of extremely grave 
crimes.18 In April 2011, the Co-Investigating Judges closed the investigation into Case 003, but refrained from 
issuing the official Closing Order necessary to end the case or commit it for trial, leaving it in a state of legal 
limbo.19 Next, in August of 2011, Co-Investigating Judges You and Blunk released a list of crimes sites relevant 
to Case 004 in a document in which both judges expressed “serious doubts whether the suspects [in Case 004] 
are ‘most responsible’.”20 This disclosure also confirmed that the Case 004 investigation focused on crime sites 
widely believed to be locations where hundreds of thousands of victims were killed during the DK period.21
Eventually, amidst mounting criticism and allegations of investigatory misconduct, Judge Blunk resigned 
in October 2011, citing the appearance of political interference as his motivation.22 Blunk’s replacement, 
Reserve International Co-Investigating Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, publicly vowed to aggressively 
investigate Cases 003/004,23 but was in turn, blocked from officially removing the “reserve” tag from his 
title by the Cambodian Supreme Council of Magistracy, which withheld its perfunctory acknowledgment 
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of Kasper-Ansermet’s succession.24 Judge You (who incidentally, sits on the Supreme Council of Magistracy 
along with ECCC National Co-Prosecutor Chea Leang) also refused to work with Judge Kasper-Ansermet in 
any capacity, stating in a press release that Judge Kasper-Ansermet “lack[ed] legal authority” to perform any 
duties as an investigating judge.25 Nonetheless, Judge Kasper-Ansermet began to investigate both cases and 
attempted to officially reopen the Case 003 investigation.26 Eventually, after being stonewalled in his efforts 
to investigate for months, Judge Kasper-Ansermet, clearly frustrated by the efforts to block his attempts to 
investigate Cases 003/004, stated that he was unable to continue fulfilling his duties due to the “dysfunctional” 
climate within the OCIJ and tendered his own resignation.27 His resignation was followed in short order 
by Judge Kasper-Ansermet releasing a series of decisions revealing the steps taken by national ECCC staff 
members to stymie his attempts to investigate Cases 003/004.28 Judge Kasper-Ansermet also released two 
further decisions in which he opined that both suspects in Case 003 qualify as “most responsible” under 
ECCC Law and therefore the Case 003 investigation should continue.29
The UN appealed for cooperation from the Cambodian government in appointing a new International 
Co-Investigating Judge30 and Judge Mark Harmon was approved as the new Co-Investigating Judge on 26 
October 2012.31 The rift between the national and international officers at the ECCC over pursuing these cases 
appears to remain however. On 19 December 2012 Judge Harmon unilaterally released a document detailing 
fourteen additional crime sites he was investigating for Case 004 without any comment from his counterpart, 
Judge You.32 Next, on 28 February 2013, Judges Harmon and You issued a joint press release that contained 
separate and diametrically opposed statements concerning Case 003 and whether the investigation was 
ongoing or completed.33 Since Judge Harmon’s appointment he has proceeded with his investigatory duties, 
while Judge You has indicated that he will not investigate either case any further.34 Meanwhile, the pressing 
need to move forward in a timely manner was underscored in March 2013 with the death of ECCC Case 002 
accused Ieng Sary and again in June 2013 with the death of presumed Case 003 suspect Sou Met. Nevertheless, 
even as the ECCC’s flagship Case 002 nears a trial judgment the first of a planned series of discrete trials, Cases 
003/004 continue to languish amidst considerable uncertainty35 and subject to a fundamental divide between 
the Court’s national and international judges and staff.36
While the fate of Cases 003/004 remains tenuously uncertain, this paper argues that as the ECCC was 
created to provide a measure of justice for the millions of Cambodians who suffered under the Khmer Rouge 
regime and to also help improve the rule of law in Cambodia by serving as a model judicial institution, the 
only legitimate course of action at this juncture is for the Court to pursue each existing case to its proper legal 
conclusion, based upon a thorough review of all available evidence. As pointed out by Robert Petit’s successor, 
now-departed ECCC International Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley, “the importance of [Cases 003/004] more 
than anything, whatever happens at the end, is that the Cambodian people see a proper legal process taking 
place.”37 This statement underscores the importance of seeing Case 003/004 through for the overall integrity 
of the ECCC as a legal institution, to both protect the legacy of the Court’s other cases and to ensure that the 
Court cannot be seen as condoning the political interference and corruption that currently runs rampant 
throughout Cambodia’s national judicial system.38 Thus, whether Cases 003/004 reach their proper legal 
conclusions will serve to either stand against, or reinforce the current rampant subversion of the rule of law in 
the service of the interests of Cambodia’s political elite.
An Exercise in Discretion: Interpreting the Term “Most Responsible”
a. The Duch Appeal Judgment: A “Policy Guide”
While the controversy concerning the future of Cases 003/004 has endured, key jurisprudence concerning 
the meaning of the jurisdictional language covering those “most responsible” and “senior leaders” in the 
Agreement and ECCC Law has emerged. On 3 February 2012, the ECCC’s highest body, the Supreme Court 
Chamber (“SCC”), handed down its first judgment, in Case 001, concluding the case against accused former 
Khmer Rouge prison chief Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch.39 In its judgment, the Chamber dismissed the defence’s 
argument that Duch falls outside of the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC and increased his sentence from 
35 years to a life term.40 On the issue of personal jurisdiction, the Chamber held that the jurisdiction of the 
ECCC is limited to “senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge who are among the most responsible [and] non-senior 
leaders of the Khmer Rouge who are [also] among the most responsible.”41 The Chamber therefore held any 
Khmer Rouge official considered “most responsible” is a proper prosecutorial target at the ECCC.
The Chamber retreated however, from interpreting the qualifiers “senior leaders” and “most responsible” 
as true justiciable jurisdictional requirements later in its judgment, holding further that:
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The terms ‘senior leaders’ and ‘most responsible’ are not jurisdictional requirements […], but operate 
exclusively as investigatorial and prosecutorial policy to guide the independent discretion of the [CIJs] and 
Co-Prosecutors as to how best to target their finite resources […]42
Concerning the phrase “most responsible”, the Chamber reasoned that the term must be interpreted as 
a guide to discretion rather than true jurisdictional requirement for three main reasons: (1) “[t]here is no 
objective method for the Trial Chamber to decide on, compare, and then rank the criminal responsibility of 
all Khmer Rouge officials”; (2) “the notion of comparative criminal responsibility is inconsistent” with the ban 
on “the defence of superior orders”; and (3) “the determination of whether an accused is ‘most responsible’ 
requires a large amount of discretion.”43 The import of the SCC’s holding is that “an accused before the ECCC 
cannot object to the Trial Chamber’s jurisdiction on the basis that the [CIJs] did not limit the indictment 
to ‘senior leaders’ or the ‘most responsible’, absent a showing that the [CIJs] abused their discretion.”44 The 
Chamber further noted that the “power of review by the Trial Chamber [regarding personal jurisdiction 
decisions] is extremely narrow in scope” and requires demonstrating “bad faith, or a showing of unsound 
professional judgment.”45 The Chamber also importantly noted that in the likely scenario that the two CIJs 
disagree and where the “reason for disagreement on the execution of an action, decision, or order is whether 
or not a suspect or charged person is a ‘senior leader’ or ‘most responsible’” then, absent a super-majority 
decision to the contrary by the appellate ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber, ‘the investigation shall proceed.’”46 The 
Case 001 Appeal Judgment thus renders determinations of who qualifies as “most responsible” a policy 
guidance tool, rather than true jurisdiction element, bounded solely by the outer limits of good-faith and 
sound professional decision-making.
While the Case 001 Appeal Judgment answered some of the most pressing questions concerning the 
meaning of the terms “senior leader” and “most responsible”, the SCC failed to indicate what factors are properly 
considered in making such inherently subjective determinations. As it currently stands, whether Cases 003/004 
can be shuttered prior to trial without violating the ECCC’s foundational legal documents turns on the issues 
of the proper bounds of judicial discretion and sound professional judgment in interpreting the phrases “senior 
leader” and “most responsible” within the Agreement and ECCC Law. This paper argues that because the 
meaning of the term “most responsible” is not readily apparent, defined in the travaux préparatoires relevant 
to the ECCC or in any other source of law or interpretation directly applicable to the Court, guidance must be 
sought from international law in determining the proper factors that must be considered in order for relevant 
ECCC authorities to exercise sound professional judgment in determining whether a suspect before the ECCC 
qualifies as a “most responsible.” Furthermore, such jurisprudence dictates that to make such an assessment, the 
gravity of the alleged crime(s) and level of contribution thereto by the suspect in question must be considered 
and compared relative to other cases before the same court or tribunal. According to this process of analysis, 
because each of the presumed suspects in Cases 003/004 are implicated as key players in the perpetration of 
extremely grave crimes, involving the systematic abuse and killing of many thousands of victims, each suspect 
should be presumptively considered amongst those “most responsible.” Any other conclusion would be contrary 
to basic logic and therefore presumptively the product of bad faith and/or unsound professional judgment.
b. Interpreting ECCC Law
The Agreement establishing the ECCC is a bilateral treaty to which the UN and Cambodia are parties. 
The ECCC Law is legislation passed to effectuate the terms of the Agreement. As such, both documents are 
to be interpreted according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: “A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”47
In his departing decisions regarding personal jurisdiction and the suspects in Case 003, Judge Laurent 
Kasper-Ansermet noted the holdings of the SCC in Case 001 and acknowledged that the gravity of the alleged 
crimes and the suspect’s relative degree of responsibility therein are the two main factors to consider regarding 
assessing whether a suspect qualifies as “most responsible.”48 The decisions also conform with ICL practice, as 
is demonstrated infra in this paper.49 Scholar Steve Heder and former United States Ambassador-at-Large for 
War Crimes Issues and current UN Special Expert on the ECCC David Scheffer50 have both provided detailed 
overviews of the negotiations and associated travaux préparatoires leading to the Agreement and ultimate 
formation of the ECCC.51 While both scholars offer important insights into the protracted negotiations that 
culminated in the Court’s creation, they both only go so far as to reach the general conclusion that at no point 
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was there any agreement – tacit or otherwise – between the UN and Cambodia that the ECCC would prosecute 
a specific, limited number of individuals or that the precise identities of whom would be prosecuted were 
decided prior to the formation of the Court. Heder further concludes that while the Cambodian government 
may have not been pleased with the necessity of ceding power to ECCC investigators, prosecutors and judges 
to decide who would be investigated and tried, such a concession is inherent in Cambodia’s signature, as 
UN officials were unequivocal that suspects could not be pre-selected.52 Scheffer similarly concludes that 
determinations of which suspects qualify as “most responsible” must be made pursuant to a reasonable 
interpretation of the term and questions whether under any such reasonable formulation, the likely suspects 
in Cases 003 and 004 could properly be considered to not qualify as “most responsible.”53
The conclusions of both Heder and Scheffer thus both beg the question of how ECCC lawyers and judges 
are to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the term “most responsible”, especially given that the term is not 
explicitly defined anywhere in the Agreement or ECCC Law. The Agreement itself provides for the procedure 
to be utilized in precisely such an instance of interpretive lack of clarity. Article 12(1) states:
The procedure shall be in accordance with Cambodian law. Where Cambodian law does not deal with a 
particular matter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the interpretation or application of a relevant rule 
of Cambodian law, or where there is a question regarding the consistency of such a rule with international 
standards, guidance may also be sought in procedural rules established at the international level.
This process of interpretive guidance is echoed in the ECCC Law Articles 20 new, 23 new and 33 new, 
which direct the Co-Prosecutors, Co-Investigating Judges and Trial Chamber Judges respectively, to remedy 
uncertainty regarding interpretation or application of the procedures applicable to the ECCC by seeking 
guidance in procedural rules established at the international level.54
c. The Bounds of Discretion and Sound Professional Judgment
Given that resort to the ordinary meaning of the term “most responsible” provides little guidance in the 
context of personal jurisdiction for international crimes and (as demonstrated by Heder and Scheffer) the 
negotiating history and travaux préparatoires simply establish that the precise number of suspects was never 
agreed upon, Article 12(1) of the Agreement clearly dictates that Cambodian law should next be canvassed 
for potential guidance. Personal jurisdictional regimes predicated on relative degrees of culpability, however, 
are inimical to the very foundation of typical domestic criminal legal regimes, as in most domestic criminal 
prosecutions it is assumed that any person suspected of a serious crime will be investigated and, if the evidence 
warrants, committed to trial. There is no space in such systems for prosecutors or judges to determine that 
an individual may be responsible for a very serious crime, yet is not a proper suspect to commit to trial 
because he or she does not fall amongst those “most responsible” for the crime in question. Instead, domestic 
penal codes presuppose that if there is sufficient evidence implicating an individual in a crime, they will be 
prosecuted without any further inquiry necessary.55
In light of this general assumption that serious crimes will be prosecuted according to the evidence, 
unsurprisingly there are no provisions within Cambodian penal law that provide guidance in interpreting 
what individuals are properly considered “most responsible” for international crimes. Instead, the Criminal 
Procedure Code of the Kingdom of Cambodia, adopted and entered into force in 2007 by the Cambodian 
Ministry of Justice,56 only provides limited guidance concerning the conduct of pre-trial investigatory 
procedures and duties and the basic boundaries of discretion in regard to these procedures. On this topic, 
the Code is similar in many ways to the investigatory procedures in place at the ECCC itself. The Code 
dictates that in domestic prosecutions, a prosecutor instigates an investigation. And via a “requisition”, the 
prosecutor confers mandatory jurisdiction on an investigating judge to complete an investigation.57 In regards 
to investigatory discretion, Article 122 of the Code dictates that investigations are “mandatory” for felonies 
and “optional” for misdemeanors.58 This limited discretion takes place when an investigating judge receives a 
requisition from the prosecutor and once an investigation commences, Article 127 of the Code dictates that 
the presiding investigating judge “shall perform all investigations that are useful to ascertaining the facts” and 
further, “shall have the obligation to investigate for charging or acquitting.”59 These mandatory duties mirror 
those which appear in the ECCC’s Internal Rules, which dictate that the Co-Prosecutors “shall” open an 
investigation when they have reason to believe a crime within the ECCC’s jurisdiction has been committed60 
and that judicial investigations are “compulsory for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC.”61
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In order to conclude a domestic criminal investigation, an investigating Cambodian judge must issue 
a “settlement warrant”62 which is similar to the mandatory “Closing Order” at the ECCC.63 The domestic 
settlement warrant forwards a case for trial or dismissal, the latter in the form of a “non-suit” order.64 Article 
247 of the Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code further states that the “investigating judge shall issue a 
non-suit order in the following circumstances: (1) The act committed was not a felony, misdemeanor or petty 
offense; (2) The perpetrators who committed acts are still not known; [or] (3) There is not enough evidence 
to charge the accused person.
 There is no indication of other discretionary grounds upon which an investigating judge can issue a 
non-suit order or otherwise decline to forward a case for trial, but each settlement warrant “shall always 
bear reasons”65 and is appealable to the appellate Investigation Chamber of the Cambodian judiciary. The 
settlement warrant procedure utilized in ordinary Cambodian criminal courts can be contrasted with Rule 
67(3) of the ECCC’s Internal Rules, which states that the “Co-Investigating Judges shall issue a Dismissal 
Order in the following circumstances: (1) The acts in question do not amount to crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ECCC; (2) The perpetrators of the acts have not been identified; or (3) There is not sufficient evidence 
against the Charged Person or persons of the charges.”66
As with the Cambodian Criminal Procedure Code, nowhere in any law directly applicable to the ECCC, 
is it suggested that additional, discretionary grounds exist upon which the Co-Investigating Judges can choose 
to issue a Dismissal Order.
Article 261 of the Cambodian Criminal Code also dictates that when receiving a complaint concerning 
an investigation, the appellate Investigation Chamber “shall examine the regularity of the procedures and the 
good conduct of the proceedings [and if] a reason for annulling is found, the Investigation Chamber may 
discretionarily nullify the whole or parts of such proceedings.”67 The Investigation Chamber may order further 
investigation if it deems such an act “useful” and can appoint one of its sitting judges to assume the authority 
of an investigating judge in order to do so.68 If the Investigation Chamber takes over an investigation, the judge 
appointed by the Chamber conducts further investigation and the Chamber concludes the investigation in the 
same manner as the original investigating judge, by issuing a settlement warrant either committing a suspect 
to trial or directing issuance of a non-suit.69
Consequently, Cambodian law provides scant guidance in sketching the boundaries of the discretion 
ECCC Co-Investigating Judges enjoy in assessing which suspects are properly considered either “senior 
leaders” or “most responsible” for the crimes committed during the DK period in Cambodia. For the most part, 
Cambodian criminal procedural law mirrors the provisions in place at the ECCC, found in the ECCC Law and 
ECCC Rules, which dictate that investigations are mandatory for crimes within the ECCC’s jurisdiction, all 
of which are clearly serious and that for such serious crimes, dismissal prior to trial is only a proper outcome 
when the evidence against a suspect is deficient in some way critical to a successful prosecution. Thus, if 
anything, a comparative analysis of Cambodian and ECCC procedural law governing investigatory powers 
suggests that discretion to dismiss charges against individuals who could likely be successfully prosecuted for 
serious crimes should be construed extremely narrowly, as such a power is not explicitly provided for in either 
body of law.
d. The Need for International Legal Guidance
In sum, there was no clear consensus amongst the drafters of the Agreement concerning the definition 
of the term “most responsible” within the Agreement and ECCC Law. Similarly, nowhere in law directly 
applicable to the ECCC or Cambodian penal law is there any mention of concept of discretionary investigatory 
trial committal powers predicated on assessments of the relative culpability amongst criminal suspects or 
suggesting a definition of the term “most responsible.” Indeed, this outcome is wholly unsurprising, as limited 
personal jurisdictional regimes over serious crimes based on relative assessments of individual culpability are 
solely and distinctly features of ICL.
Furthermore, resorting to the “object and purpose” of the Agreement to seek insight into the proper 
definition of the term, as dictated by the Vienna Convention, results in problems of circularity, as the stated 
object and purpose of the Agreement itself is to bring to justice “senior leaders” and others “most responsible” 
for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge period.70 There is no apparent plain meaning of the term that would 
make any sense within criminal proceedings and because Cambodian law is predictably provides little help in 
defining this jurisdictional concept, both the Agreement and ECCC Law dictate that international law should 
be turned to for assistance in arriving at this critical determination.
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As demonstrated below, while international law intentionally refrains from providing an explicit 
universal definition of relative levels of culpability, ICL jurisprudence does suggest what types of individuals 
presumptively qualify as amongst those “most responsible” and clearly dictates that any proper decision 
concerning the relative culpability of an individual must be based on an appraisal of the gravity of the alleged 
crime(s) and the suspect’s degree of responsibility therein. This assessment process must also use other 
suspects/accused tried by the same authority as comparative benchmarks in order to avoid inconsistent or 
conflicting results.
e. The Concept of “Most Responsible” According to International Criminal Law
Once one determines that it is necessary to look to international law for guidance in interpreting the 
term “most responsible” at the ECCC, one must next consider where to look for useful legal principles. 
Given that limited jurisdictional regimes based on relative culpability assessments are wholly unique to 
ICL, jurisprudence from this discipline appears to be good place to start. Indeed, a robust jurisprudence 
from the SCSL, ICTY and to a lesser extent, ICC on issues of relative culpability, personal jurisdiction and 
the selection of suspects, combine to offer some helpful guiding principles on the key issue of the proper 
process and considerations in assessing issues of relative culpability. Practice at these courts and tribunals 
clearly demonstrate that the two main considerations in determining culpability are the gravity of the alleged 
crimes and the degree of responsibility therein of the individual in question. Moreover, within existing ICL 
jurisprudence, gravity and responsibility are to be considered within the context of the overall historical 
narrative at issue and in comparison to other cases, though not in an overly formal or mathematical fashion.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The “Greatest Responsibility”
In 2000, the UN Security Council requested the formation of a court with “personal jurisdiction over 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for the commission of international crimes within Sierra Leone.71 
The result was the SCSL, a hybrid court created pursuant to a treaty between the UN and the government of 
Sierra Leone with the mandate “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 
November 1996.”72 Article 1 of the SCSL Statute confers “the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law.”73
The phrase “greatest responsibility” was a topic of much debate prior to the creation of the SCSL. Then 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that this language should be “understood as an indication of a 
limitation on the number of accused by reference to their command authority and the gravity and scale of the 
crimes [and] propose[d] that the more general term ‘persons most responsible’ should be used” and observed:
While those ‘most responsible’ obviously include the political or military leadership, others in command 
authority down the chain of command may also be regarded ‘most responsible’ judging by the severity of the 
crime or its massive scale. ‘Most responsible’, therefore, denotes both a leadership or authority position of the 
Accused, and a sense of the gravity, seriousness or massive scale of the crime.74
Ultimately, the SCSL employed the narrower term “greatest responsibility” in its Statute and this phrase 
was held to operate solely as a guide to prosecutorial discretion.75 The Court’s Appeals Chamber held the 
SCSL Statute, which makes the Prosecutor responsible “for the investigation and prosecution of persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility,” renders determinations of which individuals are suitable for prosecution a 
matter of prosecutorial discretion unsuitable for judicial review.76 The Chamber emphasized the need for the 
Prosecutor to “act independently [and] not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any 
other source” and concluded in the Prosecutor v. Brima et al. judgment that it would be:
inconceivable that after a long and expensive trial the Trial Chamber could conclude that although the 
commission of serious crimes has been established beyond reasonable doubt against the Accused, the 
indictment ought to be struck out on the ground that it has not been proved that the Accused was not one of 
those who bore the greatest responsibility.77
The Chamber did note however, that a “good-faith” standard applies to the exercise of discretion by the 
Prosecutor.78
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The SCSL Prosecutor ultimately brought charges against a total of twelve individuals, resulting 
nine convictions and the deaths of three accused prior to judgment.79 These twelve accused held various 
positions in the three main parties to the Sierra Leonean conflict the SCSL was created to account for: 
the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”), Civil Defence Forces (“CDF”) and Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (“AFRC”). The accused ranged from overall commanders to others who held significant positions, 
but were clearly subordinated to the highest echelons of power. For example, in Prosecutor v Sesay et 
al., The SCSL Trial Chamber found that accused Augustine Gbao “was not a member of the AFRC/RUF 
Supreme Council [responsible for decision-making]” and remained in a single district during the period 
the AFRC/RUF held power.80 Nonetheless, the “Chamber found that Gbao was an ideology instructor 
and that ideology played a significant role in the RUF movement [and within] RUF controlled territory, 
[Gbao’s unit] was responsible for the enforcement of discipline and law and order.”81 In Prosecutor v Fofana 
& Kondewa, accused Allieu Kondewa was the “High Priest” of the CDF responsible for recruitment of new 
members and holding ceremonies that supposedly immunized combatants from bullets prior to battles.82 
The Appeals Chamber upheld Kondewa’s convictions, finding that as High Priest, Kondewa “had authority 
and power to issue oral and written directives; that he could order investigations for misconduct and hold 
court hearings; and that he had the legal and material ability to issue orders.”83 There was no intimation by 
the Chamber that the SCSL Prosecutor did not act well within the bounds of good-faith in determining 
that Gbao and Kondewa qualified as bearing the “greatest responsibility” for crimes committed in Sierra 
Leone.
ICTY Rule 11bis and Referral Decisions
Neither the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), nor the ICTY included specific 
provisions in their founding documents limiting personal jurisdiction to select classes of individuals. 
Instead, both Tribunals were conferred the “power to prosecute persons responsible” for crimes under their 
respective subject matter and temporal jurisdictions.84 As a result, the ICTR and ICTY have indicted well 
over two hundred suspects in total.85 In response to the ballooning case loads of the two Tribunals, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 1503 in August of 2003, which instructed both Tribunals to “transfer[] 
cases involving those who may not [qualify as most senior leaders who are most responsible] to competent 
national jurisdictions.”86 The procedure for effectuating such transfers, through “Referral Benches” of judges, 
was then outlined in Rule 11 bis in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“RPE”) for both Tribunals.87 Rule 11 
bis(C) of the ICTY RPE states that the “Referral Bench shall, in accordance with Security Council resolution 
153488 (2004), consider the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of the Accused” when 
determining whether transfer is appropriate.89 The ICTR on the other hand, has no similar jurisdictional 
language in its version of Rule 11 bis90 and consequently, referral decisions have instead focused on other 
considerations, such as fair trial and security concerns.91
The ICTY eventually referred thirteen accused to national jurisdictions, denied motions for referral 
concerning four accused and the prosecution withdrew its referral requests concerning five accused.92 ICTY 
Rule 11 bis referral decisions principally turned on determinations of whether the accused in each case were 
considered “most senior leaders . . . most responsible” for crimes under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.93 Moreover, 
the decision of an ICTY Referral Bench whether to refer each case proposed by the prosecutor has been 
interpreted as a “discretionary one.”94
In general terms, the more grave the charged crimes and the more directly an ICTY accused is implicated 
therein, the more likely such accused will be found ineligible for referral.95 However, ICTY Referral Benches 
struggled to determine the precise line to draw between cases of a seriousness necessitating adjudication at 
the Tribunal and those suitable for referral.96 Relevant factors considered by ICTY Referral Benches include: 
the number of alleged victims; the duration of the alleged criminal activity; the geographic scope of alleged 
criminal activity; and the accused’s alleged level of authority at the time(s) relevant to the indictment, when 
deciding whether referral is appropriate.97 If the alleged crimes in the indictment “do not cover a wide area and 
are limited in duration” then referral becomes “likely.”98 The process of assessing the relative gravity of charges 
in varying cases has not proved an easy task for ICTY judges. As noted by the Referral Bench in Prosecutor 
v Ademi & Norac, it is “impossible to measure the gravity of any crime in isolation” necessitating that each 
referral application “must also be viewed in the context of other cases tried by [the] Tribunal.”99 The Bench 
however, not explicitly compare the relevant factual allegations to any specific previous ICTY case, leaving the 
degree of comparison utilized unclear.100
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a. The Referrals of Ljubičić and Trbić
The two most serious ICTY cases referred to national jurisdictions were Prosecutor v Ljubičić and 
Prosecutor v Trbić. Paško Ljubičić held several roles within the Croatian military and at the time relevant to the 
indictment was allegedly a Military Police Battalion Commander in Central Bosnia.101 The indictment further 
alleged that a special “‘Anti-Terrorist Group’, also known as the ‘Jokers’” was created by Ljubičić, which, along 
with other personnel under Ljubičić’s command, were responsible for:
a series of attacks on Bosnian Muslim towns and villages...which were carried out in January and April 1993 
and resulted in the death of more than 100 civilians, detention and cruel treatment of a high number of men, 
destruction of villages, and religious institutions, plunder and forcible transfer of the population.102
Ljubičić was charged with 15 total counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes based on these 
facts.103 The Referral Bench found that, while Ljubičić “was a military commander and had a position of 
authority, in the context of other cases being tried before [the ICTY], it is not apparent that he was one of 
the most senior leaders who were the most responsible for the crimes within the [ICTY’s] jurisdiction” and 
referred his case to Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”).104
The Trbić case meanwhile, stands out as the only ICTY Rule 11 bis case involving genocide charges.105 
The indictment alleged that Milorad Trbić was “a duty officer in the [Serbian Army], holding the rank of 
captain” but that “[d]espite his nominal rank, it is alleged that in fact Trbić was subordinated to Lieutenant 
Drago Nikolić, and that he was responsible, inter alia, for helping manage the Military Police of the Zvornik 
Brigade.”106 Trbić was charged with being a member of two separate Joint Criminal Enterprises (JCEs), the 
objectives of which were “the summary execution and burial of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys 
captured from the Srebrenica enclave from 12 July 1995 until about 19 July 1995” and “the forcible removal 
of the Bosnian Muslim population from the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves to areas outside the control of 
Republika Srpska.”107 The Indictment alleged that Trbić:
assisted […] in organising, coordinating and facilitating the detention, transportation, summary execution 
and burial of [] Muslim victims[ and] acting individually or in concert with other members of the Joint 
Criminal Enterprise and Conspiracy[,] summarily execute[d] and bur[ied] the able-bodied Muslim men 
from Srebrenica.108
Specifically, the Referral Bench found that Trbić’s most significant involvement [was] alleged to have been 
at the Grbavci School in Orahovac on 14 July 1995, where it is claimed that he and Drago Nikolić personally 
supervised the Military Police in guarding Muslim prisoners and transporting them to a nearby field to 
be summarily executed; the Indictment further avers that the [Trbić] executed several of these prisoners 
himself.109 Trbić was charged with genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.110
The Referral Bench first noted that there is no official hierarchy of crimes under the ICTY’s jurisdiction, 
and therefore genocide charges do not necessarily render a case non-referable.111 Instead, the Bench opined 
that it “must instead look to the underlying conduct allegedly constituting a given crime, as well as the 
surrounding circumstances, to determine that crime’s gravity.”112 The Bench then noted that the crimes 
charged in the Trbić indictment were the “most serious” it had examined in the context of a referral request 
and were “among the gravest ever charged at [the ICTY].”113 The Bench however, still referred the case to BiH, 
finding that among the “literally hundreds of persons involved” in the Srebrenica genocide, Trbić’s “level of 
responsibility was relatively low” because Trbić had no significant role in “formulating the objectives of the 
[two] JCEs or in planning or orchestrating how they would be brought to fruition.”114
b. The Denial of Referral for Milošević, Delić and Lukić 
The ICTY denied referral requests made by the prosecution in regards to only four accused: Dragomir 
Milošević, Rasim Delić, Sredoje Lukić and Milan Lukić.115 In 2005, the ICTY Referral Bench denied the 
Prosecutor’s request to refer Dragomir Milošević’s case to BiH, holding “that the gravity of the crimes charged 
and the level of responsibility of the Accused, particularly when they are considered in combination, requires 
that the present case be tried at the [ICTY].”116 Milošević had been charged with fourteen counts of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, all in relation to the shelling and sniping campaign in Sarajevo from 1994 
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to 1995.117 The indictment alleged that troops under Milošević’s command had “shelled and sniped at civilians 
as they conducted their civilian activities such as tending vegetable plots, queuing for bread, collecting water, 
attending funerals, shopping in markets, riding on trams, riding bicycles, gathering wood, or simply walking 
with their children or friends.”118 The campaign was intended to spread terror among the civilian population 
and also included indiscriminate aerial bombardments with modified explosives not designed for use against 
civilian targets.119
Overall, the campaign directed by Milošević was of such a scale that “[i]n addition to the death and injuries 
that the shelling and sniping caused, the constant threat of death and injury caused extensive trauma and 
psychological damage to the inhabitants of Sarajevo.”120 The Referral Bench noted that the original indictment 
had only charged “a small representative number of individual incidents for specificity of pleading.”121
Milošević was alleged to have been the Chief of Staff of a wing of the Bosnian-Serb Army, the “Sarajevo-
Romanija Corps (‘SRK’) ... from around March 1993 and [became overall Commander of the] SRK on or 
about 10 August 1994.”122 Milošević commanded over 18,000 military personnel and also “negotiated, signed 
and implemented an anti-sniping agreement, local cease-fire agreements, and participated in negotiations 
relating to heavy weapons and access ... to territory around Sarajevo.”123 The Bench found that, although 
Milošević was subordinate to the supreme military and civilian commanders of the Bosnian-Serb forces, “the 
phrase ‘most senior leaders’ used by the Security Council is [not] restricted to individuals who are ‘architects’ 
of an ‘overall policy’ which forms the basis of alleged crimes.”124 Such an extreme restriction would, in the 
opinion of the Bench, “diminish the true level of responsibility of many commanders in the field and those 
at staff level, [who] de jure and de facto, are alleged to have exercised such a degree of authority that it is 
appropriate to describe them as among the ‘most senior’, rather than ‘intermediate’.”125
The Bench also found that the crimes Milošević was charged with were of a gravity that “stand[s] out 
when compared with other cases before the [ICTY]” based on the extreme carnage wrought during the 
besieging of Sarajevo, which “‘killed and wounded thousands of civilians of both sexes and all ages’ and caused 
extensive material destruction,” over a period of fifteen months.126 The Bench noted that the violence against 
civilians also escalated once Milošević assumed local command.127 Finally, the fact that the specific crimes 
and underlying factual allegations contained in the indictment may had been already “fully addressed” by the 
ICTY in a previous case was dismissed by the Bench as “irrelevant.”128 Based on these findings, the Bench held 
that Milošević fell into the category of individuals Rule 11 bis “requires” be tried at the ICTY.129
In 2007, the ICTY Referral Bench denied the Prosecutor’s request to refer the case against Rasim Delić 
to the authorities of BiH.130 According to the indictment, Delić was “commander of the Main Staff of the 
Army of [BiH] from 8 June 1993 until his retirement on 1 September 2000.”131 In this position, Delić was 
“subordinate only to the President of [BiH]” and “exercised military command and control over all regular 
[Army] forces [of BiH].”132 In 1993, Delić also allegedly created “the ‘El Mujahed Detachment’, comprised of 
foreign volunteers who were prepared to conduct ‘Holy War’ against the enemies of Bosnian Muslims” and 
which subsequently “committed killings, maltreatment and rape of civilians and/or enemy soldiers who were 
captured or had surrendered.”133
Delić was charged with four counts of war crimes.134 The allegations in the indictment “involve[d] around 
100 victims of murder, cruel treatment and rape […] committed in four locations in Central Bosnia and over 
a time-span not exceeding three months in 1993 and 1995.”135 Unlike the Milošević case, the Bench held that 
Delić’s status as a “most senior leader” independently precluded referral, despite the fact that the charged 
crimes were of a similar gravity to those in previously referred cases.136
The third case in which the ICTY denied a prosecution referral request involved cousins Milan and 
Sredoje Lukić, and initially ordered to be referred to BiH by the Referral Bench.137 Milan Lukić sought to keep 
his case at the Tribunal and successfully appealed the Bench’s decision to the ICTY Appeals Chamber.138 Milan 
Lukić allegedly formed a paramilitary group known alternatively as the “White Eagles” or “Avengers” and 
Sredoje Lukić was alleged to have been a member of this group.139 Both men were alleged to have, along with 
others, “brutally killed some 140 persons and [] severely injured others in two incidents by barricading them 
in houses and setting the homes on fire. Milan Lukić [was] additionally charged with having killed another 13 
persons in three incidents.”140 The Referral Bench found these crimes “very serious” but ultimately concluded 
that neither accused was a “most senior leader”, and ordered referral.141
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Referral Bench’s appraisal of gravity, but found the Bench’s 
“conclusory” summation of Milan Lukić’s degree of authority had improperly presupposed that “local” 
paramilitary leaders could never be considered “most senior leaders.”142 The Appeals Chamber found that 
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“within his own sphere, [Milan Lukić] was a dominant presence” and that the Referral Bench had placed 
“undue emphasis on [the] geographic scope” of the alleged crimes.143 The Chamber then noted that the White 
Eagles had acted with impunity and answered to no higher authority for over two years, making Milan Lukić 
“perhaps the most important paramilitary leader indicted at the [ICTY].”144 The Appeals Chamber concluded 
consequently held that the case against Milan Lukić was “too significant to be appropriate for referral” and 
reversed the Referral Bench’s decision.145
c. Prosecutorial Discretion at the ICC
The ICC has “jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern.”146 The 
Rome Statute instructs the ICC Prosecutor to determine whether there are “substantial reasons to believe” that 
beginning an investigation would “serve the interests of justice” while “taking into account the gravity of the 
crime and the interests of victims.”147 In 2003, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor released a Policy Paper defining 
its “general strategy” of evaluating potential cases for investigation, stating:
Although any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court is a serious matter, the [Rome] Statute clearly 
foresees and requires an additional consideration of ‘gravity’ whereby the Office must determine that a case 
is of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. In the view of the Office, factors relevant in 
assessing gravity include: the scale of the crimes; the nature of the crimes; the manner of commission of the 
crimes; and the impact of the crimes.148
In a subsequent publication, the Office further stated that it will “investigate and prosecute those who bear 
the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes ... [encompassing] those situated at the highest echelons 
of responsibility, including those who ordered, financed, or otherwise organized the alleged crimes.”149 These 
two publications further confirm the general focus of scarce prosecutorial resources within ICL practice on 
pursuing prosecutions of individuals who are key players in the perpetration of relatively serious crimes and 
fall in line with personal jurisdiction jurisprudence from the SCSL and ICTY.
Themes of International Personal Jurisdictional Jurisprudence
From an overview of practice at the SCSL, ICTY and to a lesser extent, ICC, a set of qualitative legal 
factors to be considered in determining whether an individual is properly considered “most responsible” can 
be gleaned. Generally, it is clear that individuals qualify as “most responsible” when implicated in especially 
serious crimes. To evaluate the conduct of an individual suspect, the two most important factors to consider 
are the relative gravity of the crimes the suspect is implicated in and the relative importance of the suspect’s 
alleged role in contributing to their commission. Gravity has been assessed in terms of the number of victims 
affected, the impact of the crimes on victims, the duration and geographic scope of the criminal conduct and 
nature and manner of perpetration.
While thus far, judges have avoided engaging in grim mathematical accounting by simply comparing 
death tolls or the overall number of victims affected, these assessments must be made using other ICL 
cases as reference points, especially those prosecuted by the same court or tribunal. A suspect’s role 
is evaluated by considering his degree of authority over others involved in the underlying criminal 
conduct and whether the suspect played a part in the decision-making process that ultimately led to 
the perpetration of the alleged crimes. Furthermore, these two factors of gravity and responsibility have 
been viewed holistically, rather than cumulatively. Aside from these qualitative assessments, a clear 
preference for prosecution is also evident, as only the ICTY has declined to prosecute a suspect based 
on finding him not amongst those “most responsible” and this finding merely resulted in the suspect’s 
prosecution in domestic courts. This is a major distinction between the ICTY’s Rule 11 bis decisions 
and the fate of Cases 003/004 at the ECCC, as there is a fundamental difference between a change from 
an international to national prosecutorial venue and the functional cessation of criminal proceedings 
against a person implicated in international crimes. There has never been any suggestion that if some or 
all Case 003/004 suspects are not committed to trial, they may nonetheless be prosecuted by an ordinary 
Cambodian criminal court. Instead, should the cases be ended prior to trial at the ECCC, the suspects 
would escape potential criminal liability altogether. This would be a major departure from the core 
principle of individual responsibility that defines ICL, as to date no case at one of the major international 
courts or tribunals has ever been dismissed prior based on a relative assessment of culpability despite the 
existence of sufficient evidence to otherwise warrant a trial.
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 The Presumed Suspects in Cases 003 and 004
Although Cases 003/004 both continue to languish in the investigative phase and therefore the identities of 
the suspects in the two cases remain technically confidential, the names of all five suspects in Cases 003 and 004 
have been publicly reported in numerous news articles and some reported suspects have even granted interviews 
to journalists.150 Indeed, this public knowledge goes well beyond mere speculation, as the Initial Submissions 
of the Office of the Co-Prosecutor initiating each case was leaked to New Zealand-based news website Scoop, 
which subsequently posted the documents for open public download on its website on 27 June 2011.151 In light 
of this publically available and widespread knowledge, this paper will discuss the roles of the currently presumed 
suspects. Originally Case 003 concerned two suspects: Meas Muth and Sou Met and Case 004 concerned three 
suspects: Ta An, Im Chaem and Ta Tith. Sou Met died from complications related to diabetes sometime in June 
2013.152 The following is an overview of the identities and roles within the Khmer Rouge of the four surviving 
probable suspects drawn from the leaked documents and other publicly available information.
Case 003: Meas Muth and Sou Met
On 16 February 2012, Case 002 accused Nuon Chea’s defense counsel named Meas Muth as one of the 
two suspects in Case 003 during oral argument, apparently confirming the accuracy of the leaked Case 003 
Initial Submission.153 Meas Muth has also long been considered a potential suspect at the ECCC candidate, as 
the case against him was previewed in a book on accountability for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge authored 
by researcher Steve Heder and lawyer Brian Tittemore.154
Heder and Tittemore allege that Meas Muth, along with his deceased co-suspect Sou Met, rose through 
the ranks of the Khmer Rouge’s Southwest Zone hierarchy155 and “held predominantly military ranks ... 
just below the senior level, which positioned them to implement [Khmer Rouge] policies and influence the 
conduct of lower-level cadre.”156 Meas Muth became “Secretary of Central Committee Division 164, which 
incorporated the [Khmer Rouge] navy” and was also the son of a prominent Khmer Rouge official named 
Pang, who died in 1968.157 According to a report published by Human Rights Watch, Meas Muth commanded 
“8,000 to 10,000” troops.158
Case 004: Ta An, Im Chaem and Ta Tith
Ta An, Im Chaem and Ta Tith are all named as suspects in the Third Introductory Submission of the 
International Co-Prosecutor leaked by Scoop. On 30 January 2012, the Nuon Chea defense also named Ta 
An and Im Chaem as suspects in Case 004 during questioning of Case 002 witness Prak Yut.159 The names of 
these individuals have also repeatedly been published in news articles; along with the name of reported third 
Case 004 suspect Ta Tith.160
Ta An is alleged to have risen to the post of Deputy Secretary of the Central Zone in 1977, where 
approximately 150,000 people, including large numbers of Cham Muslims, were massacred in a series of 
executions.161 Im Chaem is alleged to have become the Secretary of Preah Net Preah district in Banteay 
Meanchey province during the 1977 Khmer Rouge purge of the Northwest Zone, where she is reported 
to have “overs[een] five labor camps and prisons where nearly 50,000 people died.”162 Finally, according to 
Khmer Rouge researcher Ben Kiernan, Ta Tith was the brother-in-law of infamous Khmer Rouge Standing 
Committee member and Southwest Zone Secretary Ta Mok and initially held the position of Secretary of 
Kirivong (District 109) in the Southwest Zone.163 Later, Ta Tith reportedly became Deputy Secretary of the 
Northwest Zone, where he “had knowledge of, ordered and possibly directly participated in the torture and 
mutilation of prisoners.”164
Gravity of Crimes Implicated in Cases 003 and 004
Just as the names of the suspects in Cases 003 and 004 have been widely reported, the factual bases 
underlying the cases are also largely matters of public knowledge. Regarding Case 003, then-acting ECCC 
International Co-Prosecutor William Smith issued a press release on 8 September 2009 stating that the 
prosecution had “request[ed] judicial investigation of eight (8) distinct factual situations of murder, torture, 
unlawful detention, forced labour and persecution, [which] if proved, would constitute crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the 1956 Cambodian Penal Code.”165 
Former International Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley subsequently issued a press release providing further 
information relevant to Case 003 on 9 May 2011.166 Then-Co-Investigating Judges You and Blunk quickly 
admonished Cayley for releasing this information, but confirmed that the Case 003 investigation includes:
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S-21 Security Centre, Kampong Chhang Airport Construction Site, purges of the East, Central and New 
North Zones, and incursions into Vietnam [which were also implicated in Cases 001 and 002], as well as the 
following new crime sites and criminal episodes: (1) S-22 Security Centre in the Phnom Penh area; (2) Wat 
Eng Tea Ngnien Security Centre in Kampong Som Province; (3) Stung Hav Rock Quarry forced labour site 
in Kampong Som Province; (4) Capture of foreign nationals off the coast of Cambodia and their unlawful 
imprisonment transfer to S-21 or murder; and (5) Security Centres operated in Rattanakiri Province.167
Cayley’s press release also discussed Case 004, stating that the prosecution had requested “investigation 
of thirty-two (32) distinct factual situations of murder, torture, unlawful detention, forced labour, and 
persecution [which] if proved, would constitute crimes against humanity, violations of the 1956 Cambodian 
Penal Code and genocide.”168 The two judges also published a list of crime sites and topics of investigation for 
Case 004, which includes eighteen security centres, two prisons, six execution sites and four dam construction/
forced labour sites.169 The CIJs also indicated that the Case 004 investigation involves allegations of genocide 
perpetrated against Cham Muslims in Kampong Cham province and crimes committed during the Khmer 
Rouge purges of the Central and Northwest Zones.170
Security Centres, Prisons and Execution Sites
Security centres were created throughout Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge and were in reality, prisons 
and work camps used to detain, torture and execute perceived enemies. Typically, execution sites were located 
near detention centres and consisted of a series of mass graves containing anywhere from several dozen to 
tens of thousands of victims in each. For example, the Documentation Center of Cambodia (“DC-Cam”) 
has estimated that at Tuol Ta Phuong Prison and Execution Site, which is among the Case 004 investigation 
sites, there are 250 to 500 mass graves containing between 50,000 and 150,000 victims executed by the Khmer 
Rouge.171 Other prison sites under investigation related to Cases 003/004 were the sites of similarly massive 
killing events during the DK period.172
Purges
Internal party purges were also a major source of death and suffering during the reign of the Khmer 
Rouge. The purges of the Northwest and Central Zones, within the purview of Cases 003 and 004, were two 
of the three largest purges (along with the 1978 purge of the Eastern Zone) and involved mass killing and 
misery on a shocking scale. According to Kiernan, the standard purge process adopted by the Khmer Rouge 
was to send trusted cadres under the command of Ta Mok or Northern Zone Secretary Ke Pauk into an area 
and thereafter systematically arrest and execute local officials.173 In 1976, Ke Pauk led a violent purge of the 
Central Zone and in 1977 Ta Mok’s forces purged the Northwest Zone.174 Kiernan estimates that the death toll 
“probably exceeded one hundred thousand” victims in 1977 alone during the purge of the Northwest Zone.175
Worksites
Worksites and forced labour camps were another feature of the Khmer Rouge regime, which caused 
mass death through both on-site executions and the convergence of overwork, famine, disease and complete 
lack of medical care.176 The purview of Case 004 covers Anglong Chrey, Trapeang Thma, Spean Spreng and 
Prey Roneam Khmer Rouge dam construction sites.177 These locations were massive worksites involving huge 
numbers of forced labourers. For example, according to Human Rights Watch, Case 004 suspect Im Chaem 
assumed responsibility for the construction of Trapeang Thma dam in mid-1977 and “[t]he very harsh conditions 
imposed on the laborers allegedly under her control resulted in many deaths. Some laborers were executed at the 
water-control work site for complaining about conditions or being unable to cope with the demands.”178
Genocide of Cham Muslims
In addition to the various international crimes committed at security centres, prisons, execution 
sites, worksites and during purges, Cases 003/004 stand out as involving allegations of genocidal killings of 
Cham Muslims, a minority ethno-religious group in Cambodia who died at a much higher rate than ethnic 
Khmer-Cambodians under the Khmer Rouge period.179 Indeed, the Khmer Rouge treated Cham Muslims 
with particular scorn and there is ample evidence suggesting that the regime committed genocide against 
the Chams.180 Crimes related to the alleged Khmer Rouge genocide of the Cham are included in both Cases 
003 and 004 and Ta An specifically has been implicated in overseeing large-scale massacres, including many 
thousands of Cham Muslims.181
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Conclusion
Based on even a brief overview of known information related to ECCC Cases 003/004, it appears that all 
four surviving suspects in the cases clearly qualify as “most responsible” individuals. First, it appears to be un-
contradicted that all four suspects were Khmer Rouge “officials” during the period from 1975 to 1979. Second 
and more importantly, the alleged crimes involved – including crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide -are amongst the most serious crimes in existence, covered large geographic areas, were committed 
over multiple years and involved millions of total victims, including the deaths of hundreds of thousands of 
victims according to former International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit.182 Indeed, journalist Douglas Gillison 
has estimated through his research that between 248,990 and 295,190 deaths are involved in the Case 004 
allegations alone.183
The sheer force of these numbers makes Cases 003/004 stand out among recent prosecutions for 
international crimes as especially grave. The ICTY for example, found Milan Lukić, Dragomir Milošević and 
Rasim Delić to all qualify as being amongst those “most responsible” for crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia and declined to refer their cases to national jurisdictions for prosecution. These conclusions 
were despite the fact that all three cases involved far less grave crimes than ECCC Cases 003/004 in terms 
of duration, total numbers of victims and the death toll, even though a referral decision resulted solely in 
a change of venue for trial to a domestic court and not cessation of prosecutions altogether. Moreover, the 
SCSL Prosecutor, operating pursuant an undoubtedly narrower jurisdictional policy, brought charges against 
twelve accused, two more than the total of ten suspects at the ECCC and the propriety of doing so was never 
in any serious doubt. In particular, the Prosecutor did not exceed the bounds of jurisdictional discretion in 
bringing cases against Augustine Gbao and Allieu Kondewa, who appear to have been subordinated to the 
highest echelons of power in Sierra Leone, just as the suspects in Cases 003/004 were within the Khmer Rouge 
hierarchy.
Equally importantly, while the overall number of death toll of the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia, 
estimated at 1.7 to 2.2 million lives, dwarfs the total number of deaths in both Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone, 
making grim comparisons of relative culpability based on death toll percentages between the ECCC, ICTY 
and SCSL impracticable, ECCC Cases 003/004 still involve far more deaths than Case 001. Indeed, presumed 
Case 003 suspect Meas Muth is directly implicated in some of the crimes prosecuted in Case 001, as he 
allegedly sent victims to S-21 prison to be tortured and executed.184 In Case 001, the Trial Chamber found 
that “at least 12,273” victims were killed under Duch’s authority.185 The ECCC Supreme Court Chamber 
summarily dismissed Duch’s claim on appeal that the ECCC Co-Prosecutors and/or Co-Investigating Judges 
abused their discretion in considering Duch a “most responsible” person and committing him to trial. Thus, 
it would appear to be irreconcilable for Duch to be sentenced to life in prison as a person properly considered 
“most responsible” for the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge by the Co-Prosecutors and Co-Investigating Judges 
if individuals, some of whom appear to have been Duch’s superiors, and all of whom appear to be directly 
implicated in equally, if not far more, grave criminal behaviour than Duch, including potential responsibility 
for tens of thousands more deaths, have the cases against them dismissed.
In sum, it appears former ECCC International Co-Prosecutor Robert Petit was correct in asserting that 
that all of the suspects in Cases 003/004 “fall well under the jurisdiction of the ECCC.”186 Furthermore, Judge 
Laurent Kasper-Ansermet’s outgoing decisions holding that both suspects in Case 003 qualified as “most 
responsible”187 also appears strongly supported in both law and fact and it is difficult to envision any scenario 
wherein sound professional judgment led to any other conclusion. As such, while trials in Cases 003/004 may 
be politically inconvenient for certain interested parties, trials in both cases appear to be the only defensible 
course of action at this juncture and any other outcome should be viewed as a product of bad faith or unsound 
professional judgment. Thus, while Case 002 undoubtedly remains the ECCC’s flagship case, Cases 003/004 
may very well determine the Court’s credibility as a legal institution and shape its ultimate legacy.
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Abstract: The trial of the four surviving senior members of the Khmer Rouge leadership was a difficult undertaking from 
the start. The elderly defendants were in frail health. Illness and death reduced the number of the accused to just two. The 
Cambodian government, led by Hun Sen, was not eager to have any trials at all, and was determined that the trial not 
implicate officials who were now allied with the ruling regime. The conflicting agendas of the international judges on the 
hybrid court and the Cambodian government often left the court mired in disputes. The Cambodian genocide tribunal 
illustrates the political complexities and challenges involved in pursuing charges against perpetrators, especially when the trial 
is held decades after the genocide occurred.
Keywords: Khmer Rouge, Cambodia Genocide Trial, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Hun Sen
The Cambodian Genocide Tribunal and the Very Slow Road to Justice
In June 2011 genocide trial opened in Phnom Penh, Cambodia that featured what were likely some 
of the most notorious defendants in a crimes against humanity or genocide tribunal since the Nuremburg 
Trials that followed World War II. The four highest-ranking living leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime were 
the defendants in the trial. Cambodia, also known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK) under the Khmer Rouge 
(KR), was the scene of one of the twentieth century’s worst genocides. The KR pursued policies that resulted 
in the deaths of an estimated 1,700,000 Cambodians during their reign from April 1975 to January 1979.1 The 
defendants were among the key decision makers of the regime, although the leader of the Khmer Rouge and 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), Pol Pot, aka Brother Number One, had died 
in 1998. Nuon Chea, Brother Number Two, had held the position of Deputy Secretary of the CPK and was 
regarded as the chief ideologue of the regime. He had also served as president of the People’s Representative 
Assembly. Ieng was the Foreign Minister of Democratic Kampuchea throughout its existence and remained 
a leading figure in the KR until he surrendered to the government of Cambodia in 1996. Ieng Thirith was 
married to Ieng Sary and served as Minister of Social Affairs in the DK government. At a meeting of the CPK 
Center in October 1975 that designated the responsibilities of the governing elite, Ieng Thirith was placed…
“in charge of culture, social welfare, and foreign affairs, sharing the last field with her husband Ieng Sary.”2 The 
fourth defendant was Khieu Samphan, who served as head of state in Democratic Kampuchea and also was, 
according to the October 1975 meeting, in charge of the “accountancy and pricing aspects of commerce.”3 Not 
since Nuremburg have leading officials of a regime responsible for so many deaths been subjected to a judicial 
proceeding.
Despite the satisfaction that some observers, foreign and domestic, derived from seeing some of the 
major perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide brought before a tribunal, many aspects of the trial before the 
court, formally known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, and often called 
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,) left various concerned parties immensely displeased. The trial commenced 32 
years after the Khmer Rouge had been driven from power by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in January 
1979. Even after the principle of genocide trials for leading Khmer Rouge cadres had been agreed to in 1997, 
seemingly interminable haggling between the United Nations and the Cambodian government over the 
composition of the court and the scope of its jurisdiction, delayed the start of judicial proceedings for a dozen 
years. (Only a single defendant had been tried before the start of the trial of the major perpetrators in 2011.) 
Many human rights activists argued that there were numerous other perpetrators of genocide who should be 
brought before the tribunal in future proceedings. In the summer of 2012, the Cambodian government led by 
Prime Minister Hun Sen remained adamant in its opposition to holding more than two trials and there was 
little evidence that the United Nations or major donor nations to Cambodia could, or would, exert sufficient 
pressure to force a concession from Hun Sen that would permit more trials. Critics of the ECCC argued that 
it was, in essence, too little and too late.
The Quest for Justice in Cambodia: Power, Politics, 
and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
68
©2014      Genocide Studies and Prevention 8, no. 2  http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.2.7
Beachler
This article explores the political circumstances that led to the two trials of Khmer Rouge genocide 
perpetrators that were undertaken decades after the regime’s demise and the reasons why there would most 
likely be just five persons tried for the crimes committed during the 44 month existence of the dystopia that 
was Democratic Kampuchea. It will be argued that given the history of genocide trials and the  national and 
international political imperatives at play in establishing and sustaining the ECCC, the very slow and limited 
judicial process was, if not inevitable, highly likely.
The Long Journey to Two Trials
The negotiations and political maneuvering that would eventually lead to the establishment of the ECCC 
occurred as the government of Cambodia was integrating some elements of the Khmer Rouge back into 
Cambodian society and politics. Because Vietnam was an ally of the Soviet Union and the Khmer Rouge had 
been close to the Chinese government, the West and China offered direct and indirect support to the KR until 
the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The Khmer Rouge remained a significant factor in Cambodian politics for 
several years after the end of the Cold War. Not least among the KR’s assets in the 1990s was an armed force 
of roughly 10,000 troops that were part of its broader infrastructure along Cambodia’s border with Thailand. 
When Ieng Sary defected to the government in 1996 with about 3,000 troops, he significantly weakened 
the Khmer Rouge. When Pol Pot sent armed soldiers to suppress the disloyal Ieng Sary and his troops, the 
expeditionary forces collapsed due to mass defections.4 The Khmer Rouge was further weakened by internal 
divisions, but still contained assets useful to other politicians in Cambodia. Because he controlled an armed 
militia, Ieng Sary was able to gain leverage as both main contenders for national power, co-Prime Ministers 
Prince Ranariddh Sihanouk and Hun Sen, sought Ieng Sary’s support and both supported an amnesty for 
him.5
In 1997, desperate for support in his struggle for power with Hun Sen, Ranariddh agreed to an alliance 
with Khieu Samphan, who wished to break away from the Khmer Rouge remnants located along the Thai 
border.6 (Rananriddh and his royalist party lost their power struggle with Hun Sen and his Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP).) The Khmer Rouge insurgency collapsed in 1998 when only Ta Mok, once known as 
Brother Number Five in the KR hierarchy, and less fraternally as “the butcher” in circles not sympathetic to 
the Khmer Rouge, declined to reconcile with the regnant political order. Sorpong Peu observes that when 
Khem Ngoun, Ta Mok’s chief of staff, defected from the last major KR holdout, the Khmer Rouge’s insurgency 
was over.7 (Ta Mok died in prison in 2006 as he awaited trial for genocide and crimes against humanity). An 
important element of the truces and amnesties that occurred as the Khmer Rouge insurgency finally collapsed 
was the integration of many KR officials into the government and military.8
 After accepting amnesty in 1996, Ieng Sary remained in his base area of Pailin province, and later took 
up residence in a prosperous neighborhood in Phnom Penh. In 1998, Nuon Chea, who was known as Brother 
Number Two in the CPK, and Khieu Samphan, who had served as head of state during the Khmer Rouge 
years in power, surrendered to the national government. Both were welcomed at Prime Minister Hun Sen’s 
country estate. The prime minister indicated that he believed that it was time to “dig a hole and bury the 
past.”9 After international and domestic criticism of his greeting the two defectors and his suggestion that 
perhaps the two should not be tried, Hun Sen issued an unclear “clarification” of his position, “My stance is 
this: the trial of the Khmer Rouge is over, but the issue still continues to exist. It is over based on the verdict 
of the people’s court in 1979, which is still valid and acknowledged by the royal decree granting amnesty to 
Ieng Sary in 1996. The issue that still exists is that of the establishment of a tribunal based on the views of 
international and national jurists who are now doing their work.”10 These comments were not Hun Sen’s last 
ambiguous remarks on the question of trials for crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge during their years 
in power. In early 1999, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan took a government sponsored tour of Cambodia 
that included visits to the seaside resort at Sihanoukville and the temples of Angkor Wat.11 In March 1999, Ta 
Mok and Kaing Guek Eav, commandant of the S-21 interrogation center, were arrested and later charged with 
genocide.12 The pattern of solicitude for Khmer Rouge leaders combined with governmental agreements to 
some prosecutions continued from the late 1990s through 2012. The various domestic and, more significantly, 
international pressures for trials of Khmer Rouge leaders and the presence of many former Khmer Rouge 
cadre in the government, including Hun Sen himself, rendered a twisted policy path inevitable.13
In 1997, Hun Sen had agreed to a trial for those Khmer Rouge leaders who were deemed “most senior” 
and “most responsible” for the crimes that occurred between 1975 and 1979.14 Of course the concepts most 
senior and most responsible were left undefined. In 1998 Hun Sen asserted that the international community 
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should examine some additional matters. He requested that prosecutors investigate the American bombing of 
Cambodia that had decimated the country in the years before 1975.15 He also stated that he thought an inquiry 
should be made into Chinese government support for the Khmer Rouge. While both topics are surely worth 
examining, such investigations would most certainly have been opposed by the United States and China, 
respectively.16 While motive is almost always difficult to discern, these demands for an investigation of the 
relationships of major world powers to the Khmer Rouge were likely made to further delay and complicate 
arrangements for a tribunal. Still, Hun Sen was correct when he argued that some of the countries arguing for 
a series trial had supported the Khmer Rouge either directly or indirectly in the 1970s and 1980s.
Hun Sen first agreed to the principle trials of perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide in 1997, but 
negotiations about the terms of the trial dragged on for several years. In an inconsistent manner, the United 
Nations placed pressure on the CPP government to work out terms and conditions for establishing an 
international tribunal. The U.N. and members of the international community who took an interest in the 
matter preferred that as much control as possible be in international hands. Outside Cambodia, it was widely 
believed that the Cambodian judicial system lacked the resources, competence and integrity to carry out a 
series of trials in a manner that would be acceptable to the international community. Invoking the principles 
of Cambodian national sovereignty and respect for his country, Hun Sen sought as much Cambodian control 
over the process as possible. He also argued that permitting an unlimited number of defendants could 
destabilize the country. The Prime Minister resisted an international tribunal with wide-ranging jurisdiction. 
His major political rival, Norodom Ranariddh, joined him.17
Six years of difficult and contentious negotiations between United Nations officials and the Cambodian 
government passed before some basic guidelines for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) were established. In 2003, under an arrangement worked out by David Scheffer, the United States 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, the majority of judges in the court would be Cambodian, however, 
no decision would be ratified without the assent of at least one international judge. Scheffer believed that 
this arrangement provided for an international veto over the actions of jurists from a judicial system that 
was widely distrusted while preserving a measure of Cambodian sovereignty. In fact, the term Extraordinary 
Chambers was chosen to distinguish this tribunal from the suspect Cambodian judicial system. The Courts of 
Cambodia portion of the formal name of the tribunal was a nod to Cambodian sensitivities about sovereignty 
and acknowledgment of the role Cambodian jurists would play in the trials.
In the three years that followed the establishment of the ECCC very little progress was made in 
establishing a basic administrative structure for the court. In 2006, David Tolbert, an American attorney who 
worked at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, examined the court in Cambodia 
and determined that, “it had no administrative leadership, particularly with respect to court management, 
including translation and interpretation, and the witness-protection program. The international side had had 
essentially given over judicial management to the Cambodian. The Cambodian staff in charge had virtually 
no knowledge or experience, and most had no judicial background. And yet there were a large number of 
them, hundreds in fact.”18 Tolbert concluded that the court was in no position to conduct a trial. Two years 
after Tolbert’s initial visit to Cambodia, there had been little progress in establishing a functioning court. In 
an effort to break a decade long stalemate, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Tolbert as an 
assistant secretary general with the primary task of assisting in the establishment of a viable tribunal.
While the terms that eventually permitted the ECCC to convene and eventually to begin trials were 
worked out, the ten-year struggle between the U.N. and the Cambodian government over the terms and 
conditions of the tribunal was indicative of the widely divergent agendas each party held. Hun Sen and his 
government were determined to keep control of the tribunal in Cambodian hands. The determination of the 
Cambodian Prime Minister to retain control of the tribunal, can of course, be read in more than one way. The 
assertion that such an international tribunal would abridge Cambodian sovereignty is undoubtedly true. The 
U.N. and human rights advocacy groups did not believe that the Cambodian government had the competence 
or the integrity to conduct a series of trials. Also because of Cambodia’s widespread and deserved reputation 
as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. International actors were convinced that they could only 
achieve their means by abrogating Cambodian sovereignty, though few people would make such a bold and 
direct assertion in public.
The scope of the ECCC was to become the major point of contention between the Cambodian government 
that wanted to limit the number of cases brought before the court and the U.N. human rights groups who 
favored an extensive series of trials. These controversies slowed the judicial process. A dozen years elapsed 
70
©2014      Genocide Studies and Prevention 8, no. 2  http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.2.7
Beachler
from the conception of the tribunal to the beginning of the trial of S-21 commandant Duch in 2009. The main 
trial of the surviving members of the Khmer Rouge elite began in the summer of 2011.
Case 001: The Trial of Comrade Duch
The first trial held by the ECCC was that of Kaing Guek Eav, better known as Duch. As commandant of 
S-21, or the Tuol Sleng Prison, Duch presided over the torture and murder of at least 14,000 people.19 Most of 
those killed there were party and government officials who were victims of the Khmer Rouge’s constant search 
for counterrevolutionaries, many of whom consistent with Maoist doctrine, were thought to reside within the 
ranks of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Duch might seem an odd figure to be prosecuted first for no 
other reason than that he was born a least a decade later (1942) than the four defendants in the second and 
possibly last of the ECCC trials. Duch was also the least politically powerful person tried by the court. While 
the most horrific tortures preceded the murders committed at S-21, Duch was not a policy maker and held no 
national office in Democratic Kampuchea. Duch was the most hands-on killer among the defendants, but was 
not accused of formulating the policies perpetrated. While he was not a high-ranking official of the Khmer 
Rouge regime, it is important to note that Duch had been a committed member of the CPK for decades. 
He might have made the ideal first defendant because he was willing to confess to guilt on all the counts of 
the indictment against him. Also because of his role as commandant at S-21, it was much easier to attribute 
direct responsibility for crimes to Duch than to other officials who held diversified portfolios with in the 
government and party during the reign of the Khmer Rouge.
Duch’s trial began in March 2009 (the defendant had been incarcerated for a decade) and concluded 
when the tribunal rendered its guilty verdict and 35-year prison sentence in July 2010. (The sentence was 
later reduced to 19 years because Duch has spent 11 years in pre-trial detention and because this time in pre-
trial detention exceeded the maximum time permitted by Cambodian law. After an appeal by the prosecutor 
Duch’s sentence was changed to imprisonment for life.20 Duch was charged with “crimes against humanity, 
enslavement, torture, sexual abuses, and other inhumane acts.”21 At the outset of his trial, Duch accepted 
all 260 counts of his indictment. During the course of his trial Duch would often accept responsibility for 
various horrific actions that occurred at S-21. His two main objections to the charges against him were that, as 
someone not part of the governing cabal, he was only following orders; orders he was forced to obey to protect 
himself and his family. While attributing the main responsibility for the atrocities at S-21 to Pol Pot, Duch also 
was capable of admitting his own guilt, albeit as a subordinate of the regime “…Pol Pot was a murderer and 
more than a million people were killed under the hand of Pol Pot. At S-21, my hand is stained with the blood 
of the people killed there.”22 Duch’s testimony was, of course, offered as part of a defense strategy to present 
Duch as the exemplar of contrition in the hope of obtaining a measure of leniency. Given the evidence against 
him and the vile nature of his crimes, such a strategy was probably the only possible legal strategy that Duch 
could pursue.
Duch’s trial included far more evidence about S-21 than was necessary to demonstrate his guilt. The 
adjudication of the charges against the defendant is, however, not always the sole or even the main purpose 
of genocide or crimes against humanity trial. Of greater importance may be the establishment of the record 
of crimes committed by the genocide perpetrators and the dissemination of these findings through the 
media coverage that a trial often attracts. For example, the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961 included 
extensive testimony about the Nazis’ genocidal Final Solution even though Eichmann stated that he did not 
dispute the testimony presented about the crimes committed against European Jews by the regime he served. 
(Eichmann, as is well known offered the defense that he was following orders, the quintessential duty of a law 
abiding citizen.) One purpose of the Eichmann trial was to educate the world about the Holocaust, an event 
about which far less was known in 1961 when the Holocaust was not a widely discussed topic in academic 
circles or popular literature and media.23
Duch’s trial took an unexpected turn in November 2009 when Kar Savuth, his Cambodian attorney, 
asked that Duch be freed because he was not among those most responsible for the crimes committed during 
the KR era. Because no other mid-level officials would be tried, Duch’s attorney argued that his client should 
be released rather than serve as a scapegoat for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. This change of strategy led 
to the resignation of Francios Roux, his French attorney, who felt that the contrition strategy of the defense 
had been undermined by a point of law that should have been raised at the outset of the trial.24 Because Kar 
Savuth had also served as legal adviser to Hun Sen there was speculation of government collusion with the 
defense team that led to the change in legal strategy by the previously submissive defendant. Kar Savuth’s 
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assertion that Duch was the only non-elite KR cadre to be charged before the tribunal was, in an odd sort of 
way, consistent with the views expressed by Hun Sen and the court’s Cambodian co-prosecutor both of whom 
opposed a large number of prosecutions. The only difference between the positions of Duch and Hun Sen 
was that Duch did not believe that any KR officials other than the elite should be prosecuted. Hun Sen was 
willing to accept that one mid–level cadre (Duch) should serve a prison sentence for crimes against humanity 
committed by the Khmer Rouge. Stephanie Giry claims that; by the end of Duch’s trial; the Cambodian 
government, the Cambodian co-prosecutor, and Duch’s Cambodian attorney were all in agreement as to the 
scope of the ECCC. All of these parties took positions that implied that there should be one additional trial, 
that of the four leading major figures from the KR regime, and that this proceeding should conclude the work 
of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.
Case 002: The Trial of the Khmer Rouge Leadership
While there were turns and twists in the trial of Comrade Duch, the trial that followed it was bound 
to be immensely more complex. The leadership trial promised to be a lengthy one as it involved issues of 
responsibility for the genocide, atrocities, and other crimes committed by the KR government. The advanced 
age of the defendants raised concerns that one or more of them might not survive along trial. (As of August 
2011 Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary were both 85 years old, while Ieng Thiriht was 79 and Khieu Samphan was 80 
years old). Some also noted that because of their advanced ages, that if convicted, the defendants were unlikely 
to serve a significant portion of the lengthy prison sentences they would probably receive (life imprisonment 
was the maximum sentence that the ECCC could impose on a convicted defendant). The case against the 
four defendants was further complicated in late August of 2011 when, Dr John Campbell of New Zealand, 
a medical examiner appointed by the Tribunal, testified that Ieng Thirith suffered “significant cognitive 
impairment” that was most likely due to Alzheimer’s disease.25 Dr. Campbell indicated that he thought it 
would be difficult for Ieng Thirith to participate fully in her defense and also recommended that she given a 
more extensive medical evaluation. In September the court announced that four additional physicians would 
examine Ieng Thirth in an effort to reach a more conclusive assessment of her mental state.26 The case against 
Ieng Thirith was dropped in November, 2011 on the grounds that her dementia rendered her unfit to stand 
trial. The ECCC recommended that she be released from custody.27 The number of defendants in the second 
trial was reduced to two when Ieng Sary died at age 87 in March 2014.28
The indictments against Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan were identical and were excerpted 
on the ECCC website:29
[…] is alleged to be responsible, through his acts or omissions (committed via a joint criminal enterprise), 
for having planned, instigated, ordered, or aided and abetted, or being responsible by virtue of superior 
responsibility, for the following crimes committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979:
• Crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation imprisonment, torture, 
persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds and other inhumane acts)
• Genocide, by killing members of the groups of Vietnamese and Cham 
• Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, willfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, willfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian the 
rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful deportation or unlawful confinement of a civilian)
• Homicide, torture and religious persecution, as defined by the Cambodian Penal Code from 1956
Ieng Thirith was subject to a similar indictment though with respect to the charge of crimes against 
humanity, she was alleged to have been guilty by having ordered such acts or having been guilty by “virtue of 
superior responsibility.30 The text of the indictments and the powerful government and party positions once 
held by the four defendants would seem to dictate that this was the major trial of the ECCC for historical 
and legal purposes. Those concerned with the resolution of these matters for either purpose likely regretted 
that it took so long for the trial to arrive and that the defendants were at such advanced ages when the trial 
commenced.
The defendants raised objections to the proceedings and argued that they were not guilty of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, or genocide. Three of the four defendants claimed that they were protected 
from prosecution by the ten-year statute of limitations of the prior Cambodian legal code. Ieng Sary claimed 
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that his trial by the ECCC was a case of double jeopardy because he had been tried in absentia and sentenced 
to death by the Vietnamese installed government of Cambodia. King Norodom Sihanouk pardoned him in 
1996. On the basis of these prior legal developments, Ieng Sary claimed immunity from prosecution. As a 
practical matter, the procedural claims about jurisdiction, double jeopardy, and prior pardons were very likely 
to be overruled by the court which was constituted for the very purpose of trying defendants such as those 
that appeared before it in Case 002. Still, the various legal arguments about the legitimacy of the charges 
delayed the already very long judicial process in Case 002.
The political complexity of the ECCC proceeding was demonstrated again when Nuon Chea’s three 
attorneys resigned saying that Cambodian government interference prevented them from presenting a 
vigorous defense of their client. The lawyers cited the refusal of sitting government ministers to respond to 
court summonses as a major impediment to their efforts to defend Nuon Chea. The lawyers’ complaint was 
described as having a degree of merit according to an observer from the Open Society Justice Initiative. While 
the testimony of government ministers would not likely lead to an acquittal of Nuon Chea, the Hun Sen 
Regime had nothing to gain from testimony that would call attention to the roles that current government 
officials played in the Khmer Rouge government.31
Are Two Trials Sufficient?
One of the most contentious issues between the Cambodian government and international human rights 
groups, as well as many international prosecutors and judges, was the question of whether there should be 
additional cases pursued beyond Cases 001 and 002. Many transnational human rights organizations as well 
as international prosecutors and consultants serving at the ECCC wished to proceed with Case 003 which 
was widely believed to concern the actions of Meas Mut and Sou Met, who were respectively the heads of the 
Khmer Rouge Navy and Air Force. Both Meas Mut and Sou Met have been accused of being responsible for 
the deaths of thousands of purged KR cadres. Hun Sen consistently opposed any efforts to expand the scope 
of the ECCC beyond the five defendants in the first two cases. His statements on this matter were consistently 
unequivocal. In October 2010, Hun Sen told Ban Ki-moon that Case 002 would be the final ECCC trial and 
that further cases were “not allowed.”32 Khieu Kanharith, a spokesman for the government, warned the ECCC 
foreign staff against pursuing further cases and said of these staff, “If they want to go into Case 003 or 004, they 
should just pack their bags and return home.”33 On the issue of whether there should be any trials after Case 
002, there was no obfuscation by the Cambodian government.
The Cambodian Prime Minister argued that further trials would cause civil unrest and possibly civil war 
in the country. Hun Sen claimed that he would prefer that the ECCC fail in its mission rather than permit 
additional trials that would produce civil war.34 His opposition to expanded proceedings by the tribunal was 
supported by Cambodian judges on the tribunal as well as Cambodian co-prosecutor Chea Leang, who had 
long been clear about her opposition to further trials. When international co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley 
said the alleged crimes in Case 003 had not been fully investigated and deserved further examination; his 
Cambodian counterpart did not support him. Disputing Cayley’s assertion, Chea Leang argued that the 
suspects in Case 003 were not within the court’s jurisdiction because they were not senior officials of the 
Khmer Rouge government and were not “most responsible” for the crimes committed from 1975 to 1979.35
There was considerable speculation that a series of cases would result in many current Cambodian 
government officials being summoned as witnesses. It is worth recalling that Hun Sen himself was once Khmer 
Rouge official, albeit of low rank, before he defected to Vietnam.36 The revelation that significant numbers of 
former KR cadres held positions in the government, while well known in Cambodia and among those who 
closely follow events in the country, would have been a source of some international embarrassment for Hun 
Sen’s government. Since it is likely that a considerable number of Cambodians had served in the government 
in some capacity under the KR, there was probably some popular support in Cambodia for limiting the scope 
of the ECCC tribunals.37 To the extent that Hun Sen secured the surrender of recalcitrant Khmer Rouge 
soldiers and leaders by informal pardons and classic political patronage, trials that exposed these dealings 
had the potential to destabilize the regime and perhaps, Cambodian society as a whole. For those benefiting 
from the status quo, there was nothing to be gained by extensive probing into the past actions of government 
officials on the part of the ECCC or anyone else for that matter.
Human rights advocates were adamant that Case 003 had to proceed if justice was to been done in 
Cambodia. Anne Heindel, legal advisor for the research organization Documentation Center of Cambodia,38 
argued that if the ECCC were perceived as capitulating to Cambodian government pressure by blocking 
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further investigation of Case 003, its credibility on Cases 001 and 002 would be suspect as well. In Heindel’s 
words, “There’s no way you can separate Case 003 out from what’s come before.”39 In April 2011, the co-
investigating judges of the ECCC, Sigfried Blunk of Germany and You Bunleng of Cambodia, announced 
they were closing their investigation with regard to Case 003. Citing political interference by the Cambodian 
government in the proceedings of the ECCC, Blunk resigned his position in October 2011.40 Laurent Kasper-
Ansermet of Switzerland, another international judge, resigned from the ECCC in March 2012. He asserted 
that his Cambodian colleague You Bunleng was blocking the court from investigating additional suspects.41
The decision not to proceed with further investigation of Case 003 was widely seen as a step towards the 
eventual closure of the case without any indictments of the suspects. Critics claimed that the judges conducted 
only a cursory investigation in the case and further alleged that political influence may have been brought to 
bear in a successful effort to forestall any action on the case. The Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), a U.S. 
based organization founded by George Soros, called for a U.N. investigation of the ECCC alleging that Case 
003 raised issues of “judicial independence, misconduct, and competency.”42 The OSJI statement also contained 
the stinging allegation that, “the court itself is on the verge of embracing impunity” for the various crimes of 
the Khmer Rouge.43 Several members of the legal staff resigned from the ECCC to protest the decision to 
discontinue the investigation of Case 003. Among those resigning their positions at the tribunal was Stephen 
Heder, a prominent historian of the Khmer Rouge era based at the School of Oriental and African Studies at 
the University of London, who had served as a consultant to the investigating judges. In his resignation letter, 
Heder claimed that the ECCC judges’ office was “professionally dysfunctional.”44 The judges were equally 
strident in a response to the resignations of court personnel, issuing a statement that welcomed the departure 
of those staff, “who ignore the sole responsibility of the co-investigating judges” with regard to Case 003.45
It is also important to note that representatives of several western governments were non-committal on 
the issue of whether Case 003 should be pursued. Some responded by emphasizing the importance of Case 
002. The United States Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, Stephen Rapp, asserted his belief that 
the ECCC must be free of interference from the Cambodian government. Rapp also offered statements that, 
however, showed a degree of understanding for those who wished to limit the number of investigations and 
prosecutions. According to Rapp, “it’s a question of the mandate, but it’s also a question of resources as well. 
We expect people to be making decisions that you can’t pursue every case. We want them to make them on 
a proper basis, with an understanding that resources are limited and they need to prioritize.”46 While such a 
statement is neutral on its face, it had to be disappointing to those who wished for more than two trials and 
viewed international pressure as the only means of achieving their objective. Hun Sen and others opposed to 
additional trials must have been pleased by the views of Rapp and others who took similar positions.
The ECCC and the Politics of Graft
In addition to other problems and controversies plaguing the tribunal, the ECCC was also the subject 
of allegations of corruption by Cambodian administrators in charge of the large court staff. In 2008, several 
employees alleged to U.N. staff members that they were forced to pay 30 percent of their salaries to their 
superiors to obtain and retain their positions. While the results of a subsequent U.N. investigation were not 
released to the public, a report for Cambodia Tribunal Monitor indicated that there was considerable evidence 
in support of the corruption allegations.47 Moreover, the cost of the trial has consistently exceeded projections 
and the tribunal has seemed on many occasions to be on the verge of insolvency. Corruption and cost are not 
the main concern of a court conducting genocide trials, but in the case of the ECCC they contributed to an 
already growing perception of a court in disarray.
The allegations of cost overruns and outright corruption that have plagued the ECCC should come as 
no surprise to those who have followed Cambodia’s pattern and practice in this regard. Stanford Journalism 
professor Joel Brinkley has argued that virtually every institution in Cambodian society is a site of bribery, 
blackmail, or embezzlement. Brinkley includes education, health care, natural resource extraction, the police, 
and judicial system as among the Cambodian institutions where kleptomania seems to be the reigning ethos. 
For good measure, Brinkley informs us that babies available for foreign adoption from Cambodia were often 
separated from their mothers by deceit, force, and in some cases, outright theft.48 French journalist Francois 
Hauter vividly offers his view of Cambodia under Hun Sen, “The country has become a regime of organized 
pillage, a vast bazaar of plundered goods, a regional center for shady business of every kind: drugs, gambling, 
sex. The head of the national police, one of Hun Sen’s closest associates, owns the largest brothel in the country. 
Many officials enrich themselves at the peasants’ expense.”49
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Transparency International (TI), an NGO that monitors private and public sector corruption, has long 
cited Cambodia as a society and a government replete with various forms of corruption. For example, in 2006 
TI completed a national study that included some trenchant remarks about Cambodia. The report concluded, 
“The NIS Study of Cambodia found that corruption has pervaded almost every sector of the country. The 
payment of unofficial fees is necessary to secure any range of services, including medical care, education 
credentials and even birth certificates. A degree of political will for reform exists within the government, but 
the reality is that those in power have little reason to change a system that has secured them much power and 
personal wealth.”50 It should be no surprise that in a poor country with a corrupt government, a tribunal that 
dispenses large sums of money would find itself enmeshed in allegations of corruption. In fact one value of the 
ECCC to the government might well have been as a source of patronage and graft. In any event, the frequent 
allegations of bribery and waste further sullied the ECCC’s reputation and could not have been helpful as it 
pursued its core mission.
Strategic Interests and International Influence in the Tribunal
If justice delayed is really justice denied then the Cambodian case is best viewed as justice largely denied. 
The Khmer Rouge regime, as has been mentioned previously, was deposed from power by the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia in January 1979. By the time Case 002 against the four elderly Khmer Rouge officials 
began in the summer of 2011, the Khmer Rouge had been out of power for more than 32 years. Of course the 
strategic calculations of the Cold War kept the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian seat at the United Nations 
until 1991 Because Vietnam was allied with the Soviet Union during the latter decades of the Cold War, China 
and the United States condemned the 1979 invasion and had no interest in pursuing judicial action against 
the perpetrators of the genocide in Cambodia.51 In fact, the official position of the United States was that the 
genocidal Khmer Rouge were the rightful rulers of Cambodia. The Vietnamese installed regime, while not 
democratic, ended the mass killings in Cambodia. The fact that the government that assumed power as a result 
of the Vietnamese invasion ended the genocide was not a major concern for those who believed that geo-
political considerations outweighed any human rights issues.52 Zbigniew Brezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s 
National Security Advisor, told journalist Elizabeth Becker that while the United States could not openly 
cooperate with someone as morally reprehensible as Pol Pot, the U.S. did encourage the Chinese and Thai 
governments to support the Khmer Rouge because it continued to resist the Vietnamese proxy government 
in Phnom Penh.53 The very notion of bringing the Khmer Rouge leaders to trial was only possible with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent reordering of global politics.
A number of political circumstances may lead to a rapid and seemingly comprehensive trial of defendants 
charged with genocide or other crimes against humanity. The most obvious case is that of the Nuremburg 
trials that followed World War II. Nazi Germany had been completely defeated militarily and was occupied 
by the four powers that conducted the first and, most famous of the tribunals. The vanquished Germans 
had absolutely no say in what would happen to leading Nazis in the immediate aftermath of the war. In 
1945-1946, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States had a common interest in 
further vindicating their positions in the war by prosecuting leading officials from various institutions of the 
Nazi regime 54 The International Military Tribunal (IMT) conducted the first trial of those labeled major war 
criminals. While not above criticism as victor’s justice, the IMT was able to function quite smoothly because 
there was a general consensus among the occupying powers on trying those regarded as major figures in the 
various organs of the Nazi government.
An interesting contrast to the IMT is provided by the trial and ultimate fate of the defendants in the 
Einsatzgruppen trial conducted by the United States in 1947-48. The Einsatzgruppen were the mobile killing 
squads that murdered at least one million Jews by mass shootings, primarily in the Soviet Union (as it was 
constituted in 1941.)55 Twenty-four officers of the Einsatzgruppen were charged with mass murder and 22 
of the defendants were found guilty of crimes against humanity. Fourteen of the convicted officers were 
sentenced to death by hanging and two others to life imprisonment. In the end, only four of the convicted 
leaders of the mass murder squads were executed (all in 1951), and as a result of commutations and pardons, 
all of the surviving convicted Einsatzgruppen leaders had been released from incarceration by 1958. Given the 
vast number of murders that these men had committed and the indisputable evidence of their personal guilt, 
all but four of them might be regarded as having in the end been treated with extreme lenience. The change in 
the treatment of Nazi officials convicted of even the most serious crimes is likely rooted in the imperatives of 
the Cold War. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had been established in 1949 and contained 
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about 75 percent of the German population. West German was an ally of the Western powers in their struggle 
against the Soviet Union and it was thought that too many executions and other harsh punishments of Nazi 
criminals would demoralize the German population that the United States wished to rally to its side as it 
confronted its former ally, the Soviet Union. International politics played a major role in determining the fate 
of the genocidal killers who commanded units of the Einsatzgruppen.56
For human rights advocates to obtain the broader prosecution of genocide perpetrators in Cambodia 
they desired, there would have had to be a concerted effort by major powers to overcome the corruption and 
the strong resistance of the Cambodian government. It is not always necessary to have a deeply vested interest 
on the part of a powerful country or group of countries to operate a genocide tribunal, as the case of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) demonstrates. In Rwanda, the exile Tutsi led Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) won the four year war against the Hutu government in 1994 and ended the three month 
long genocide perpetrated against Tutsis residing in Rwanda. After the war, the RPF had both the motive and 
the power to assist in a trial of Hutu perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.
Another aspect of the terrible events of 1994 in Rwanda has not been placed before the ICTR. Credible 
research indicates that the RPF may have killed tens of thousands of Hutu civilians in the course of its struggle 
for power in Rwanda.57 Still prosecutors, most notably Carla Del Ponte, failed in their efforts to gain cooperation 
from Rwandan President Paul Kagame (a Tutsi and former RPF military commander) and his RPF regime to 
pursue judicial actions against RPF officials who may have committed massacres of Hutus. Little international 
pressure was brought to bear on the recalcitrant Rwandan government. The United States and Britain were the two 
external powers with the greatest capacity to influence the Kagame government. While he argues that sympathy 
for the plight of the Rwandans and guilt about the West’s indifference during the 1994 genocide generated 
support for the RPF, Victor Peskin claims that strategic calculations were a major factor in determining British 
and American policy with respect to the ICTR. In Peskin’s words, “In light of their strategic goals in Rwanda, 
Washington and London had little interest in pressing the Kigali regime to cooperate with investigations of 
RPF atrocities. Nor did the United States have an interest in shining a spotlight on the wave of post-1994 RPF 
atrocities against Hutu genocidaires and innocent civilians who had fled to Congo.”58 Peskin argues that the RPF 
led Rwandan government was a major source of Anglo-American influence in the resource rich and strife ridden 
Congo.59 The slaughter of Tutsis at the behest of Hutu Power advocates was indubitably the major component 
of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. ICTR prosecuted many of those directly responsible for the genocide of the 
Tutsis, but the political interests of various governments dictated the parameters of the trial.
Because roughly half of its national budget is derived from grants provided by foreign governments and 
international agencies, Cambodia is obviously vulnerable to a considerable measure of international pressure. 
Should donors care to exert influence on a matter such as genocide trials?60 In the absence of any concerted 
and vigorous external pressure by major powers, the United Nations was unlikely to intervene in a forceful 
way. After the June 2011, resignation of Stephen Heder, a spokesperson for U.N Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon issued a statement affirming the work of the ECCC and asserting its impartiality.61 Ban also denied 
that the U.N. had any role in instructing tribunal judges to not pursue additional cases.62 On the issue of 
whether there should be additional cases brought against anyone other than the five original defendants, 
Anne Heindel, legal advisor to the DC-CAM blamed the U.N. for not pressing for an expanded series of trials. 
According to Heindel, “The Cambodian government has been forthright all along that there would be no new 
trials...it’s the failure of the United Nations to act that’s been surprising.”63 Had she considered the motives and 
interests of nations such as the United States, China and Japan in Southeast Asia, Heindel might have been less 
surprised by the lack of U.N. support of a more expansive tribunal.
In a survey of Cambodia in 2010 written for an academic journal, Professor Heder noted that while 
relations with the U.N. remained fraught in 2010, Cambodia improved its standing with two of the world’s 
major powers. The United States and Cambodia agreed on a plan to use Cambodian territory to train Asian 
troops for peacekeeping operations.64 Margo Picken claims that counterterrorism training for Cambodian 
troops has been an increased focus of the U.S. government in recent years. In early 2012, Political scientist 
Kheang Un offered a similar view with regard to American interests in Cambodia”…the U.S. has shifted its 
Cambodian engagement from demanding respect for human rights and democracy to focusing on anti-
terrorism, anti-drug trafficking, and countering China’s influence.”65 While the United States might, in 
principle, be in favor of bringing justice to more perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide, such a matter 
ranked very low on the list of foreign policy concerns confronting the United States in the first eleven years 
of the 21st century.66
76
©2014      Genocide Studies and Prevention 8, no. 2  http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.2.7
Beachler
China had a much more sustained and extensive relationship with the Cambodian regime than did the 
United States. Heder notes that between 2006 and 2010 China received approval for $6 billion of investment 
in Cambodia. Among the most important of these Chinese investments was the development of hydroelectric 
power projects designed to increase Cambodia’s capacity to export agricultural projects. There are, of course, 
benefits to both China and Cambodia in these deals.67 In 2007, journalist Francois Hauter argued that the 
Chinese government supported and protected Hun Sen’s corrupt regime in return for the right to develop 
Cambodian natural resources.68
China also had a strategic interest in maintaining a cordial relationship with the Hun Sen government. 
China is involved in disputes with several other Asian nations about sovereignty over areas of the South 
China Sea, which is thought to contain large reserves of oil and natural gas. China and several other Asian 
nations claim sovereignty over the uninhabited Spratly Islands and their possible oil and gas deposits. Half 
the world’s merchant shipping tonnage passes through the South China Sea. Perhaps hoping to check Chinese 
power in East Asia, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated that the resolution of territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea was in America’s national interest.69 China’s commitment to modernize and expand the 
Cambodian port at Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand should enhance China’s capacity to project naval 
power into disputed regions and to assert this power in the event of a conflict that threatened vital shipping 
lanes including the extremely important Strait of Malacca.70 Given its commercial and geo-political interests, 
there was no political imperative for the Chinese government to exhibit anything other than indifference to 
the ongoing battles over the scope of the ECCC trials. It is difficult to think of a country that has ever sacrificed 
what it perceived as vital national interests to promote something as insignificant to it as the ECCC trials 
were to China. (China’s long history of support for the Khmer Rouge probably also helped make it a less than 
enthusiastic advocate of a comprehensive judicial airing of the crimes of Democratic Kampuchea.)
Picken describes Japan, a major donor to the ECCC, as generally supportive of Hun Sen and the CPP.71 
As a nation competing with China for influence in the region, there is no real political or economic incentive 
for the Japanese government to pressure or antagonize the government of Cambodia by engaging in disputes 
about the number of trials that should be held for former Khmer Rouge officials.
With Cold War tensions long gone and Vietnam far more concerned about its much larger regional rival, 
China, the relationship between Cambodia and Vietnam has grown stronger as commercial ties deepened. 
In 2009, Vietnam reached an agreement with Cambodia, which would permit the Vietnamese to grow about 
a quarter million acres of rubber in Cambodia.72 By 2010, trade between Cambodia and Vietnam totaled 
$1.2 billion.73 Given the prospect of further commercial agreements between the two nations, there was little 
reason for the Vietnamese to pressure Hun Sen into proceeding with a trial in any direction that he did not 
wish to permit as he maneuvered through and around the long enduring ECCC negotiations and trials.
Vietnam’s main geo-political interest was defending its claims to portions of the South China Sea. There was 
little political or economic incentive for the Vietnamese government to disrupt its relationship with Cambodia by 
concerning itself with the trial of the elderly leaders and other functionaries of a regime it had driven from power 
more than three decades ago, especially when the Hun Sen government was seen as a close partner of Vietnam.
Beyond Guilt and Innocence:  The ECCC and Regime Change 
To some human rights organizations the trial of fact and law with regard to Khmer Rouge defendants was 
a secondary purpose of the Cambodia Tribunal. Duncan McCargo argues that retributive justice is one of only 
several goals that some external NGOs have for the ECCC.74 (Retributive justice in the Cambodian context is 
simply punishment for those guilty of atrocities and genocide during the reign of the Khmer Rouge). McCargo 
suggests that international organizations and advocacy groups had a number of objectives including the far 
reaching objective of incremental regime change.
One of these goals was to provide an example of a well-run trial in a nation where according to a study 
by the Nordic Institute for Asian Studies, many criminal trials lasted less than 20 minutes. It was hoped that 
the ECCC would have a contagion effect that would improve the Cambodian criminal justice system. Closely 
related to the goal of transforming the judicial processes of Cambodia was the aim of altering the culture of 
impunity that allowed powerful people to plunder, steal and literally get away with murder in Cambodia. 
Some analysts and advocates argued that the source of this lawlessness by the rich and powerful was rooted 
in the fact that the Khmer Rouge leaders had never been punished for their crimes. The hope was that the 
imposition of legal processes and punishment against key Khmer Rouge cadre would undermine the culture 
of impunity in Cambodia.75
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The ultimate objective of some human rights advocates was indeed gradual regime change. The obstacles 
to achieving this very ambitious objective were at once enormous and should have been obvious from the 
outset of the process of establishing a tribunal. The Hun Sen CPP government was, as evidenced by its conduct 
over more than a decade, interested in a far less expansive outcome. (In any nation the incumbent regime is 
not likely to be interested in regime change). The conditions that the Cambodian government was able to 
place on the various aspects of the ECCC meant that from the outset of the proceedings broad transformative 
goals were unlikely to be achieved. The lack of a sustained commitment to goals as far reaching as judicial 
process contagion or transforming the entire Cambodian political system by any nations possessing global or 
regional power, made achieving such ambitious aims a virtual impossibility from the outset. (Regime change 
is, of course, by no means guaranteed even when there is much greater international commitment than was 
evident in Cambodia.)
Politics, Justice, and Genocide Tribunals
The question of legal, political, and moral responsibility for genocide is always enmeshed in various 
political and strategic calculations. The case of Turkish government denial of the Armenian genocide is 
quite well known and a good example of the politics of genocide recognition. While there is, of course, no 
possibility of holding a trial, in the traditional sense, for perpetrators of a genocide that occurred in 1915, 
the government of Turkey has not been willing to admit that there was a genocide of the Armenians residing 
in Anatolia76. Some foreign governments have geopolitical motives that inhibit criticism of official Turkish 
unwillingness to acknowledge what is now a well-documented genocide.  For example, the United States has 
been allied with Turkey; a member of NATO since 1952, for several decades and the U.S. government has been 
unwilling to officially use the word genocide when referring to the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. The State 
of Israel has long refused to use the term genocide in reference to the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. Israel 
has, until quite recently, had quite close relations with Turkey.77 This relationship was especially important to 
Israel because Turkey has a 98 percent Muslim population. Neither Israel nor the United States was prepared 
to place strategic interests at risk for the goal of recognizing an historical truth.
 Genocide in the past or present may also be neglected out of indifference rather than strategic calculation. 
At most times, small countries like Cambodia do not figure all that prominently in the concerns of politicians 
and foreign policy elites in many countries. In the summer of 1991, the administration of President George 
H.W. Bush was little concerned about events in the Balkans as the region descended into communal violence. 
Secretary of State James Baker’s view of the United States’ role in attempting to resolve the deadly conflicts that 
erupted after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 was captured by his remark that, “we do not have a dog 
in this fight.”78 As for the president, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft reported that, “The President 
would say to me once a week: ‘Tell me again what this is all about.’”79 Even a president with a long resume in 
foreign policy and a noted preference for acting in the international rather than the domestic policy arena, was 
not easily engaged by the outbreak of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia.
In an opinion piece in The New York Times in 2010, Professor Ear gave his bitter assessment of the trial to 
that date. “Plagued by corruption, the tribunal was essentially hijacked to advance domestic and international 
political agendas. For domestic politicians...to reduce its scope by limiting the number of individuals it could 
indict (five) while currying international favor addressing, superficially at least, crimes against humanity…
Cambodians have learned their lesson: Don’t believe in international promises; they are not kept.”80 While 
it would be difficult to argue against Ear’s moving conclusion, his findings are not so surprising. Politicians 
on the national and international stage acted largely in their own self and national interests with regard to 
the ECCC. It would have been quite shocking if much political capital had been expended on overcoming 
Cambodian government resistance to a series of trials of leaders of a genocidal government that had been 
deposed three decades ago. The Cambodian genocide trials are hardly the first time that the imperatives of 
realpolitik triumphed over concerns for truth and justice in matters of genocide and other mass killings.81 The 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal is also unlikely to be the last time such hard political calculations trump the desires of 
victims for more comprehensive justice.
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Joel Brinkley, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, former New York Times reporter, and Stanford University 
professor, has written a book on Cambodia that is every bit as gloomy as its title and subtitle indicate. The 
small Asian country has been afflicted by war and genocide and their traumatic aftermaths. In recent decades 
Cambodia has been beset by frequent political strife that has turned violent at times. The nation is so riddled 
with corruption that Brinkley reports that $18 billion dollars in foreign aid has done little to alleviate the 
suffering of impoverished Cambodians who constitute a large majority of the population. Cambodia has one 
of the highest rates of domestic violence in the world and it is a major center of sex tourism for pedophiles. 
While Brinkley provides interesting reporting and analysis on all these matters, this review will focus on 
concerns most likely to interest readers of Genocide Studies and Prevention - his extensive coverage of issues 
related to the Cambodian genocide.
The chapter of Cambodia’s Curse that may be of greatest interest to readers of this journal is the 25-
page narrative that Brinkley provides on the Khmer Rouge Tribunal officially known as the Extraordinary 
Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The establishment of a tribunal was a long and convoluted 
process that involved a measure of international pressure and a considerable degree of resistance from the 
government of Prime Minister Hun Sen. The issues that complicated the process, which eventually resulted in 
the trial of some Khmer Rouge leaders, are explained well. Brinkley writes about the trial of Comrade Duch 
who was in charge of the notorious Tuol Sleng (S-21) detention center where perhaps 15,000 prisoners were 
murdered after undergoing horrific torture. As delineated in an article in this issue by this reviewer, the ECCC 
also indicted the four highest-ranking members of the Khmer Rouge regime. Brinkley does an excellent job 
of analyzing the political motives of the Hun Sen regime in delaying the trial and in limiting the number of 
defendants who could be tried. The reader comes away with the distinct impression that this is a court that 
most of the world simply did not care about, and of those who did care, most preferred that it not exist. In 
any event, Brinkley’s chapter on the Khmer Rouge Tribunal is indispensable reading for anyone wishing to 
understand the contentious politics of the genocide trials.
Brinkley informs the reader about a topic that has received little attention in the popular press when 
he discusses the lasting psychiatric impact of the Khmer Rouge years on large segments of the Cambodian 
population. Brinkley references academic research that claims that millions of survivors suffer from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). According to a study cited by psychiatrist Muny Sothara, a survey in 
Kampong Chan province indicated that 47 percent of the residents suffered from PTSD or other psychotic 
disorders. Muny Sothara and California psychologist Nigel Field both claim that parents often pass PTSD to 
their children.
Brinkley cites the work of professional researchers on topics such as PTSD, noting that quotes without 
reference refer to personal interviews he conducted. Still, when Brinkley cites someone discussing academic 
research on important matters, it would be helpful to have some reference to the relevant materials. 
Furthermore, while this is a work of journalism rather than an academic treatise, it would be useful to have 
a citation that would allow the reader to follow up on assertions made by various scholars. Indeed, the entire 
book would do with more bibliographic material. The bibliography at the back of the book consists of a list 
of 14 books and contains no works by noted scholars of the Khmer Rouge such as Ben Kiernan or Steve 
Heder. David Chandler’s important book on S-21 and his biography of Pol Pot are also not included in the 
bibliography. Readers coming to some of these topics for the first time would especially benefit from a more 
robust list of sources.
Other parts of the book that concern the rise, reign and fall of the Khmer Rouge will be familiar to those 
who have some knowledge of this horrific era in Cambodian history. The skepticism about claims of Khmer 
Rouge atrocities (during the years the Cambodian Communists were in power) held by many critics of U.S. 
military involvement in Indo-China is discussed as is the support offered by the U.S. government for the 
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Khmer Rouge regime after it had been driven from power by Vietnam in 1979. For American policy makers, 
Cold War strategic calculations clearly trumped any concern for human rights. These issues will be interesting 
to the general reader while those versed in the politics of this era will find little that is new.
Brinkley recounts the role of Norodom Sihanouk and his successor, the American ally, Lon Nol, in 
helping to create conditions that facilitated the ultimate triumph of the Khmer Rouge. Brinkley departs from 
those who are inclined to absolve Sihanouk from responsibility for the horrors that befell Cambodia from 
1975 to 1979. He rejects the views of William Shawcross on the impact of American bombing of Cambodia, 
expressed in the well-known book, Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Destruction of Cambodia. While not 
absolving Lon Nol and the U.S. of all blame for the rise of the Khmer Rouge, Brinkley holds Sihanouk more 
responsible by arguing that, when the deposed prince allied with the Cambodian Communists and advocated 
that his former subjects support them, the he set Cambodia on the road to genocide.
It is when he deals with controversial issues, such as the impact of American bombing, that Brinkley‘s 
lack of sourcing detracts from the power of his book. He claims that “more recent scholarship has suggested 
that the American bombing for all its wanton, deadly results, so disrupted the nation that it delayed the 
Khmer Rouge’s ultimate victory until after the B-52 campaign had ended in August, 1973.” (p. 32). Brinkley 
is essentially claiming that scholarship indicates that it was the halt in the U.S. bombing, a goal of American 
leftists and liberals (a group to which Brinkley claims to be a quondam member) that permitted the final 
victory of Pol Pot and his murderous comrades. Yet, the curious reader in search of this scholarship will receive 
no help at all from Brinkley - for there are no references to support his claims about revisionist scholarship 
on the impact of American bombing. Surely, when dealing with such a controversial matter, mere assertion 
does not suffice as proof.
Despite this reviewer’s reservations about the lack of adequate sourcing of some claims offered by 
Brinkley, this book is a valuable read for those interested in modern Cambodia. The insightful presentation 
of the political and social context of present legal and political efforts to deal with the ongoing impact of the 
killings of the 1970s make this book a valuable resource for those concerned about the fates of the perpetrators 
and victims of the Cambodian genocide.
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20th Century Illuminations
For Cambodian Americans, the challenges of identity, as individuals and community, whose recent past 
embodies the societal fragmentation and the trauma of war, genocide and relocation is the raw material for “memory 
work” in Cathy J. Schlund-Vial’s publication War, Genocide and Justice: Cambodian American Memory Work.
This volume brings to the forefront the deep reckoning with history and memory manifest through 
the intimacies and perplexing challenges faced by the “1.5 generation” of Cambodian Americans through 
contemporary cultural expressions in film, literature, rap music and dramatic performance.1 The thrust of 
Schlund-Vials’ theoretical framework is revealed through her analytical treatise of these forms of cultural 
expression, which she evaluates in couched terms as an “attempt to remember a history of U.S. imperialism, 
Khmer Rouge authoritarianism, and involuntary refugee dispersal.” The clarity and depth of critical analysis 
that Schlund-Vials attends to with each example is impassioned, thorough, multi layered and illuminating 
for the otherwise uninitiated reader to the complexities and trials of survivors and their descendants in the 
Diaspora of the “Khmer Rouge Reign of Terror.”
The introduction sets the stage for the content of the work as an “interdisciplinary investigation into 
how Cambodian American cultural producers analogously (yet divergently) labor to rearticulate and re-
imagine the Killing Fields era vis-à-vis three distinct and unfixed modes of negation: dominant-held erasures, 
refugee-oriented ruptures, and juridical open-endedness.” Schlund-Vials lays out, in no uncertain terms, 
the “problematic terrain” of justice in contemporary, post genocide Cambodia (and American geopolitics) 
through a provocative recapitulation of the political dynamics of the current Cambodian administration as 
well as the various US government administrations’ “politicized memory of a preventative humanitarianism” 
that “revises the script of the Vietnam War era to fit a humanitarian, not militaristic, end.”
The revelations in the first chapter, entitled “Atrocity Tourism” enlightens the reader to the “juridical 
mode of collected memory fixed to Vietnamese-oriented statecraft” in the critical analysis of the Tuol Sleng 
Prison and Choeung Ek Killing Fields which, in Schlund-Vials’ compassionate observation, “fail to provide 
Cambodians with viable spaces for commemoration.” And more egregiously have become a “place where 
they use the bones of the dead to make business.” So begins Schulund-Vials’ quest for “contemplative 
commemoration: (through) Cambodian American memory work.”
The next chapter sets out on a crossing of sophisticated and politically revelatory chronicling of two 
American-produced cinematic portrayals: The Academy Award winning film The Killing Fields (Roland 
Joffe, director) and New Year Baby (Socheata Poeuv, author). Joffe’s film, and the back-story of the friendship 
between American journalist Sydney Schanberg and Dith Pran, former U.S. Army translator turned foreign 
press assistant is, on its surface, ”a story of two friends separated by (the realpolitik of) forces beyond their 
control”. But under Schlund-Vials’ tenacious scrutiny the “reframing” of failed U.S. policy in South East Asia, 
through this film, is transformed into an “exceptionalist narrative of reunion, salvation and redemption 
[through a] master narrative of cold war victimhood” that reconciles American military aggression through 
the trauma and redemption of the friendship, “forged in the interstices of war….literally screened, strategically 
staged and tactically projected by way of guilt, apology and reconciliation.” Poeuv’s autobiographical film, 
based in the” Cambodian American present” is portrayed sympathetically as a “documentary-reliant on 
survivor memory instantiated by intergenerational inquiry (which) militates against familial silences and 
strives to connect survivors and their children by way of historical reclamation, collected family stories, 
and collective remembrance.” Schlund-Vials’ understandably impassioned assessment of New Year Baby 
is nonetheless accurate and deeply instructive. In fact, the contextual structure for evaluation of New Year 
Baby, a restructuring of an “unfinished memory work that grapples with intergenerational, familial silences 
and… partial knowledge of this past” serves as the template for exploration in the following chapters, that 
is, to “rationalize contemporary family frames” (through Cambodian American Memory Work) of the “1.5 
generation” of Cambodian Americans.
War, Genocide and Justice: Cambodian American Memory Work, 
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Chapter 3 investigates “Cambodian American Life Writing” through the publications and reception 
politics of Loung Ung’s memoir: First They Killed My Father: A Daughter of Cambodia Remembers and 
Chanrithy Him’s memoir: When Broken Glass Floats:  Growing Up under the Khmer Rouge. This moving 
chapter expresses the “anti-forgetting…labor of (Cambodian American) memory to expose catastrophic U.S. 
policy, lay bare international indifference, and underscore contemporary juridical inaction.” A clear rebuilding 
of identity of the Diaspora Cambodian American survivor evolves through this chapter, which masticates the 
constructs and narratives of each work.  The directive of Schlund-Vials in-depth considerations of Cambodian 
Life Writing, in this chapter is aimed at remembering the “politics of representing mass-scale loss… and the 
necessarily politicized act (of the memoir) that break(s) potent silences...in a largely un-reconciled milieu of 
competing national agendas (in the U.S and Cambodia).”
 Chapter 4 crafts the fascinating trajectory of Cambodian American Hip Hop artist Prach Ly aka praCh’s 
up-bringing in “Cambodia Town” Long Beach California and the transnational strength of his lyrics and 
musical compositions. Schlund-Vials expression and analysis of praCh’s career and work “emblematically 
remembers a fractured genocidal history, a forgotten post conflict imaginary, and a ruptured Cambodian-
American selfhood” and is decidedly upbeat. “Locating Who We Are and Where We Came From” develops 
thematically through clear and inspiring explorations of several albums; the lyrics and remix of traditional 
Cambodian musical instruments through original, contemporary compositions. Schlund-Vials predicates on 
praCh’s work which traces the “rapper’s evolving Cambodian American consciousness…and restive potential 
of Cambodian American selfhood.”
The epilogue chapter narrates the creative work of poet / performer/ visual artist Anida Yoeu Ali’s epic 
composition “Visiting Loss” which, in Gordon Fraser’s  words: “employs a stream-of-consciousness narration 
evident in en-jambed lines, imagistic stanzas, and affective vignettes” and engages the central aims of Cambodian 
American memory work that “brings into dialogue genocide remembrance, collected memory and juridical 
activism.” Consecutively the installation “Palimpsest for Generation 1.5” activates the performance of Ali’s 
back as canvass upon which “intergenerational grievances are inscribed and summarily erased.” Through 
dress, gesture, and erased inscription, the performance artistry of Ali is an act of “re-memory” reminiscent 
of ” nineteenth-century American slave narrative” that re-assembles a “communal memory without the 
luxury of justice at the level of the nation-state.” This potent closure to War, Genocide and Justice: Cambodian 
American Memory Work succinctly expresses the impactful narrative of this revelatory volume of the legacy 
of the Khmer Rouge era on today’s Cambodian Americans. Their contributions to contemporary society, on 
an international scale, and woven from the raw material of “memory work” have undoubtedly added vital 
contributions to the color, texture and weave of the fabric of remembrance in the face of annihilation.
End Notes
1. The term 1.5 generation refers to people who immigrate to a new country before or during their early teens.
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Genocide and the Geographical Imagination: Life and Death in Germany, China and Cambodia is James 
Tyner’s most recent scholarly contribution to a relatively undeveloped niche of comparative genocide 
studies. Previously only a smattering of journal articles1, the odd book2, and a special issue of the journal 
Space and Polity3 have attempted to merge the concept of genocide with the discipline of geography. Tyner 
has recognized this conceptual vacuum, seeing it as an opportunity to probe genocides and unravel the 
“spatial stories” they represent. His first book length attempt looked at a single case of genocide from a 
geographic perspective in The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide and the Unmaking of Space.4 Here 
he first develops the notion of the “geographic imagination.”
His stated thesis in Genocide and the Geographical Imagination is that, “mass violence results from the 
imposition of state sanctioned normative geographical imaginations that justify and legitimate unequal access to 
life and death.”5 In other words, genocide and other exterminatory policies are conducted through a spatially 
oriented framework, or geographic imagination. Tyner argues that through the various mechanisms of the 
sovereign state, who is allowed to live and who must die are both determined via a process of valuation.
This process is informed, Tyner emphasises, by geographic considerations.  As such, his purpose here is 
to discern what genocide might say about sovereignty and the spatiality of life and death. He defines spatiality 
as “the purposefully organized space of social interactions.” By introducing the notion of sovereignty to 
this mix Tyner hopes to draw our attention to how the geographic imaginations of the sovereign state are 
manifested in the day-to-day lives of the subject populations. In addition, staying true to his thesis, he 
wants to show how particular valuations of human lives are informed by these geographic imaginations. 
He describes how the various spatial practices of sovereignty impact a population’s continued physical 
existence, be it by allowing it to live, by outright killing, or by ‘letting it die.’ With these ends in mind, Tyner 
looks at three cases of genocide: Germany, China and Cambodia. He wants to focus upon “the practices 
[…] by which governments rule and regulate, discipline and control, the populations within their territorial 
domains.”6 Stated differently, Tyner wishes to chart the habits and patterns of a sovereign’s valuations that 
determine life or death.
In the second chapter, Tyner reckons that, “The Holocaust was composed of state sanctioned violent 
practices that stemmed from a basic geographic imagination: to construct a pure living space for one 
population through the elimination of another population.”7 Racial and geopolitical theories on eugenics 
and lebensraum undergirded a system of valuation which, through the mindset of a particular geographic 
imagination, determined who might live and who must die. This leads, Tyner argues, to a, “geopolitically 
informed eugenics policy [that] demanded the identification of ‘inferior’ and ‘degenerate’ bodies, those 
whose lives threatened the security of race and state.”8
Tyner uses the early years of the Nazi regime to argue that laws such as the Marital Law and the Sterilization 
Law were initial attempts to determine who was to be included and excluded from the German volk. Gradually 
the emphasis on sterilization was refocused onto euthanasia, first of defective infants and children, then to adults 
not considered worthy of living. Tyner affirms that, “This valuation of life, however, was not directed at any given 
individual, but rather at populations ― entire groupings of people: the mentally ill, the physically deformed, 
homosexuals, criminals, the Sinti and Roma, the Jews.” Tyner traces the evolution of Nazi valuations of life and 
death from sterilization to euthanasia and beyond, whereupon, death camps emerge as “the endpoint of a series 
of policies, programs, and practices that all revolved around the Nazis’ will to lebensraum.”9
Tyner next moves on to the famine in China (1958  1961). He acknowledges that the Famine is both 
legally and academically a contested example of ‘genocide.’ He counters that “identifiable policies and practices 
initiated by the state” created the famine, and resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of through starvation. 
They were not directly slaughtered, as in the Nazi case, but ‘allowed’ to die. The core of his argument is that 
the policy of “letting die” is the moral equivalent of direct killing. In China, while the state did not directly 
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cause the deaths of those who died of starvation, it was still morally culpable because it knowingly allowed 
people to die.
Mao attempted to build a communal utopia framed by a particular geographic imagination. To 
implement these plans, Mao introduced a series of structural conditions that substantially contributed 
to the famine, including the communes and collectivization, the wasteful backyard smelting and ruinous 
engineering programs. It is through this particular geographic imagination, and the policies through which 
it was enacted, that day-to-day decisions of life or death were made. In addition, Tyner contends that there 
was a ‘culture of impunity’ in Chinese social relations. This resulted in the collective blame for the pain and 
suffering of the peasantry being attributed, not to the state, but back upon the peasantry. The deaths from 
starvation, say apologists for the state, were the result of “irrational peasant behavior” specifically resulting 
from hiding food, overeating or lying to authorities on production output. Tyner shows how through this 
particular geographic imagination millions died due to starvation, or were allowed to “let die,” a theme he 
continues into the final chapter.
The final case that Tyner focuses upon is Cambodia and this chapter draws substantively on his previous 
writings and experiences. He reiterates much of his argument from The Killing of Cambodia and focuses 
upon the “erasure” of Cambodia and the “writing” of Democratic Kampuchea. In brief, Tyner argues that 
the Khmer Rouge aimed to erase all vestiges of society from before Angkar [Angkar refers to the communist 
state while “Angkor” is the historical kingdom.] and in its place impose, through their own geographic 
imagination, a new revolutionary space. Next, Tyner identifies the promotion of social conformity through 
practices of violence that are based upon a system of moral inclusion and exclusion. Those who expressed 
difference were eliminated outright, just as in the Nazi case. Alternately, as he discussed in reference to the 
famine in China, those populations were “allowed to die.”
At times it seems as though we can sense Tyner’s enthusiasm from having discovered uninhabited 
conceptual territory. Tyner’s heavy use of post-modern/post-structuralist theorists may be reflected in 
this enthusiasm, as in the course of the book he presents an avalanche of intermingling concepts that 
occasionally emerge as confusing, overlapping or occasionally lacking a clear empirical referent. While 
poststructuralist language definitely serves to shed light upon previously unrecognized vistas, Tyner brings 
forth too many imported ideas at once. Conversely, his chapter conclusions are very concise and the use of 
post-structuralist concepts mostly absent. These concluding paragraphs would have been an ideal location 
to tie together and make sense of the numerous ideas Tyner discusses in relation to the evidence provided. 
In addition, conspicuously absent from the chapter conclusions are attempts to tie both theory and the 
history back to the notion of the geographic imagination. Moreover, there is little effort to systematically 
compare the various geographic imaginations. While rigorous comparison was not his explicit purpose, it 
would have served to show the value of the geographic imagination as an analytical tool that could be used 
to interpret and understand other instances of genocide.
These are, however, small flaws and Tyner ought to be applauded for his enthusiasm and his courage. 
Very few scholars have given consideration to genocide’s conceptual terra nullius and Tyner has approached 
this uncharted territory with alacrity and a keen sense of direction.
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